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“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience,”1 wrote 
Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1881, laying the foundation for what would become 
the legal realist movement, and subsequently much of the way we think about, 
practice, adjudicate, and study the law today. Yet what if the life of the law has 
been both logic and experience? What if the law has its own structure, 
taxonomy, and unwaivable principles, which in turn operate to make the world 
a better place, even in extra-legal terms (economic, social, or otherwise)? This 
debate, regarding the proper balance between internal and external perspectives 
on the law, continues to unfold today. In my dissertation—consisting of this 
Introduction and my first,2 second,3 and third4 scholarly articles—I have set 
out to bridge the internal and external viewpoints on an area of jurisprudence 
that, so far, has largely remained on the realist side of the spectrum: corporate 
law. 
This Introduction describes the path I took while writing my 
dissertation, explaining the motivation for each article, how it relates to the 
others, and what lessons I hope can be derived from the dissertation as a whole. 
 
A.      Why Do Legal Categories Have Value? 
The idea of share law, which lies at the center of my first article,5 
occurred to me some years before I came to the University of Pennsylvania. As 
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an aspiring academic, and an avid reader of legal cases and scholarship, I often 
thought about questions such as: who should be the parties to this lawsuit? 
Who holds what kind of cause of action? More broadly, where do we find the 
legal norm that tells us what rights and duties people have in a given situation—
and which people have them? In most cases, that inquiry is not overly difficult; 
although it is sometimes hard to distill the norm itself, we generally know 
where to look for it. Contract law governs the rights and duties of contract 
parties (and, because this legal framework exists, contracts have economic 
value). Constitutional law constrains the legislature, and other state branches, 
vis-à-vis the people. We would normally not think to conflate the two, just as 
we would not confuse contract with, say, property or tort law, or these two 
among themselves. Indeed, even the most ardent legal realists6 saw the 
significance in Professor Wesley Hohfeld’s classic taxonomy of rights and 
duties.7 
Yet, in regard to one kind of situation—that of shareholders—I found 
it much harder to discern both the substance and the parties. As I soon realized, 
that difficulty was shared by the broader legal community. Despite the fact that 
the value of publicly-traded shares worldwide is in the tens of trillions of U.S. 
dollars,8 shareholders fit like a square peg into the round hole of conventional 
legal categories: as my first article demonstrates, shareholders are not contract 
parties, given the near-total lack of ex ante information about any promise 
owed to them;9 they are not covered by property law, for it is not clear what 
“owning” a corporation practically means, nor do shareholders own the 
corporation’s buildings, trademarks, or bank accounts (the corporation does);10 
they cannot be regarded as trust beneficiaries;11 and, despite seemingly 
pervasive judicial language in some U.S. jurisdictions, shareholders (outside of 
“a limited set of circumstances”12) are not direct beneficiaries of the corporation’s 
                                                                                                                                   
6 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 828 (1935) (favorably referring to Hohfeld’s ideas). 
7 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
8 See Stocks Traded, Total Value (Current US$), WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRAD.CD [https://perma.cc/QVF6-U8HN] 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2021) (indicating that the total value of shares publicly traded worldwide, 
in 2019, was US$60.359 trillion). 
9 See Raz, supra note 2, at 282-85. 
10 See id. at 285-87. 
11 See id. at 287-90. 
12 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989). 
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fiduciaries (such as directors and officers).13 As a result, shareholders cannot 
even be described as creatures of corporate law generally; their rights derive 
from a certain segment of corporate law, different than that which regulates the 
relationship between the corporation and its fiduciaries. 
What legal norms govern shares, then? In other words, why do shares 
have value? It was with this question that I set out to write my first article. The 
solution I fashioned was straightforward: shares reside in their own legal 
category. Within corporate law, we can identify a set of rules and principles 
that apply where a person is a residual claimant—having an entitlement defined 
only as “what is left after the corporation meets all of its other obligations.”14 I 
call that set of rules and principles “share law.” Because shareholders, as residual 
claimants, encounter a unique array of problems (mainly resulting from the 
open-ended, practically unlimited range of situations they might find 
themselves in),15 the law responds with a set of devices—among them the 
appraisal remedy, the law of share dilution, dividends and buybacks, 
shareholder voting, books and records inspection, and shareholder 
litigation16—tailored to ensure shareholders have a fair opportunity to receive 
the fruits of their bargain (even if the economic substance of those fruits 
changes on a constant basis). 
Just as the rest of corporate law does not float in mid-air, but borrows 
from other legal traditions (although it often re-assembles them in a unique 
manner), share law primarily rests on concepts of equity. It is the sensitivity of 
shareholders’ legal position, which can easily (and sometimes invisibly) be 
frustrated by their main counterparty (the corporation) or by others (such as 
directors, officers, and fellow shareholders), that justifies reliance on the anti-
                                                                                                                                   
13 See Raz, supra note 2, at 290-301. 
14 This is the defining property of residual claims. If a person has some claim that arises 
under any other legal mechanism, it is not residual by nature. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Poor 
Pitiful or Potently Powerful Preferred?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2025, 2040 (2013) (“To the extent 
the preferred get a contract right, they are preferred. To the extent they do not, they are 
subject to the same risks as other stockholders and entitled to no extra value or rights.”). The 
definition of residual claims, as subordinated to all of the corporation’s other legal 
obligations, also has strong bearing on broader debates in corporate law, and helps chart a 
more accurate way between the two prevailing conceptions (shareholderism and 
stakeholderism). See infra pp. 10-13. 
15 See, e.g., id. at 263-69 (discussing a case where some of the corporation’s shareholders 
could not be located, so the court was asked to decide whether to distribute their dividend—
about US$5,700 per claimant—among the other shareholders); Raz, supra note 4, at 54 
n.309 (describing other highly unusual situations involving shareholders, litigated in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery). 
16 See Raz, supra note 2, at 311-19. 
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opportunistic power of equity.17 Although the terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably by U.S. corporate lawyers, equity is not the same as fiduciary 
law; the latter is but one branch of equity.18 About a year after my first article 
was published, I was happy to see this distinction further developed, in 
extensive detail, by Professor Paul Miller.19 The oppression remedy, discussed 
in Miller’s article, and grounded in equitable (rather than fiduciary) principles, 
sits at the heart of share law in Commonwealth and other jurisdictions. 
In several places throughout my first article, I discuss the prominent 
role played by the concept of corporate purpose.20 It is there that the foundations 
have been laid for my next article. 
 
B.      Taking the Corporation Seriously 
My second article21 came as a result of several insights I gained during 
2018-2020, while participating in the dynamic environment of corporate and 
business law, which I was fortunate to experience at Penn Law. In discussions 
with professors, practitioners, judges, and others—and while reading scholarly 
articles and other resources—I noticed a curious pattern, which I call the 
“blanket pulling problem”:22 it is often the case that members of the legal 
community recognize most of corporate law’s underlying principles, and yet do 
not fully observe at least one crucial component. 
                                                                                                                                   
17 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J. 1050 (2021) (discussing 
equity’s role in dealing with the problem of opportunism). Note that equity is not only about 
anti-opportunism: for example, the practice of “equitable interpretation” is a response 
available to judges to deal with a situation where “lay legislatures, out of ignorance, 
inattention, or democratic zeal, enact statutes that threaten the working structure of specific 
areas of law or contravene deep-rooted rule of law principles.” Farah Peterson, Interpretation 
as Statecraft: Chancellor Kent and the Collaborative Era of American Statutory Interpretation, 
77 MD. L. REV. 712, 712 & passim (2018). 
18 See, e.g., Henry E Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 261, 261 (Andrew S Gold & Paul B Miller eds., 2014) 
(“Fiduciary law is an outgrowth of equity—perhaps the most important and characteristic 
branch of the tree of equity . . . .”). 
19 Paul B. Miller, Equity, Majoritarian Governance, and the Oppression Remedy, in FIDUCIARY 
OBLIGATIONS IN BUSINESS (Arthur B. Laby & Jacob Hale Russell eds., forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3483563 [https://perma.cc/T3MD-LBNV]. 
20 See Raz, supra note 2, at 291 n.142, 293, 294 n.152, 318-19, 321. 
21 Raz, supra note 3. 
22 See id. at 526, 533 & n.49. 
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For example, in a 2019 article,23 Professor Jonathan Macey and Chief 
Justice Leo Strine correctly emphasize the importance of corporate 
personhood;24 at the same time, they argue that “shareholders are . . . merely 
owners of investment contracts that give them certain contractual claims on the 
cash flows generated by the corporation,”25 despite the fact that residual claims 
are inherently uncertain, and the concomitant role of equity.26 Similarly, in a 
2020 article,27 Professor Ann Lipton elaborates on the corporation’s 
fundamental duty to obey the law, but minimizes corporate personhood—for 
instance, by saying that “[c]ompanies do not act; individuals within them do.”28 
The authors’ valuable arguments would not be diminished—and might actually 
be reinforced—if they acknowledged the missing building block; but it is 
missing nonetheless. 
The blanket pulling problem even extends to the most significant 
faultline in modern corporate law: the debate between the “shareholderist” and 
“stakeholderist” conceptions, which are seen as dichotomous, and often 
perceived as the only two options.29 While shareholderists argue that the 
corporation’s purpose is, and should be, the pursuit of profit, they mostly sweep 
aside the corporation’s entity status (and sometimes, ironically,30 the 
unwaivable norms of equity and fiduciary duty). Stakeholderists, on the other 
hand, correctly point out that the corporation is a legal person, separate from 
its shareholders—and at the same time, do not admit it should be permissible 
for that entity to pursue profit, even if it does so in full accordance with law; 
instead, an extra layer of non-clearly-defined obligation to promote “corporate 
                                                                                                                                   
23 Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, 
2019 WIS. L. REV. 451. 
24 See id. at 458-77. 
25 Id. at 483. 
26 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 19; Raz, supra note 2. 
27 Ann M. Lipton, Beyond Internal and External: A Taxonomy of Mechanisms for Regulating 
Corporate Conduct, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 657. 
28 Id. at 661. 
29 See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 passim (contrasting the “property conception” (shareholderism) 
with the “entity conception” (stakeholderism)); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: 
The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established 
by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 773 (2015) 
(stating that in his article, “Chancellor Allen dilated on the two major traditions in American 
corporate law”). 
30 See Raz, supra note 4, at 59-62. 
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social responsibility” should attach to corporations. Two months after I 
presented my second article at the National Business Law Scholars Conference 
at UC Berkeley School of Law, the shareholderist-stakeholderist debate again 
took center stage (in terms of both public and scholarly attention), with the 
Business Roundtable’s statement on corporate purpose.31 It has remained there 
since. 
When the blanket is pulled this way, someone will always be left in 
the cold: the corporate entity, stakeholders, or shareholders. I realized that it 
was possible, and now vital, to formulate a theory of corporate law that covers 
all bases. Such theory should both have good predictive power (in terms of 
adhering, better than existing theories, to real-life observations on the 
operation of corporate law), and respond to the normative concerns of 
shareholderists and stakeholderists alike. This is the purpose-based theory of 
corporate law. 
As my second article explains, the core property of the corporation is 
that it is a person with a purpose. The concept of corporate personhood is not 
always easy to fathom, as exemplified by the public response to the Citizens 
United32 and Hobby Lobby33 decisions (ironically so, since the Supreme Court 
in these cases largely ignored corporate personhood),34 and by many scholars’ 
preference for saying that the corporation is a “nexus of contracts,”35 or just an 
aggregate of something else (people, assets, or rights). Yet, as I detail in the 
article,36 every corporation is one, single entity, having its own Hohfeldian 
relationships with other people. This is true both descriptively and normatively: 
corporate personhood is a defining, practically important, and highly beneficial 
phenomenon in corporate law.37 
                                                                                                                                   
31 See Raz, supra note 3, at 528 n.15. 
32 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
33 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
34 See, e.g., ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS 364 (2018) (“Corporate personhood 
. . . is entirely missing from the [Citizens United] opinion. . . . [T]he Citizens United decision 
obscured the corporate entity and emphasized the rights of others, like shareholders and 
listeners.”); Raz, supra note 3, at 571. 
35 See, e.g., Raz, supra note 4, at 4 n.15 and accompanying text. 
36 See Raz, supra note 3, at 539-48. 
37 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003); Lynn A. Stout, The 
Corporation As a Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the 
Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685 (2015). As I note in my second article, see Raz, 
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Although corporate personhood has (and should have) a wider range 
of ramifications than many currently admit, we must not forget that 
corporations—like law itself—ultimately exist to make the world a better place 
for humans.38 The legal concept of corporate purpose39 serves as the glue that 
binds the corporation with other members of society. The corporation’s 
purpose shapes its legal interactions in three principal ways: first, the purpose 
must always be lawful (for example, the lawful pursuit of profit); the 
corporation is obliged to meet all of its obligations to stakeholders (or non-
residual claimants), arising under any area of law, without exception.40 Second, 
the remaining part of the corporation’s purpose—such as “the pursuit of profit” 
(or any other, as in the case of nonprofit corporations)—generates the value of 
residual claimants’ rights,41 albeit only indirectly.42 Third, the corporation’s 
fiduciaries (among them directors, officers, controlling shareholders, and in 
some cases activist shareholders43) are obliged, by their duty of loyalty, to cause 
the corporation to achieve its purpose.44 As four leading Delaware jurists have 
written, “the director’s job demands affirmative action—to protect and to 
better the position of the corporation.”45 
As I argue, corporate law therefore has a total of five structural, 
unwaivable building blocks: two properties inherent to the corporation itself 
(its purpose and personhood), and three relationships in which it engages, with 
certain legal norms attaching to each (the duty of obedience in regard to 
stakeholders; the equitable rights of residual claimants; and the fiduciary duties 
owed by fiduciaries). These building blocks are “not subject to private ordering; 
                                                                                                                                   
supra note 3, at 543-44, a classic work in law and economics, R. H. Coase, The Nature of the 
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), also underscores the role of corporate personhood. 
38 See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 
1663 (“[W]e owe no allegiance to corporations . . . without reference to the idea that people 
are involved.”). 
39 See Raz, supra note 3, at 533-39. 
40 See id. at 548-57. 
41 See id. at 562 (discussing the link between share law and the law of corporate purpose). 
42 See id. at 538-39, 561. 
43 See, e.g., id. at 567-70. 
44 See id. at 563-66. 
45 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey M. Gorris, 
Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 
98 GEO. L.J. 629, 636 (2010). 
10 Asaf Raz [Dissertation 
 
[they are] the foundation upon which contracting occurs.”46 
Hyper-contractarians might balk at even these five requirements, but 
this is a fairly minimalist account of corporate law’s mandatory structure. For 
instance, when no separate entity is present, by definition there cannot be 
limited liability, or asset partitioning, which we take for granted as associated 
with a “corporation.”47 Nor is it clear why should the law permit a waiver of 
fiduciary duties (at least the “core”48 thereof), as no manager can possibly expect 
to be legally entitled to harm the corporation, or expropriate its assets (just as 
lawyers cannot possibly expect to have a legal right to act against their own 
client, even if the client signed a “contract” supposedly allowing that).49 
While the second and third relationships (corporation-shareholder 
and corporation-fiduciary) are subject to fairly extensive scholarly attention, 
here I would like to expand on the first one: the corporation’s relationship with 
its stakeholders, centered on the corporation’s omnipresent duty of legal 
obedience. Improving our understanding in this area is critical for charting a 
better course for corporate law, moving away from the two prevailing, but 
inaccurate, conceptions (shareholderism and stakeholderism), as I started to 
suggest in my second article. In the next several paragraphs, I offer a direction 
for further study, based on insights from my dissertation. 
The corporation’s duty to obey the law—and the legal system’s 
response when that duty is breached—has several distinct foundations. First, 
                                                                                                                                   
46 Raz, supra note 3, at 530. 
47 See, e.g., REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 5-8 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing “[l]egal 
personality” as a “core structural characteristic[]” of the corporation); Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) 
(“[O]rganizational law . . . provide[s] for the creation of . . . ‘asset partitioning’ that could 
not practicably be established [without organizational law].”). 
48 Amir N. Licht, Motivation, Information, Negotiation: Why Fiduciary Accountability Cannot 
Be Negotiable, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 159, 179 (D. Gordon Smith 
& Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018) (“Fiduciary law . . . preserves an irreducible core of 
accountability to ensure fiduciary loyalty.”). 
49 This is related to another argument I make in my second article: that the limited liability 
company (LLC) is functionally identical to a corporation (in the narrow sense of the word, 
used in the U.S. for historical reasons), as both have these exact same building blocks—and 
therefore, laws “permitting” the waiver of fiduciary duties owed to LLCs are misguided and 
inequitable. See Raz, supra note 3, at 573-81. While it is clear that U.S. law has a long way 
to go toward fully recognizing this, I was glad to see that a recent casebook by Professors 
Lynn LoPucki and Andrew Verstein also emphasizes the strong congruity between these 
entity forms. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ANDREW VERSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: A 
SYSTEMS APPROACH (2020). 
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the corporation is a person, and thus subject to the full plethora of laws that 
bind people in society (both private and public law, from contract, through tort 
and environmental, to criminal law).50 Decades of shareholderist writing on the 
corporation as a “nexus of contracts,” or otherwise minimizing its entity status, 
may have caused some confusion (and contributed to stakeholderists’ counter-
response) in this regard. 
Second, within corporate law itself, we find a set of mechanisms 
designed to ensure the corporation’s legal compliance. Some duties are imposed 
on the corporate entity; others, on its fiduciaries. These devices begin with the 
foundational statement that a corporation may only engage in “lawful” acts or 
activities.51 They continue with at least five different doctrines, all tied to the 
principle I identify here—and some currently undergoing a revival, in both 
practice and scholarship. These include the fact that a fiduciary’s duty of loyalty 
contains a duty of good faith,52 which in turn requires that the fiduciary not act 
“with the intent to violate applicable positive law”;53 the Caremark doctrine;54 
the change in corporate purpose, from entrepreneurial to custodial, when a 
corporation nears insolvency;55 the rules conditioning the permissibility of 
                                                                                                                                   
50 For example, in the multidistrict civil litigation arising from the opioid epidemic, the vast 
majority of defendants are corporate entities. See, e.g., County of Summit v. Purdue Pharma 
L.P. (In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig.), No. 1:17-md-2804, 
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213657, at *1-55 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2018). Moreover, “the 
plaintiffs seek remedies arising in such [non-corporate law] areas as tort law and unjust 
enrichment.” Raz, supra note 3, at 554. On the corporation as subject to criminal law, see, 
for example, Mihailis Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory of Corporate 
Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507 (2018). 
51 E.g. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a) (2020). Case law has also emphasized this point. 
See, e.g., In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., No. 5430-VCS, 
2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at *73 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (“Delaware law allows 
corporations to pursue diverse means to make a profit, subject to a critical statutory floor, 
which is the requirement that Delaware corporations only pursue ‘lawful business’ by ‘lawful 
acts.’”). 
52 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006). 
53 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
54 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). For detailed 
discussion of Caremark’s recent reinvigoration, see Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight 
and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013 (2019); Roy Shapira, A New Caremark Era: Causes 
and Consequences, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3732838 [https://perma.cc/RW2M-MPUL]. 
55 See, e.g., Amir N. Licht, My Creditor’s Keeper: Escalation of Commitment and Custodial 
Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 99 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3680768 [https://perma.cc/Z9NP-4PK5]. 
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dividends and buybacks on the corporation’s continued solvency;56 and the 
seniority of preferred shareholders, to the extent they have a non-residual 
(namely, contractual) claim toward the corporation.57 
Clearly, the corporation’s duty of legal obedience is deeply rooted. 
Corporate law is not, and never has been, about “shareholder primacy”: more 
accurately, it is characterized by a norm of legal primacy. Until recently, 
commentators have paid much more attention to only one half of the 
corporation’s purpose—the “pursuit of profit,” rather than the equally 
important “lawful” part. Fortunately, this is starting to change, with the flux of 
scholarship on corporate obedience and compliance, which can be made even 
more robust by tying together the various aspects I discuss above. 
Yet, just as shareholderists have been misguided in focusing on the 
“profit” part and minimizing the corporation’s entity status, stakeholderists 
should re-examine the concept of “corporate social responsibility,” and consider 
placing greater weight on a more fundamental idea: positive law. Telling 
corporate entities what their obligations are, and imposing sanction when those 
are violated, is far preferable to relying on a low-information normative 
framework, operationalized through the subjective determinations of changing 
fiduciaries in each corporation. This route is fairer and more efficient toward 
stakeholders, as well as toward corporations, who—like other people in 
society—are entitled to know what their legal duties are, and to be able to fulfill 
them. 
Moreover, in terms of shaping corporate behavior (just like human 
behavior), law is not the only tool. The markets for products and services; the 
capital markets;58 and reputational practices all influence what corporations do, 
and their effect on others’ lives. It might be that a fiduciary who causes the 
corporation to operate lawfully, but in a manner that generates a consumer 
boycott, acts in an uninformed or careless way, and should therefore be 
penalized under corporate law. This question mainly resides in the domain of 
the business judgment rule. In any event, it requires the initial act on the part 
of consumers, which is not a matter of law. If, however, the corporation’s 
behavior was unlawful, this stage of the inquiry ends there: legal sanction is 
                                                                                                                                   
56 See, e.g., tit. 8, §§ 160(a), 170-174. 
57 See, e.g., LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 452 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(“[I]t is the duty of directors to pursue the best interests of the corporation and its common 
stockholders, if that can be done faithfully with the contractual promises owed to the 
preferred . . . .” (emphasis added)); Strine, supra note 14, at 2040. 
58 See, e.g., Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index 
Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243 
(2020). 
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possible.59 As I note in my second article, “[l]aw is imperfect, but it can be 
reformed—which requires going through the democratic, judicial, or 
regulatory process.”60 It is precisely such reform that would most decisively 
accomplish stakeholderists’ necessary, and often urgent, end goals. Corporate 
law, for its part, has ample tools in place to maximize the likelihood that the 
law, once enacted, is obeyed. 
For that to happen, however, corporate law itself must remain vital 
and enforceable. As my third article would show, even that cannot be taken for 
granted—and requires, once more, delving into the generations-old debate 
among internal and external perspectives on the law. 
 
C.      Taking Corporate Law Seriously 
In a 2005 article, Professors Avi Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky write 
that, while the field of property law “seems to be in insoluble theoretic disarray, 
with scholars scrambling to assemble a giant puzzle of ill-fitting pieces,”61 in 
fact, “[p]roperty . . . is center stage; it is a distinct and vital legal institution of 
its own merits with rules specifically designed to serve its purposes.”62 As I 
gradually came to realize, corporate law has the same problem—and should 
receive the same treatment. In other words, not only is there a habit of blanket 
pulling with regard to the internal structure of corporate law,63 but corporate 
law itself—as a distinct legal institution—suffers from a “low-visibility 
problem,”64 where members of the legal community often ignore the boundary 
separating it from other legal frameworks. We need to clarify what makes 
corporate law what it is—and, more pointedly, why it ought to be preserved 
going forward. 
It turns out that the latter question is now standing for a real-life test. 
As I describe in my third article,65 the federal courts—in at least one pending 
                                                                                                                                   
59 See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 54, at 2017 (“Delaware courts have prioritized giving 
directors broad latitude to take business risk by drawing a line at legal risk . . . .”). 
60 Raz, supra note 3, at 550. 
61 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 
533-34 (2005). 
62 Id. at 615. 
63 See supra Section B. 
64 Raz, supra note 4, at 7, 60. 
65 Id. 
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case—are being asked to decide whether to introduce the practice of mandatory 
arbitration, as governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s expansive precedents, into the corporate law realm.66 If that 
happens, it would have highly detrimental, if not existential, effects for 
corporate law and governance: because managers and controlling shareholders 
will be able to unilaterally impose arbitration on their corporations; and because 
federal arbitration law is structured to suppress almost any possibility of 
intervention into unfair or inefficient practices (for example, class action 
waivers)67—it is clear that corporate law, which relies on litigation even more 
heavily than other areas, is in danger of becoming unenforceable. Meritorious 
cases could no longer be adjudicated, and those who choose to violate the 
equitable and fiduciary norms of corporate law would repeatedly get “free 
lunch,” at the expense of corporate entities, shareholders, and sometimes 
stakeholders.68 
There is a way out of this scenario, and—consistent with the broad 
theme of my dissertation—it requires us to take a look at what corporate law 
says and does, as law. Specifically, it demands that we examine corporate law’s 
boundary question: where does corporate law start and other legal categories 
end? This inquiry is critical in the mandatory arbitration context, because, in 
order for the FAA to apply in a given situation, there must be a “contract” that 
contains the arbitration clause, as opposed to an instrument arising under some 
other category of law.69 As I argue in the article, corporate law is, indeed, such 
a different category. 
At present, corporate and contract law are often conflated, particularly 
by scholars.70 Here we see a clear contrast between internal and external 
perspectives on the law: to an economist, “contract” might denote every 
situation in which some level of volition is involved. Legally speaking, however, 
contract requires more, including offer, acceptance, and most importantly, ex 
ante consent to known subject matter.71 
                                                                                                                                   
66 See id. at 19-29. 
67 See id. at 12-16. 
68 See id. at 29-41. 
69 See id. at 6 n.21. 
70 See, e.g., id. at 3 n.3, 43. 
71 See, e.g., James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 257, 279 n.91 (2015) (“[T]he requirement of definiteness is not a 
matter that the parties can waive if they are to have a contract. Indeed, it is tautological to 
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When we look into corporate law, an entirely different structure 
appears. In the article, I argue that corporate law (just like property,72 and many 
other areas73) has a unifying principle, which I call the “open-endedness 
principle.” The building blocks I have identified in my previous article 
(purpose, personhood, obedience, equity, and fiduciary duty) operate together 
to create a unique situation, where corporate entities can pursue open-ended 
adventures, without making any actual promise, ex ante, as to what they will 
achieve, if at all.74 Instead, corporate law relies on ex post supervision, by courts 
of equity (the most well-known being those in Delaware), to both remedy and 
deter wrongdoing by corporations and their fiduciaries.75 
The external perspective is not abandoned, however. As I explain, 
“[c]orporate entities both change the world, and adapt to it, in numerous, 
entirely unforeseeable ways. Through this, corporate law encourages 
innovation and entrepreneurship, in a manner that is impossible to attain by 
any other legal device.”76 My article thus aims to show that the legal, 
unwaivable structure of corporate law also generates an array of real-world 
benefits, extending well beyond the law itself. 
Only if we take corporate law for what it is—“a distinct and vital legal 
institution of its own merits with rules specifically designed to serve its 
purposes”77—can we avoid both the specter of mandatory arbitration, and 
many other forms of injustice or inefficiency. This is a message that runs 
through all three articles in my dissertation. I believe the scholarly community 
is now in the process of rediscovering law, moving toward a more nuanced 
understanding that combines the insights of non-legal disciplines with the 
law’s distinctive vantage point. Law can make the world a better place; in this 
regard, corporate law may be leading the charge—even if it still has substantial 
distance to cover. 
 
                                                                                                                                   
argue that the parties can agree to an indefinite level of performance, since there cannot be 
an agreement if parties do not know to what they have agreed.”). 
72 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 61, at 615 (stating the unifying principle that 
“property is best understood as a legal institution designed to create and protect the value 
inherent in stable ownership of assets”). 
73 See Raz, supra note 4, at 44-46. 
74 See id. at 49-52. 
75 See id. at 52-55, 56-59. 
76 Id. at 52. 
77 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 61, at 615. 
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D.      Final Remarks 
My time at the University of Pennsylvania has been the most 
enriching, productive, and satisfying period of my life. Coming here in the 
summer of 2017, I could not yet imagine the sheer scope of this adventure. 
Both in and outside of legal academia, I tend to be a “long-distance runner,” 
looking at the big picture of human affairs. This perspective has traditionally 
been somewhat muted in the field of corporate law, but based on what I have 
seen during my doctoral journey, that is changing for the better. I hope my 
dissertation has made a meaningful contribution in this regard. 
In an august paper, written thirty-two years ago—and cited less often 
by present-day corporate law scholars than ought be—British philosopher 
Roger Scruton gets at the heart of corporate law’s signature achievement. I 
close this Introduction with his words: 
[In a world without corporations,] [t]he primary 
thing that is missing, I believe, is the long-term view. No 
obligation endures there—not even the obligations of love 
and friendship—beyond the lifetime of the individuals who 
undertake them; nor does any obligation exist towards those 
who are not present to reciprocate it. The unborn and the 
dead are not only disenfranchised: they have lost all claim on 
the living. Their claims can be acknowledged only if there are 
persons who endure long enough to enter into personal 
relation, both with us, the living, and with them. The true 
public spirit—the spirit from which civil society and all its 
benefits derives—requires just such a projection of our duties 
beyond the grave. The care for future generations must be 
entrusted to persons who will exist when they exist: and if 
there are no such persons surrounding me, how can I have 
that care, except as a helpless anxiety? I can enter into no 
personal obligation that will bind me to past and future souls, 
nor can you. Only a corporate person can enter such an 
obligation, and only through corporate persons, therefore, can 
the relation to the unborn and the dead be made articulate 
and binding. . . . 
That this relation to the unborn and the dead is 
necessary for the fulfilment of the rational agent is something 
that we should not doubt. For it forms the premise of self-
justification. The individual is justified by the knowledge that 
he did right by those who survive him, whom he never knew, 
and who promised him nothing; and equally by those who 
preceded him and bequeathed to him unknowingly their store 
of trust. In the broadest sense, then, the corporate person is 
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necessary to the ecology of rational agency, and without it our 
aims will be as truncated as our lives.78 
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
78 Roger Scruton, Corporate Persons, 63 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, SUPP. VOL. 239, 266 
(1989) (quoted text reproduced with minor changes in ROGER SCRUTON, Gierke and the 
Corporate Person, in THE PHILOSOPHER ON DOVER BEACH 56, 72-73 (1990)). 
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SHARE LAW:  
TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF CORPORATE LAW 
ASAF RAZ
ABSTRACT
Shares are an instrumental phenomenon in law, finance and 
modern life.  Much of corporate law revolves around shares and 
shareholders, but our current understanding of shares is in a trou-
bling posture:  it resorts to various frameworks—contract, proper-
ty, trust, and fiduciary law—neither of which can correctly ac-
commodate the concept of shares.  Contrary to prevailing notions, 
in both Delaware and other jurisdictions around the world, this Ar-
ticle proves that shareholders are not directly owed fiduciary du-
ties; nor can they be simply described as contractual parties, due to 
the unique properties of shares as residual claims.  Where do 
shares derive their value from?  What rules and principles govern 
shares?  The answer is that shares inhabit their own legal space. 
Weaving together corporate theory, doctrine, and real-life cases, 
this Article proposes the concept of share law, a new field of classi-
fication within corporate law.  Share law, which is grounded in eq-
uity, provides the normative structure for conceptualizing, analyz-
ing, and resolving share-related issues—including some very high-
profile topics, such as dividends and buybacks, aspects of mergers 
and acquisitions, appraisal rights, multiple-class equity, sharehold-
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er voting and activism, and shareholder litigation.  This Article 
presents a nuanced account, strongly supported both positively 
and normatively, of shares and their proper treatment within cor-
porate and general law.  In the process, it sheds new light on other 
areas in high currency, including corporate fiduciary law, corpo-
rate personhood, and the law of corporate purpose. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Shares are fascinating.  This type of security, issued by corpora-
tions,1 ignites the imagination for the perceived unlimited upside it 
offers to the lucky investor who picks the “right” share.  On a more 
concrete level, shares form the spinal column of modern economy. 
The total value of shares publicly traded on the world’s exchanges, 
in 2017, was more than US$77 trillion.2  Peoples’ life savings lean 
on shares, or share-related instruments and schemes.3  Share offer-
ings finance the global expansion of human activity through corpo-
rations.  In addition, shareholders—not other creditors—have a 
substantial degree of control over the governance mechanisms of 
corporations, through voting and other means, including access to 
certain types of legal actions.  Since corporations are immensely 
important actors in today’s world, shareholders occupy a unique 
position indeed. 
Against this backdrop, it is troubling to realize how little we 
know about shares.  Other types of corporate obligations, such as 
bonds, emanate from detailed contracts, defining the parties’ rights 
and duties.  Even where the contract itself is lacking, contract law
provides ample solutions.  When we turn to the “share contract”—
the corporation’s constitutional documents4—we quickly discover 
1  In this Article, “corporation” alternates between two meanings.  Mostly, it 
refers to several different types of artificial persons, which include the company, 
the cooperative, the partnership and others, as far as the range of corporate laws 
in a given jurisdiction allows.  They include both for-profit and other-purpose 
corporations.  Related phrases, such as “corporate law,” should be accordingly 
construed.  More narrowly, a “corporation” is how Delaware and similar U.S. law 
describes the type of entity which other jurisdictions, including Israel and the 
U.K., call a “company.”  See Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, ch. 1 (2018) [hereinafter: DGCL].  This duality is not problematic, since every
Delaware corporation is also a corporation in the broader sense.  Where relevant
in this Article, it is clear that the reference is to Delaware corporations, rather than
corporations in the more general sense.
2 See Stocks traded, total value (current US$), THE WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRAD.CD 
[https://perma.cc/622W-XFFC] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).  The numbers stated in 
that source should be considered in addition to the value of shares issued by pri-
vate, or non-publicly-traded, corporations. 
3 See generally MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND
POLICY (2016) (discussing many types of investment schemes and institutions, 
such as pension funds, securities firms, mutual funds, private equity funds and 
derivatives, having shares as part of their asset portfolio or as their underlying 
asset). 
4  In corporate law, constitutional documents are certain documents required 
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that it is a patently undetailed agreement,5 augmented only to a lim-
ited extent by statutory provisions.6  Furthermore, the very nature 
of the obligation toward shareholders is “residual,” meaning that it 
derives from the constantly fluctuating difference between the cor-
poration’s assets and liabilities.  Due to these factors, shareholders’ 
legal position cannot ever be well-defined in advance.  Based on 
what concepts, doctrines and principles should we examine share-
related issues?  As this Article reveals, not only contract law is un-
suited to explain shares; so are the fields of property, trust and fi-
in order to create a corporation.  Usually, they govern some fundamental aspects 
of the corporation’s identity and affairs.  They are also a normative source (most-
ly, a contract) binding the corporation and its residual claimants, the first of 
whom are also its founders.  See, e.g., DGCL § 101(a) (stating that every corpora-
tion shall have a certificate of incorporation); STAAR Surgical Co. v. Waggoner, 
588 A.2d 1130, 1136 (Del. 1991) (“[A] corporate charter is . . . a contract between 
. . . the corporation and its shareholders. . . . The charter is also a contract among 
the shareholders themselves.”); Companies Act, 5759-1999, §§ 15, 17(a), SH No. 
1711 p. 189 (Isr.) [hereinafter: Israel Companies Act] (“Every company shall have 
an article of incorporation . . . .”; “The article of incorporation is legally a contract 
between the company and its shareholders and between [the shareholders] them-
selves.”).  Constitutional documents are sometimes called “organizational docu-
ments,” see, e.g., Sylvia Ann Mayer & Manesh Jiten Shah, I Wish I May, I Wish I 
Might... File Chapter 11 Tonight: Authorization and D&O Considerations When Filing 
Chapter 11, WEIL BANKRUPTCY BLOG 2 (Nov. 2010), http://business-finance-
restructuring.weil.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Mayer_BK10_Paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q5SZ-Y5KD] (“[T]he organizational documents (such as the 
charter, articles of incorporation, bylaws, limited liability company (“LLC”) 
agreement, or partnership agreement) . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
5  In Delaware, the list of mandatory clauses for a certificate of incorporation 
is very short: the corporation’s name, address, goals (“The nature of the business 
or purposes to be conducted or promoted.”), authorized share capital and the 
names and addresses of the corporation’s founders.  See DGCL § 102.  In Israel, 
only four clauses are mandatory in every article of incorporation (the sole consti-
tutional document required under the Israel Companies Act): the company’s 
name, goals, authorized share capital and type of liability limitation (if any).  Ad-
ditionally, the article of incorporation has to be signed by the company’s founders 
(its first shareholders).  See Israel Companies Act §§ 18, 23. 
6  Several sections of the Delaware corporate statute deal with shares, see
DGCL §§ 102, 109, 151–174, 201–205, 211–233, 241–245, in addition to other sec-
tions where share law issues are intermittently mixed in with others, such as the 
merger and dissolution provisions in DGCL §§ 251–267, 271–285.  For statutory 
share law in Israel, see Israel Companies Act §§ 1, 15–24, 33–35, 57–91, 127–139, 
176–193, 285–313.  Importantly, most of these sections contain fairly broad state-
ments and do not attempt to provide rules of conduct or decision even for known 
types of share-related disputes, such as share dilution, withholding of dividends, 
or unfair prejudice.  Similarly, none of them explain how the rights attached to 
shares are different from those attached to any other security or corporate obliga-
tion; none of these provisions address the unique nature of residual claims and 
the problems they give rise to.  The same is true of constitutional documents, even 
when they are more detailed than the minimum statutory requirements. 
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duciary law.  Presumably, the share is a legal mystery.  We are 
seemingly unable to answer even a simple question:  “why do 
shares have value?”  Yet, around US$80 trillion hinges on our an-
swer.7
One reason for this gap is habit and routine.  Dividends and 
merger proceeds get paid, or not; shareholder voting effects 
change, or not.  It often feels as if corporations’ successes and fail-
ures translate directly enough into shareholders’ pockets.  The 
most familiar perception of shares comes from the secondary mar-
ket:  the trading of shares in a stock exchange, with their prices go-
ing up and down.  Not enough attention is paid to the underlying 
nature of shares, and the rules and principles governing them—in 
short, to share law.
However, such attention is highly necessary.  It is required in 
order to grapple with very salient questions, such as shareholders’ 
power compared to that of directors, or the position of non-
shareholder constituencies.  Additionally, things do go wrong with-
in the relationships that shareholders are parties to:  for many rea-
sons, the corporation’s fortunes might not translate into those of its 
shareholders, or part of them.  That happens constantly, and in 
surprising ways.  Due to their unusual characteristics, shares give 
rise to a very wide range of possible situations.  To realize how 
broad that range is, it might be beneficial to take a look around the 
globe. 
In September 2017, the Supreme Court of Israel issued its deci-
sion in General Guardian v. Co-Op Blue Square Services Cooperative 
Ltd. (In Liquidation).8  In that judgment, the Court held that the eco-
nomic rights of shareholders cannot be taken away from them sole-
ly because they cannot be located.  The Court ordered that, instead, 
those rights (here, a liquidating dividend in cash, totaling approx-
imately US$15 million) will be held in trust, for the benefit of the 
unknown shareholders, for an unlimited period of time, to be 
claimed by the unknown shareholders when they do appear. 
The Co-Op decision sheds profound light on the fundamental 
concepts relating to shares, not only in Israel, but under percep-
tions that evolved globally, since the birth of modern corporations. 
The decision is illuminating precisely because the Court struggled 
7 See supra note 2. 
8  CA 238/16 Gen. Guardian v. Co-Op Blue Square Servs. Coop. Ltd. (In Liq-
uidation) (Sept. 10, 2017) (Isr.) [hereinafter: Co-Op], 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/16/380/002/N21/16002380.N21.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G5VJ-7K6Y]. 
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to reach this outcome.  Israel has a developed economy, with a 
common law system9 featuring highly sophisticated bodies of cor-
porate and other private law.10  Yet, the Court could find no statu-
tory, case law or contractual provisions clearly establishing that 
shareholders are entitled to the economic rights arising from their 
shares, and that this entitlement is unlimited in time.  The opinion 
of the Court, by Judge David Mintz, relied on an amalgamation of 
written law provisions to reach the result.11  In a concurrence,12
Judge Daphne Barak-Erez attempted to formulate a broader prin-
ciple:  share rights are “property” rights, so that, like other types of 
property, they enjoy strong, constitutional protections and cannot 
be simply taken away from their owners. 
In fact, the Co-Op Court operated as a court of equity, treating 
shareholders’ claims as equitable rights, with the attendant results. 
Mainly, in this case, shareholder rights were regarded as quasi-
property rights,13 similar to (albeit different than) a trust benefi-
ciary’s rights.  Like other equitable rights, those rights are both ob-
ligatory, toward the corporation; and quasi-proprietary, toward 
9 See, e.g., AMIR N. LICHT, DINEI EMUNA’UT: HOVAT HA’EMUN BA’TA’AGID 
U’BA’DIN HA’KLALI [FIDUCIARY LAW: THE DUTY OF LOYALTY IN THE CORPORATION AND
IN THE GENERAL LAW] 23–24 (2013) (“[T]he question of Israeli law’s classification 
into a legal family, if it was ever controversial, is no longer in dispute.  The an-
swer is clear: Israeli law is common law . . . .”). 
10 See generally INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL (Amos Shapira & Keren 
C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995); ALON KAPLAN, ISRAELI BUSINESS LAW (1999); Itai Fieg-
enbaum & Amir N. Licht, Corporate Law of Israel (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 372, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3050329
[https://perma.cc/LK8K-8CT7].
11 But see infra pp. 306–07 (describing how the equity approach, which the 
Court perceives as obvious, “operates behind the scenes” of the decision and mo-
tivates the outcome). 
12 See Co-Op at 28. 
13  The concurrence, id., uses the term “property rights”, but that wording 
(which does not appear in the opinion of the Court) is inaccurate.  See infra Part 5.2 
(explaining that shareholder rights toward the corporation’s net worth are not 
property rights under property law).  Alternatively, the concurrence might have 
referred not to the rights contained in the share, but to shareholders’ rights toward 
the share.  The latter are, indeed, property rights.  See infra pp. 275–76.  Of course, 
this does not resolve the legal content of the share itself.  In Co-Op, shareholders’ 
property rights toward their shares were undisputed; the issue was their right to 
receive a portion of the corporation’s assets, which is one of the rights embedded 
in the share, and is governed by equity-based share law.  Finally, the concurrence 
might have referred to “property rights” in a constitutional law sense, which is 
not congruent with private law classifications, and might include all manner of 
economic rights, whether proprietary, equitable, or obligatory.  In constitutional 
and human rights law, such an approach is generally warranted. 
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the shareholder’s respective portion of the corporation’s net worth. 
Indeed, net worth is also known as “shareholders’ equity.”  That is 
one verification of the link between shares and equity; this Article 
details many others.  Current approaches to shares rely on various 
legal disciplines, but none of these correctly and fully explain the 
share phenomenon.  Equity is the basis of share law, both in posi-
tive law (people act according to this approach since the birth of 
modern corporations14) and normatively.  The rights, and even the 
existence, of shares and shareholders cannot be adequately ex-
plained any other way.  Especially when dealing with such extent 
of capital and such a scope of human interests, it is crucial to un-
derstand where shares come from, which actions pertaining to 
them are permissible, and what the parties to share-borne relation-
ships may expect. 
This Article weaves together theoretical, doctrinal and compar-
ative approaches, producing a consistent model of corporate law 
and its subdivisions.  To that end, this Article mainly surveys two 
jurisdictions:  the United States, the prominent arena of business 
and legal activity in the world, and within it, as pertains to corpo-
rate law, mainly Delaware; and Israel, a country with a well-
developed commercial sphere, legal system and common law ju-
risprudence, where the Co-Op case took place.  Occasionally, this 
Article turns to other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, 
which is historically the source of both American and Israeli law. 
Many of the core concepts of corporate and other private law are 
very similar among these jurisdictions—which makes any differ-
ences all the more telling. 
The issues that comprise share law have been with us since the 
dawn of corporations.  This Article, for the first time, introduces 
the concept of share law as a separate classification.  It explores 
both the theoretical foundations of share law, and many of the 
practical topics it encompasses.  This Article aims to assist future 
inquiries by businesspeople, investors, lawyers, judges and schol-
ars, as it presents a unified framework for resolving the many 
questions that emerge from the share phenomenon.  While doing 
so, this Article also provides a more nuanced understanding of 
such areas as corporate personhood and corporate purpose—other 
paradigms that give rise to some of the most pressing issues facing 
today’s corporate jurisprudence. 
14 See infra Part 6.3. 
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2. THE CO-OP CASE: FACTS, LAW AND JUDGMENT
Before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the land 
was under British mandate rule.  British law in force, which was 
later absorbed into the law of Israel,15 enabled people to start a 
regular business company; that was, as it still is in Israel, the most 
common type of corporation.  The law also afforded promoters the 
option of establishing another, more unique type of corporation:  a 
cooperative.  This type of entity, having strong roots in the U.K. it-
self,16 is a for-profit,17 separate legal person,18 with optional limited 
liability for shareholders.19  These characteristics make a coopera-
tive similar to other for-profit corporations.  However, a coopera-
tive also has several unique traits, intended, as its name implies, to 
foster social cooperation among its shareholders or “members.” 
These include, among other things, restrictions on the maximum 
stake of the cooperative’s outstanding shares any single sharehold-
er can own (set at 20%);20 a mandatory “one shareholder, one vote” 
rule;21 and a rule excluding cooperative shares from being subject 
to a lien,22 apparently intended to restrict their transferability to 
outsiders not as committed to the cooperative’s goals as voluntary 
members are. 
One of those corporations, established in 1942 and continuing 
to exist in Israel,23 is Co-Op Blue Square Services Cooperative Ltd. 
15 See Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948, § 11, O.B. (Official Bul-
letin) No. 2 p. 1 (Isr.) (the first legislative act enacted in the State of Israel; this sec-
tion declaring that the existing law of the land continues to be valid, as part of the 
law of Israel). 
16 See generally JOHN F. WILSON ET AL., BUILDING CO-OPERATION: A BUSINESS 
HISTORY OF THE CO-OPERATIVE GROUP, 1863-2013 (2013). 
17 See Cooperatives Ordinance, §§ 39, 40, HEI (Laws of the Land of Israel) 
Vol. 1 p. 336 (1933) (Isr.) [hereinafter: Israel Cooperatives Ordinance] (providing 
rules in regard to the cooperative’s profits and the permissibility of various ac-
tions pertaining to them).  Alternatively, a cooperative may be described as a 
“mixed-purpose” corporation; one purpose within the mix is the pursuit of profit. 
18 See id. at § 21. 
19 See id. at § 4. 
20 See id. at § 5(1). 
21 See id. at § 16. 
22 See id. at § 25.
23 See Cooperative Search, MINISTRY OF ECONOMY,
https://apps.moital.gov.il/CooperativeSocieties [https://perma.cc/8E32-6EFH] 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (search for cooperative number 570004465; indicating 
that the cooperative was founded on Mar. 4, 1942 and is in liquidation proceed-
ings). 
264 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 40:1
(Co-Op).  This entity was in the business of food retail and distri-
bution of produce; before its liquidation, it mainly operated 
through subsidiaries, many of them regular commercial compa-
nies.24  As the years passed, Co-Op amassed substantial earnings: 
during its liquidation proceedings, its assets were sold for over 1.3 
billion NIS (New Israeli Shekels),25 equivalent in 2017 rates to 
about US$370 million.26
In 2002, Co-Op entered into court-ordered liquidation.  The 
reasons for that decision are not pertinent for current purposes, but 
importantly, it is a non-bankruptcy liquidation:  the corporation 
maintained a positive net worth (shareholders’ equity), on the or-
der of the sum of its assets.  A cooperative is a for-profit, or at least 
mixed-purpose corporation; incidental to that, the persons entitled 
to receive its net worth, when it is distributed, are its sharehold-
ers.27  Accordingly, the liquidator, appointed by the District Court 
of Tel Aviv, set out to distribute among shareholders the cash pro-
ceeds, gained from the sale of the corporation’s assets.  Most 
shareholders were indeed located and received their due fraction 
of the corporation’s net worth.  As a matter of course, that fraction 
derives from the relation between the number of shares owned by 
the shareholder and the number of outstanding shares. 
There was a problem, however, which ended up at the heart of 
the case.  Due to the age of the corporation and the time passed 
since the allocation of most of its shares—which were not publicly 
traded—it turned out to be impossible to contact the owners of 
about 10% of the outstanding shares.  Many simply changed their 
addresses.  It is naturally apparent that many shareholders passed 
away; this does not materially change the legal analysis, since their 
24 See infra note 31, para. 3. 
25 See Brief for Appellant, para. 6, CA 238/16 Gen. Guardian v. Co-Op Blue 
Square Servs. Coop. Ltd. (In Liquidation) (Isr.), 
http://www.justice.gov.il/Pubilcations/Articles/Documents/KO_OP_FINAL.pd
f [https://perma.cc/8JWX-WUH5]. 
26 See Exchange Rates, BANK OF ISRAEL,
http://www.boi.org.il/en/Markets/ExchangeRates/Pages/Default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/P9XT-PKWL] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (search for the ex-
change rate on Sept. 10, 2017; indicating that on the day of the Co-Op decision, the 
exchange rate was 3.504 NIS for 1 U.S. dollar). 
27 See Israel Cooperatives Ordinance §§ 39, 40; Companies Ordinance (New 
Form), 5743-1983, § 284, DMI (Laws of the State of Israel) No. 37 p. 761 (Isr.) [here-
inafter: Israel Companies Ordinance] (providing rules in regard to the distribution 
of profits to shareholders, during the corporation’s ongoing existence or during 
liquidation). 
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claims passed on to their heirs.28  The liquidator did manage to lo-
cate some previously unknown shareholders, and at present they 
continue to show up, gradually.29
By 2015, the liquidation proceedings seemingly reached an im-
passe.  All of the corporation’s assets had been sold.  The liquidat-
ing dividend was fully distributed to the known shareholders.  It 
was perceived by many, including the liquidator and representa-
tives of the known shareholders, that the chances of locating more 
unknown shareholders were becoming slimmer as time passed—
although previously unknown shareholders did continue to show 
up, at however seemingly slow rate.30  In 2015, the liquidator filed 
a motion with the lower court, the District Court of Tel Aviv, ask-
ing to end the liquidation proceedings, wind up the corporation 
and, most importantly, order the distribution of all remaining 
funds between the known shareholders, irrevocably nullifying the 
claims of currently unknown shareholders, even if they show up in 
the future.  The known shareholders—the only ones appearing be-
fore the court—agreed to this, unsurprisingly.  The lower court 
granted the motion.31  Its decision did not include substantive dis-
cussion on the merits of the unknown shareholders’ legal or equi-
table rights; rather, it was based on practical considerations, pri-
marily the seeming inability to locate any more unknown 
shareholders expeditiously enough, in light of the liquidation 
stretching out for many years.32  The lower court’s decision also 
took somewhat for granted the link between winding up the cor-
poration and distributing the remaining funds to the known share-
holders.  It did not expound on another possibility:  depositing the 
remaining funds in trust, for the benefit of the unknown share-
holders—although the appellant did raise this option before the 
lower court.33
The General Guardian, an agency of the Israel Ministry of Jus-
28 See Inheritance Act, 5725-1965, § 1, SH No. 446 p. 663 (Isr.) (“Upon a per-
son’s death his estate passes to his heirs.”). 
29 See Co-Op, para. 5. 
30 See id.
31 See LC (Liquidation Case) (TA) 1153/02 Co-Op Blue Square Servs. Coop. 
Ltd. v. Levitt (Nov. 26, 2015) (Isr.), 
https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/mechozi/ME-02-1153-521.htm 
[https://perma.cc/L7JD-JM44]. 
32 See id., para. 10. 
33 See id., para. 9. 
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tice entrusted by statute34 with representing the interests of proper-
ty owners who are unidentified or unable to appear in court, time-
ly appealed to the Supreme Court.  The appellant also moved to 
stay the distribution to the known shareholders, until the appeal is 
decided.  The Court granted this stay, soon after the appeal was 
filed.35  The amount corresponding to the unknown shareholders’ 
claims totaled 53 million NIS36 (approximately US$15 million in 
2017 rates37).  At this stage, the unknown shareholders numbered 
2,600,38 giving each a claim of about US$5,700.  If the lower court’s 
judgment was to stand, they faced an irreversible loss of this 
amount.39
In September 2017, the Supreme Court issued its judgment in 
the case.40  The opinion of the Court was written by Judge David 
Mintz, a 2017 appointee to the Court, who previously served on 
the District Court of Jerusalem and is renowned for his expertise in 
bankruptcy law.41  Judge Yoram Danziger, the most senior member 
of the three-judge panel, joined in Mintz’s opinion.42
The Court’s analysis begins with a survey of the law of cooper-
atives, noting, as mentioned above, the dual nature of this type of 
corporation, which harbors both social and economic purposes.43
Importantly, the Court then mentions that a cooperative’s exist-
ence, like that of other corporations, is based on a constitutional 
34 See General Guardian Act, 5738-1978, SH No. 883 p. 61 (Isr.). 
35 See CA 238/16 Gen. Guardian v. Co-Op Blue Square Servs. Coop. Ltd. (In 
Liquidation) (Feb. 2, 2016) (Isr.),
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/16/380/002/O05/16002380.O05.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MY5P-WCU3]. 
36 See supra note 31, para. 9. 
37 See supra note 26. 
38 See Co-Op, para. 5. 
39  If the funds had been distributed among the known shareholders, then 
even if the lower court decision would have been later found to be in error, there 
is absolutely no procedural mechanism, either in Israel or in other countries, in-
cluding the U.S. and U.K., that enables one (such as a previously unknown share-
holder) to pursue an action seeking remuneration from a very large number of 
dispersed people (such as the tens of thousands known shareholders).  A class ac-
tion only works the other way around. 
40 Co-Op, supra note 8. 
41 See Justices and Registrars of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL,
https://supreme.court.gov.il/sites/en/Pages/Justices.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/X2ZN-ZTBS] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
42 See Co-Op at 27–28. 
43 See id., para. 19. 
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document—the article of incorporation.44  This relates to the con-
tractual approach to shares, discussed below.45  The Court goes on 
to mention the strong link between company law and cooperative 
law, stating that doctrines from other areas of corporate law may 
be “imported” into cooperative law.46  This is consistent with the 
methodology employed in this Article, viewing corporate law as a 
general field, with different types of corporations, having similar 
traits, entitled to similar treatment.  In other words, although Co-
Op involves a unique type of corporation, its lessons are fully ap-
plicable to “regular” companies and other corporations. 
The Court then delves into a prolonged analysis of various 
provisions, gathered from cooperative law, bankruptcy law (occu-
pying a large part of the opinion, even though the Court acknowl-
edges the large positive net worth of the corporation, and that 
shareholders are its intended recipients;47 this analysis might be 
expected, considering that most liquidation activity arises in bank-
ruptcy), comparative law from the U.K. and U.S., Hebrew law, and 
even administrative law, but importantly, by the end of that part of 
the opinion,48 the outcome remains to be clarified.  Unsurprisingly, 
neither of these sources provide clear rules as to the unique situa-
tion involving unlocated shareholders in a liquidating corporation, 
entitled to large sums of money and facing (unbeknownst to any of 
them) a motion to distribute those funds among other, known 
shareholders. 
Two statutory provisions mentioned by the Court come close to 
providing a decisive rule in the case.  The first, Section 372 of the 
Israel Companies Ordinance, states that if some of the liquidating 
company’s funds, held by the liquidator, are not duly claimed by 
anyone within six months, they shall be deposited in a bank ac-
count; if the claimant later appears, the funds shall then be paid; 
that section places no time limit on making the claim.49  However, 
the Court mentions that non-shareholder creditors’ claims are time-
limited, by other statutory provisions, which the Court declines to 
apply to shareholders.50  Why are shareholders different?  Also, 
44 See id., para. 20. 
45 See infra Part 5.1. 
46 See Co-Op, para. 21. 
47 See id., para. 2. 
48 See id., paras. 25–64. 
49 See Israel Companies Ordinance § 372. 
50  The Court simply states that “a shareholder is not required to file a proof 
of claim, since he is not considered as a creditor of the company but a participant 
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what if Section 372 did not exist, or if it was less sufficiently word-
ed (common predicaments of statutory law)?  The second statutory 
provision, Section 248 of the Israel Companies Ordinance, deals 
with distributions to shareholders during the company’s liquida-
tion, ordering as follows:  “A sum that a [shareholder] is entitled to 
due to being a [shareholder] . . . shall be taken into account in re-
gard to adjusting the rights of all [shareholders] among them-
selves.”51  The Court invokes this provision to state that “there is 
no place to benefit one shareholder at the expense of another.”52
Again, besides merely quoting the statute, the Court does not ex-
plain how shareholders are different than other creditors.53  Yet, 
this short provision does allude to an important principle of equi-
ty-based share law:  the equality between identical shares (and 
hence, between equal shareholders). 
The Court then announces the result:  the lower court’s deci-
sion is overturned.  The monetary rights of the unknown share-
holders shall be held in trust, by the appellant, for each sharehold-
er to receive whenever in the future they may appear.54
In a short concurrence,55 Judge Daphne Barak-Erez joins Judge 
Mintz’s opinion.  She also offers another explanation for the eter-
nality of shareholders’ rights:  “The rights of the unknown share-
holders are property rights for all intents and purposes.  These are 
fundamental rights, which today even enjoy constitutional protec-
tion.”56  The concurrence also points out that “the known share-
in it.  Therefore, applying here the provisions relevant to a “creditor” would be 
problematic.”  Co-Op, para. 66.  The term “participant” is synonymous with 
“shareholder,” see id., para. 67.  The Court does not elaborate on what gives rise to 
this distinction between “creditor” and “shareholder.” 
51  Israel Companies Ordinance § 248. 
52 Co-Op, para. 66. 
53  Notably, the pari passu equality rule, which Israel Companies Ordinance § 
248 secures to shareholders, also applies to creditors under general and bankrupt-
cy law.  At the bottom line, the Court’s conclusion in paras. 65–67 of the opinion is 
simply that “creditors” must file a proof of claim in liquidation proceedings, and 
have a limited period of time to do so, while “shareholders” are different in both 
respects.  This conclusion is not explained by the statutory language or the Court’s 
discussion, but see infra pp. 306–07 (describing how the equity approach, which 
the Court perceives as obvious, “operates behind the scenes” of the decision and 
motivates the outcome). 
54 See Co-Op, para. 70. 
55 See id. at 28.
56 Id.  Regarding the use of the term “property rights,” see supra note 13.  The 
constitutional protection referred to comes from Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty, § 3, SH No. 1391 p. 150 (Isr.) (“There shall be no violation of the property 
of a person.”). 
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holders never had any legitimate expectation grounded in law to 
receive more than their respective fraction of the cooperative’s as-
sets.  They are not the unknown shareholders’ natural “heirs” or 
their partners.”57  This, again, is an allusion to principles of equity, 
such as the maxim “equity delights in equality.”58  In other words, 
there is no difference between a known and an unknown share-
holder, at least none that justifies forfeiting the latter’s rights and 
giving them to the former. 
This is a remarkable decision, reached from a remarkable fac-
tual background.  It warrants further discussion.  What is the fun-
damental basis of Co-Op—and indeed, of shareholder rights and 
shares generally? 
3. CLASSIFICATIONS IN CORPORATE LAW AND THE UNIQUENESS OF 
SHARES
The difficulty faced by the Court in Co-Op arises, to a large ex-
tent, from a gap in the way we currently classify the structure of 
corporate law.  This Article explains how to close that gap.  Its ex-
istence is somewhat perplexing, because lawyers must classify, and 
do so all the time.  Peter Birks wrote that “taxonomy is the founda-
tion of most of the science . . . .  Without it there is only a chaos of 
unsorted information . . . .  A sound taxonomy . . . is an essential 
precondition of rationality. . . . Abolition of categories would entail 
abolition of thought.”59  Pertinently, he warned that “[a]ll these are 
wanting in common law systems.”60  Corporate lawyers, in particu-
lar, classify a lot of things:  is the claim derivative or direct?  Is the 
transaction a merger or an acquisition?  Was the breach of a duty of 
loyalty or care?  Which statutory sections govern the current situa-
tion?  Yet, the question is whether they are classifying enough.
Today, when we discuss corporate law, we often perceive one 
class of matters to “lie at its heart,” or even amount to all of corpo-
rate law.61  These matters can be termed corporate fiduciary law.62  It 
57 Co-Op at 28. 
58  MICHAEL LEVENSTEIN, MAXIMS OF EQUITY 103 (2014). 
59  Peter Birks, Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy, 26 U. W.
AUSTL. L. REV. 1, 3–7 (1996). 
60 Id. at 4. 
61  An example of this partial view is provided by Goshen and Hannes, who 
dramatically announce “the death of corporate law,” while actually describing 
some changes in a specific area of corporate law—the balance of power between 
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is the law governing the relationships between a corporation and 
its fiduciaries, that is, the people who owe it fiduciary duties. 
These include directors, other officers (such as managers), control-
ling shareholders and others.  Such well-discussed and litigated 
topics as self-interested transactions,63 appropriation of corporate 
opportunities,64 and executive compensation65 are part of corporate 
fiduciary law.  Also within this field are some structural issues, 
such as the prerequisites for a new director appointment, the oper-
ation of board committees, or the roles of independent directors. 
Indeed, corporate fiduciary law is a necessary, defining com-
ponent of corporate law, and there is a fundamental reason for 
that:  every corporation must have at least one fiduciary at any giv-
en moment.  A corporation is a person, but not a natural person.  It 
does not have eyes and hands, or any other bodily and cognitive 
capacities, entirely of its own.  Therefore, it always has to operate 
through someone else (the fiduciary), whom by design it entrusts 
with acting in its benefit.  While part of corporate law, corporate 
fiduciary law is also part of the broader field of fiduciary law.66
The norms governing trustees, lawyers and many others,67 even in 
non-corporate contexts, are part of fiduciary law.  The unique duty 
characterizing fiduciary law is the duty of loyalty.  Its underlying 
theme is the fiduciary principle:  a fiduciary must single-mindedly 
act to the advantage of the beneficiary, without being swayed by 
directors, activist shareholders and courts.  See Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, 
The Death of Corporate Law (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 402, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3171023
[https://perma.cc/8EFR-CGMG].  That article treats a narrowing in the scope of 
corporate fiduciary law (at least as it is traditionally perceived) as a decline of all 
corporate law.  In fact, shares and shareholders, with their voting and other rights, 
are also part of corporate law, which is alive and well. 
62 See, e.g., David Kershaw, The Path of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 8 N.Y.U. J. L.
& BUS. 395 (2012); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Principles 
and Delaware Corporation Law: Searching for the Optimal Balance by Understanding 
That the World is Not (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper 
No. 40, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3044477 
[https://perma.cc/ZBL3-UKS7] (using the term “corporate fiduciary law”). 
63 See generally WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 292 (5th ed., 2016). 
64 See generally id. at 328. 
65 See generally id. at 343. 
66  Many volumes are devoted to general, rather than only corporate, fiduci-
ary law.  See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (2011); LICHT, supra note 9; 
LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW (2005). 
67  For a partial list, see ROTMAN, supra note 66, at 15. 
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any other interest.68  This is a much higher standard of behavior 
than that pertaining to regular, arm’s length obligations, where 
each party is free to benefit itself.  It arises when the fiduciary 
agrees to undertake this position, which involves the power to uni-
laterally affect the beneficiary’s affairs and legal standing.  The fi-
duciary also has absolute advantage in information over the bene-
ficiary.  Due to these power and information asymmetries, the 
regular law of obligations is insufficient, and a heightened type of 
duty is invoked to protect the beneficiary’s interests, and more 
generally, justice and fairness.  As a result, fiduciary law is known 
for its strictness toward fiduciaries.69  Given this rigidity, corporate 
68 See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (“[I]t is 
elemental that a fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to 
those whose interests the fiduciary is to protect . . . .  This is a sensitive and “in-
flexible” rule of fidelity, barring not only blatant self-dealing, but also requiring 
avoidance of situations in which a fiduciary’s personal interest possibly conflicts 
with the interest of those owed a fiduciary duty . . . .  Included within this rule’s 
broad scope is every situation in which a fiduciary, who is bound to single-
mindedly pursue the interests of those to whom a duty of loyalty is owed, deals 
with a person “in such close relation [to the fiduciary] . . . that possible advantage 
to such other person might . . . consciously or unconsciously” influence the fiduci-
ary’s judgment . . . .” (third and fourth alterations in original) (second brackets in 
original) (citations omitted)); Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc’y v. Mothew [1996] EWCA 
(Civ) 533, [1998] Ch 1 at 18 (appeal taken from Eng.) (describing the conditions 
that give rise to a fiduciary relationship, stating that “[a] fiduciary is someone 
who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another . . . in circumstances which 
give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence.”; also describing the main obli-
gations imposed on fiduciaries, including that “[t]he principal is entitled to the 
single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary.”).  This Article generally employs the 
American view of the scope of fiduciary duties, subsuming both loyalty and care.  
In other jurisdictions, fiduciary law might be understood to encompass only the 
duty of loyalty.  See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Is the Corporate Director’s Duty of 
Care a “Fiduciary” Duty? Does It Matter?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2013) 
(“[U]nlike the United States, other common law jurisdictions including the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and Canada generally do not conceptualize the duty of care 
as “fiduciary” in nature.”). 
69 See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“A public policy, 
existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human 
characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate 
officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance 
of his duty . . . .  The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does not 
rest upon the narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting 
from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a broader foundation of a wise public pol-
icy that, for the purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of 
profit flowing from a breach of the confidence imposed by the fiduciary rela-
tion.”); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Many forms of con-
duct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbid-
den to those bound by fiduciary ties.  A trustee is held to something stricter than 
the morals of the market place.  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.  As to this there has devel-
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fiduciary law employs mechanisms, such as the business judgment 
rule, meant to apply when the duty of loyalty has not been 
breached, in order to promote the dynamics of corporate life and 
other policy considerations that arise in the corporate context.70
However, corporate fiduciary law is only one part of corporate 
law.  The fiduciary-corporation relationship is one of the two main 
relationships that uniquely define corporate law.  When classifying 
corporate law, we also encounter a set of issues that are non-
fiduciary or only partly fiduciary in nature.  We talk about these 
topics in law school classes, practice them as lawyers, adjudicate 
them and draft statutes that govern them.  These issues are at the 
heart of corporate law just as much as corporate fiduciary law is. 
They deal with the second group of persons71 that must exist in re-
lation to every corporation.  In the broadest terms, that group may 
be called “residual claimants.”  Every corporation, at any given 
moment, has at least one of those.72
The underlying reason for this is that a corporation’s life can 
end, as it often does, whether through merger or liquidation. 
oped a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.”). 
70 See, e.g., Hamermesh & Strine, supra note 62, at 11 (“One of the earliest re-
finements in Delaware corporate fiduciary law was the articulation of the business 
judgment rule.”).  The article also discusses the rule’s application and some of its 
justifications. 
71  In most corporations, the same person can be a member of both groups, 
that is, a fiduciary for the corporation and its residual claimant, at the same time. 
72 The absolute necessity of both fiduciaries and residual claimants can also 
be stated as follows: unlike a natural person, who is under no inherent duty to en-
ter into any contract, a corporation, by design, must be party to at least two con-
tracts, at any moment of its existence: one with its fiduciary (or fiduciaries) and 
the other with its residual claimant(s).  This stems from first principles, described 
in this Part of the Article (the corporation, not being a natural person, is only able 
to act through others; the need to determine who would be entitled to receive the 
corporation’s net worth at the end of its life), and from written law.  See, e.g.,
DGCL §§ 101(a) (stating that every corporation shall have a certificate of incorpo-
ration), 151(b) (instructing that after share redemption, the corporation must have 
at least one outstanding share); STAAR Surgical Co. v. Waggoner, 588 A.2d 1130, 
1136 (Del. 1991) (“[A] corporate charter is . . . a contract between . . . the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.”); Israel Companies Act §§ 15, 17 (stating that every 
company shall have an article of incorporation, and that it is a contract between 
the company and its shareholders); DGCL § 141(b) (stating that every corpora-
tion’s board must include at least one director); Israel Companies Act § 219(b) 
(stating that every company must have at least one director).  Regarding the con-
tractual aspect of the fiduciary-corporation relationship, see, e.g., Bristol v. Mothew,
[1998] Ch 1 at 18 (stating that the fiduciary position has to be “undertaken” by the 
fiduciary), meaning that the relationship is based on agreement—while also, by 
definition, absorbing the norms of fiduciary law.  Some of the fiduciary’s “em-
ployment contract” may also be, and often is, in writing. 
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When that happens, the corporation’s interests (assets and non-
economic interests alike) do not disappear.  If the corporation has 
liabilities (including both economic and non-economic obligations), 
then according to general law,73 its interests must first go toward 
satisfying those.  Yet only rarely, if ever, do a corporation’s inter-
ests precisely equal its liabilities.  There must be some person enti-
tled to receive the difference, or “residual.”74  That person is the re-
sidual claimant. 
Crucially, a corporation has residual claimants throughout its 
life, not only at or near its end.  To explain this, the analysis above 
needs to be expanded.  The phenomenon can be first explained in 
contractual terms:  when a corporation is formed, its founders also 
choose its first residual claimants (usually themselves); that choice 
is found in the constitutional documents.75  Put another way, the 
persons entering into that particular contract accept, as part of their 
contractual bargain, the fact that they are the residual claimants. 
Conversely, parties to other relationships with the corporation ac-
cept the fact that they are not the residual claimants.  Second, the 
continuous, indispensable existence of residual claimants can be 
explained in terms of corporate purpose-setting:  someone has to de-
termine the ends toward which the corporation will act.76  This, 
too, is part of a contractual bargain:  the person who becomes a 
party to the constitutional documents agrees to accept a position as 
determiner of corporate purpose.  Other creditors are not in that 
position, nor should they be, as long as the obligations they are en-
titled to are being met.  Furthermore, in the case of for-profit cor-
porations, the residual claimant is also the indirect economic bene-
73  That is, law external to corporate law.  In this sense, general law also in-
cludes bankruptcy law, which often dictates where corporations’ assets go when 
their lives end.  For discussion of the relation between general law and corporate 
law, see infra notes 77, 142. 
74  The residual might be negative.  In non-limited liability corporations, the 
analysis remains the same: residual claimants are entitled to receive the residual, 
which happens to mean they will be burdened with new obligations, rather than 
acquiring new rights.  In limited liability corporations, when the residual is nega-
tive, residual claimants are legally entitled to forego it. 
75 See supra note 5 (noting that constitutional documents must specify the 
names of the first shareholders).  With the transferability of shares, the residual 
claim passes on to each subsequent shareholder. 
76  This is done when a promoter (and soon-to-be residual claimant) selects a 
certain form of incorporation, with a known, fixed purpose (a for-profit, nonprof-
it, or mixed-purpose corporation), see infra note 142.  Additionally, and subject to 
that fixed purpose, the residual claimant specifies the corporation’s goals in its 
constitutional documents, see supra note 5. 
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ficiary of pursuing those ends.  From a deontological viewpoint, as 
long as the rights of no one else are violated,77 there is nothing 
wrong with having a person determine the corporation’s purpose 
and goals and indirectly enjoy their attainment. 
In a sense, a natural person can also be said to have, at any giv-
en moment, “residual claimants”:  the person’s presumptive heirs. 
They, too, are entitled to receive the future decedent’s “net worth” 
(as their claim ranks below that of creditors) when the decedent’s 
life ends.  However, a natural person is different from a corpora-
tion in this regard, since heirs have no right to control the affairs of 
the future decedent inter vivos.  This results from an important ex-
77  Indeed, by definition, residual claimants cannot bypass, or impair the 
rights of, non-residual creditors.  Residual claimants always rank below creditors 
in the priority order of claims for the corporation’s assets.  The corporation must 
fulfill, or at least be able to fulfill, all of its obligations to creditors, before it is le-
gally allowed to hand out any economic benefit to its residual claimants.  Fur-
thermore, residual claimants themselves cannot validly do anything (such as 
adopting a resolution in the shareholder meeting) that unilaterally impairs the 
content of the corporation’s obligation to a creditor.  These facts stem from the 
very concept of residuality.  They are also protected by mandatory provisions of 
positive law, including general law (requiring every corporation, as any other 
person, to meet its obligations), bankruptcy law (placing residual claimants at the 
lowest level of priority, dictating that if the corporation’s obligations to creditors 
are not fully met, residual claimants are not entitled to any value) and corporate 
law, see, e.g., DGCL §§ 160(a), 170–174 (establishing mandatory rules to determine 
when a corporation is allowed to make a distribution to its shareholders, requir-
ing that distributions not “impair” the corporation’s capital, or that they be made 
out of the corporation’s profits); Israel Companies Act §§ 301–305, 307, 309–313 
(establishing mandatory rules to determine when a company is allowed to make a 
distribution to its shareholders, requiring, without exception, that it maintain its 
ability to meet all obligations to creditors).  See also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 11 (1991) (“Equi-
ty investors are paid last, after debt investors, employees, and other investors . . . . 
These equity investors have the “residual” claim in the sense that they get only 
what is left over . . . .”).  But see, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves 
Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corpo-
rate Governance System, 126 YALE L. J. 1870, 1928–29 (2017) (criticizing that under-
standing of the relation between residual and non-residual claims).  However, 
that part of Chief Justice Strine’s article far from negates the concept of residual 
claimancy.  First, it conjures up an image of an “ultimate reckoning of accounts,” 
id. at 1929, on which residuality presumably depends, while overlooking the 
many concrete, continuously binding norms, some mentioned above, that support 
the priority of non-residual creditors.  Second, it points to problems with the en-
forcement of law in this area, not with its substantive content.  Certainly, it is possi-
ble to break the law, for example by transferring wealth to shareholders while ob-
ligations to creditors are not being met.  Yet, no one has a right to do so.  Similarly, 
a breach of contract does not modify the rules of contract law.  Courts and other 
enforcement mechanisms exist in order to prevent and address such violations, in 
corporate law as in any other area. 
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tra-legal, philosophical distinction:  a natural person is an end in 
himself, free to determine his own fate and life purposes.  In con-
trast, a corporation exists to pursue some purpose and goals de-
termined for it by others.  Of course, due to the limits of the corpo-
ration’s physical nature, there is simply no way it could determine 
its own purpose and goals without other people, and the choices 
they make.  This does not undermine the corporation’s existence as 
a separate person; it just means that an artificial person’s life pur-
pose is chosen in a different manner than that of a natural person. 
Moreover, the fixing of purpose, at the corporation’s “birth,” does 
not change the fact that the corporation, through its fiduciaries 
(and usually not its residual claimants), has extremely wide lati-
tude in choosing its course of action, or “way of life,” within that 
purpose.78
The logical chain laid out above leads to the inevitable exist-
ence of residual claimants, in respect to every corporation.  De-
pending on the type of corporation, residual claimants can have 
many names, such as “partners” or “members.”  In some corpora-
tions, residual claimants are comprised of, and identical to, some 
other group of creditors, as in “mutual insurance companies,” 
where policyholders are also the residual claimants.79  In modern 
corporations, residual claimants are mostly known as “sharehold-
ers”—persons who own a “share.”  Like other securities, a share is 
a “thing,” an object toward which property rights exist; a share has 
owners.  It can also be rented, pledged as collateral, and so on. 
Simultaneously, the share itself is a bundle of rights:80 it confers on 
its owner some obligatory rights, while attaching some obligations
to at least one other person.  The economic magnitude of these 
rights and obligations is equal to the residual interests of the cor-
78 See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 
1989) (“[Directors’] broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corpo-
rate course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profit-
ability.”). 
79 See, e.g., 2017 Annual Report, EQUITABLE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
CANADA 15 (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://cdn.equitable.ca/forms/unsecured/insurance/2017-Annual-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EU4P-4FYA] (showing “policyholders’ equity” as the only 
type of equity in the balance sheet).  Practically, this means that the residual 
claimants have a dual contract with the corporation, giving rise to claims under 
both general (contract and insurance) law and corporate law, including equitable 
claims as discussed in this Article. 
80 See Israel Companies Act § 1 (defining “Share” as “a bundle of rights in 
the company that are determined in law and in the article of incorporation[.]”). 
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poration—those left after all corporate obligations, of any kind, to 
all non-residual claimants are satisfied, in practice or in capacity.81
Most importantly, the related concepts of “share” and “residu-
ality” create a long, open list of unique problems.  This stems from 
the unusual, not easily explicable nature of residual obligations—
mainly, the inherent lack of any contractual or other legal mecha-
nism to determine what the shareholders’ claim is, except for the 
phrase “what is left after all obligations to other creditors are satis-
fied.”  That phrase might seem straightforward, but it is not. 
Shareholders’ claims are intricately tied to another person’s acts, 
omissions, successes and failures.  They ebb and flow with the cor-
poration’s fortunes.  This situation has no parallels in other legal 
fields.  In contract and property law, for instance, the claimant has 
a claim toward something grounded in external reality, such as 
concepts of money, time and place.  An obligor might breach an 
obligation, but these concepts exist independently of him.  This 
makes it comparatively easy for the claimant to ascertain and de-
mand what is owed, for example, “one hundred dollars.”  In con-
trast, shareholders can never accurately know the extent of their 
claims, both because of information and power asymmetries to 
their detriment, and because many things, some wildly unex-
pected, might happen to the corporation, or within the various re-
lationships arising from the share (shareholder-corporation, share-
holder-shareholder and shareholder-third party).  Therefore, “the 
claim attached to one percent of the corporation’s outstanding 
shares,” or what should be considered as that claim, is far more 
complex and problematic than “one hundred dollars.”82
81  Residuality characterizes shares by default.  “Regular” residual claim 
shares are often known as “common shares.”  There also exist types of securities, 
sometimes called “preferred shares” (although they can have many other names 
and properties), that carry some contractual terms endowing their owners with 
non-residual, or a combination of residual and non-residual, claims.  Their owners 
may, in fact, be regular creditors.  See infra pp. 280–81 (discussing preferred 
shares).  This situation also occurs in U.S. mutual funds, where shareholders do 
not own a residual claim share; rather, they own trust law claims toward a corpo-
rate trustee and a defined pool, or segment, of its assets.  That definition, often in 
terms of a certain investment strategy, appears in the contractual documents cre-
ating each class of “shares.” 
82  These problems attach to the concept of shares at a very preliminary level. 
For example, the number of outstanding shares is a starting point in any determi-
nation of shareholder rights in a corporation.  It gives meaning to the content of a 
single share, by establishing the relation between it and the entirety of sharehold-
ers’ claims.  However, a shareholder might not even be able to reach that point 
easily enough.  It is possible that shareholders will have no knowledge of the real 
number of outstanding shares a corporation has at a given moment, due to some 
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This unclarity leads to an extraordinary range of possible situa-
tions.  Some of these are between the corporation and its share-
holders:  for example, in the case of no dividend being distributed 
for a long time; no legal right exists to demand distribution.83  Some 
problems are among shareholders themselves, as in the case of a 
dilutive allocation of new shares, which is an indirect transfer of 
wealth from current to new shareholders; general contract law no-
where contemplates this situation.84  Some problems are between 
shareholders and third parties, as in the case of harm done to the 
corporation, and indirectly to shareholders’ claims toward it, 
which for some reason cannot be corrected with legal action taken 
by the corporation itself.85  Another example is harm done to the 
administrative error or an information gap (such as a private allocation of shares 
to a new shareholder, not timely and correctly reported to current shareholders, 
for any reason).  Israeli law partly attempts to address this situation, see Securities 
Regulation (Private Offering of Securities in a Registered Company), 5760-2000, §§ 
2, 21, KT 6051 p. 834 (Isr.) (requiring approval by the stock exchange and a public 
disclosure of the details of any private offering of shares by a public company).  
This provision is meant to prevent information gaps, so that all shareholders 
know of changes in the number of outstanding shares, including those resulting 
from a non-public allocation.  However, this regulation, like any other, can be 
breached, intentionally or not.  This possibility illuminates the crucial difference 
between shares and non-share claims, as the latter are grounded in concepts (such 
as sums of money) independent of the corporation.
83  Yet, corporate law recognizes and may provide remedy against an inequi-
table withholding of dividends.  See, e.g., Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 47 N.W. 
131, 134 (Mich. 1890) (“Courts of equity will not interfere in the management of 
the directors unless . . . they . . . refuse to declare a dividend when the corporation 
has a surplus of net profits which it can, without detriment to its business, divide 
among its stockholders, and when a refusal to do so would amount to such an 
abuse of discretion as would constitute a fraud, or breach of that good faith which 
they are bound to exercise towards the stockholders.”), quoted in Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919).  More generally, “the court of equity is 
at all times open to complaining shareholders having a just grievance.”  Id. at 684. 
84  Yet, corporate law recognizes and may provide remedy against inequita-
ble dilution.  See, e.g., Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006) (holding that 
former minority shareholders, deprived of value by a debt conversion transaction, 
can bring a direct claim against the former controlling shareholder; also holding 
that in various circumstances, share dilution can give rise to both derivative and 
direct claims); Feldman v. Cutaia, 956 A.2d 644, 655 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“A claim for 
wrongful equity dilution is premised on the notion that the corporation, by issu-
ing additional equity for insufficient consideration, made the complaining stock-
holder’s stake less valuable.”); CA 667/76 L. Glickman Ltd. v. A. M. Barkai Inv. 
Co. Ltd. 32(2) PD 281 (1978) (Isr.),
https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/elyon/LA-2-281-L.htm 
[https://perma.cc/S8FL-P9SK] (affirming grant of injunctive relief to minority 
shareholders, following a large allocation of new shares for consideration below 
their real value). 
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ability of the corporation to distribute rights to its shareholders, as 
with limitations on dividends in the financial sector.86  In some sit-
uations, the third party might be the corporation’s creditors, as in 
the case of an unlawful distribution, or in non-limited liability cor-
porations.  The third party might also be the corporation’s fiduciar-
ies (directly, not derivatively), such as when the corporation is in 
Revlon mode.87  Yet another group of such issues concerns those 
third parties involved in facilitating the corporation-shareholder 
link, such as banks, brokers, custodians, depositories, nominee 
companies, and stock exchanges, without the proper services of 
whom most shareholders would never practically enjoy their 
rights. 
These issues need to be dealt with in a methodic manner, based 
on some unifying, underlying principles, as good law must strive 
to do.  Together, they comprise the field of share law. 
4. THE STARTING POINT: SIMPLISTIC PERCEPTIONS OF SHARES
Yet, the amount of methodic treatment given to share law, es-
pecially compared to corporate fiduciary law, is surprisingly min-
imal.  One omnipresent problem is under-definition.  In the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law, no definition appears of the terms 
85  Yet, corporate law recognizes the derivative action, brought on behalf of a 
corporation by a shareholder.  See infra note 159. 
86 See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2010), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [https://perma.cc/99R6-Q968] (estab-
lishing guidelines for implementation by national regulators, regarding, among 
other things, limitations on banks’ and similar financial institutions’ ability to dis-
tribute capital to shareholders).  This exemplifies a situation where the interests of 
the corporation, as well as its fiduciaries, are not aligned with those of sharehold-
ers.  The corporation and its fiduciaries get a “good excuse” to keep and control 
more assets, rather than distribute them.  Hence, they might be more aligned with 
the third party (the regulator) who imposes the limitation.  Conceivably, legisla-
tures and other regulators can mandate any extreme limitation, even barring dis-
tributions altogether.  They might do so in regard to any corporation, not just fi-
nancial services providers.  This illustrates an equity situation, where no “legal” 
right exists (to be entitled to distribution), yet, an outcome where shareholders are 
completely separated from their investment is clearly unjustifiable.  Shareholders 
might be able to challenge this type of regulation.  Their claim would be direct, 
not derivative.  Such a challenge would require (on multiple fronts, from proce-
dural standing to substantive arguments) a well-grounded explanation of shares 
and shareholder rights.  That explanation is provided in share law. 
87 See infra pp. 298–300. 
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“share” or “stock.”  This may be attributed to the lack of an intro-
ductory definitions section in that statute, but it is also the result of 
a deeper issue:  that we think of the concept of a share as some-
thing “taken for granted,” requiring little analysis because we do 
not really need to know what it is.  Supposedly, the share is a black 
box.  We easily and offhandedly identify its “outputs,” such as div-
idends and voting rights, but we have no well-crafted idea of the 
process that generates these particular outputs.  The Delaware 
statute is replete with no less than 662 mentions of the terms 
“shareholder” and “stockholder”,88 granting them a central role in 
many statutory provisions, without ever defining who they are or 
what they possess.  The American Law Institute’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance exemplify this problem even more strongly, 
with an empty definition of an “Equity security” as “a share . . . or 
. . . a security convertible [into a share.]”89  The reader is left not 
knowing what a share, nor an equity security, actually is.  The Isra-
el Companies Act fares slightly better, when it defines a share as “a 
bundle of rights in the company that are determined in law and in 
the article of incorporation[.]”90  This, first, identifies the basic na-
ture of shares:  they are rights (and not, say, contracts).  Second, it 
creates a link between the share and another concept, the constitu-
tional documents, so shares can arise only from that particular con-
tract.  If a security is not mentioned there, it is definitely not a 
share.91  Yet, the statute fails to explain what are rights “in” another 
person (indeed, that phrase is meaningless92), or what prevents a 
corporation from also specifying the details of non-share obliga-
tions in its constitutional documents (indeed, nothing does). 
Another example of this simplistic approach lies in how natu-
rally we view the trading, on the same exchange floor, of shares is-
sued by corporations that are incorporated in very different juris-
dictions, or even legal traditions (civil and common law).  The New 
88 See DGCL (search for the phrases “shareholder” and “stockholder” over 
the entire document). 
89  PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 1.20 (AM. LAW INST. 1994).
90  Israel Companies Act § 1.
91  This is further embodied in the mandatory requirement that the author-
ized capital, which is the maximum number of shares the corporation can issue of 
each class, shall be specified in the article of incorporation.  See Israel Companies 
Act §§ 18(3), 33, 34.  Therefore, if a security is not mentioned, in the article of in-
corporation, as having a certain authorized capital, it is definitely not a share. 
92 See infra Part 5.2. 
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York Stock Exchange lists equity securities issued by corporations 
from China,93 Germany,94 Israel95 and the U.S.,96 among many oth-
ers, and they live unsuspiciously together.  We perceive them just 
as “shares,” rarely stopping to examine their insides.  The corpo-
rate laws of these different places might treat shares in disparate 
ways.  Such differences can be important in multiple respects.  For 
example, only if a corporation has issued shares, not other securi-
ties, to the public, does it become a “public company,”97 with all 
the massive legal ramifications that category entails.  Being a 
“share,” not something else, carries many other consequences, in a 
manner that often takes for granted the ability to differentiate be-
tween shares and non-share obligations.98
Even when we do try to discern shares from other legal phe-
nomena, a common method is to discuss them in terms of a list of 
rights, or the benefits with which they usually endow their own-
ers.99  That list might include dividends, liquidation proceeds, 
merger proceeds, voting, access to certain information, and per-
haps some court actions.100  However, first, this list is both short 
and not always correct.  It can be contracted around, leaving the 
security owners with more rights or less, or highly modified ones; 
93 See, e.g., Alibaba Group Holding Limited American Depositary Shares Each Rep-
resenting One Ordinary Share (BABA), NYSE, 
https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:BABA [https://perma.cc/6PRH-CGUM] 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
94 See, e.g., SAP SE ADS (SAP), NYSE, 
https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:SAP [https://perma.cc/M8JQ-JPM9] (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
95 See, e.g., Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited American Depositary Shares 
(TEVA), NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:TEVA
[https://perma.cc/SZK4-Z872] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
96 See, e.g., International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), NYSE, 
https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:IBM [https://perma.cc/9ZS7-KYXM] (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
97 See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 1 (defining “Public company” as “a com-
pany whose shares are listed on an exchange or were offered to the public . . . and 
are held by the public[.]”).
98 See, e.g., supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
99 See, e.g., ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 63, at 146 (introducing shares as 
distinct from debt securities, by focusing on two rights, voting and dividends: 
“Common stockholders elect the board.  After the company has paid its expenses 
. . . and [paid its debts to creditors], whatever is left over can loosely be said to 
“belong” to the stockholders in the sense that it is available for the payment of 
dividends.”). 
100 See, e.g., Israel Companies Act §§ 183–191, 194(a), 320–321; Israel Compa-
nies Ordinance §§ 284, 330(1) (detailing various rights granted to shareholders). 
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they might still be shareholders.  A good example is preferred 
shares.  The term “preferred share” denotes a family of securities 
that straddle the line between actual shares and other securities, 
namely bonds.  A preferred share, despite its name, might not be a 
“share” in any substantive sense.  Even when it is, its content is of-
ten markedly different than that of other securities called “shares;” 
for example, it might not carry any voting rights.  How do we tell if 
something is a share or not?101 How do we determine the legal 
treatment that should be given to a particular security?  These 
questions are part of share law, and its interaction with broader 
concepts of corporate and private law.  General, simplistic views of 
shares do not suffice to explain preferreds, or to fully and fairly de-
termine the rights of their owners—problems that recent scholar-
ship has grappled with.102
Second, the “list of rights” approach fails to note an important 
fact:  a given corporation might not experience any rights distribu-
tion event (such as a dividend or liquidation) for an extremely long 
time—in fact, a potentially unlimited period—yet, shares of that 
corporation will have intrinsic value and people will buy and sell 
them, for a price, at the secondary market.  This is in contrast to 
other kinds of obligations, which do have a maturity date, or oth-
erwise limited lifetime.  It is clear why bonds have value:  their 
owners have a contractual right to receive known sums of money 
at known times.  Shares carry no such rights; in fact, it is hard to 
ascertain from any textual source (contract or law) what is the eco-
nomic content a share carries throughout its existence.  So, why do 
shares have value?  What is their intrinsic content?  What claims 
does a shareholder have, and toward what or whom? 
101  A question of great practical importance, due to, inter alia, the special sta-
tus that corporate law confers upon shareholders and not others, often by mere 
reference to the word “share” or “shareholder,” presupposing the ability to differ-
entiate between shares and other securities.  See supra note 88 and accompanying 
text (noting that the DGCL mentions the terms “shareholder” and “stockholder” 
662 times, without defining shares). 
102 Compare William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred 
Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815 (2013), with Leo E. Strine, Jr., Response: Poor Pitiful or 
Potently Powerful Preferred?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2025 (2013) (articles presenting dif-
ferent views regarding the nature of preferred shareholders’ rights, on a spectrum 
between equitable rights, similar to those attached to common shares, and con-
tractual rights, similar to those attached to non-share corporate obligations). 
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5. FOUR UNSATISFACTORY APPROACHES TO SHARES
These questions are traditionally answered using several ap-
proaches (that is, beyond the simplistic “black box” and “list of 
rights” approaches outlined above).  As the discussion below re-
veals, even these more developed approaches only examine the 
topic via their own, entrenched perceptions.  Some offer correct ob-
servations, but none is free of inaccuracies; none can serve as the 
basis for a theory and law of shares.  This Part surveys the four 
main approaches invoked today to explain the share phenomenon. 
As a unifying theme, it asks how the Co-Op decision might be justi-
fied, if at all, under each approach. 
5.1.  The Contract Approach 
According to one common approach, shareholders are just a 
group of creditors, who have paid large sums of money103 to enter 
into a contract (the constitutional documents) which in itself is de-
void of meaningful content.  It includes no maturity date, no peri-
odic payments, no financial covenants, and no right to sue under 
general contract law even when the corporation is running badly 
and the chances of getting a return become slim.104  It is a contract 
for a residual claim, with all the attendant problems.105  This ap-
proach views shareholders as contractual parties, but with a large-
ly unwritten,106 custom-based or implied covenant-based con-
103 See supra note 2.  The amounts mentioned there are on a global scale, but 
they are composed of the holdings of many separate shareholders, each the owner 
of substantive rights that should be protected by legal norms and institutions, as 
any other right. 
104  In non-limited liability corporations, shareholders bear an even bigger 
risk: ending up with shares of negative value, due to having to satisfy part or all 
of the corporation’s liabilities themselves.  See supra note 74.  Non-residual credi-
tors do not bear such a risk; if insolvency occurs, they stand to lose, at most, their 
own claim.  This further demonstrates the unique position of shareholders, com-
pared to all other creditors. 
105 See supra Part 3. 
106 See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corpora-
tions: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1989) 
(“Complications arise in corporate transactions, however, because the relevant 
“agreement” is generally unwritten, frequently ambiguous or contradictory and 
often not an agreement at all.”).  See also supra notes 5, 6. 
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tract107 and with legal rights disproportionate to their economic in-
vestment.  They are creditors having none of the protections of 
contract law. 
On the other hand, they might incur the downsides:  in Co-Op,
one could argue that the unknown shareholders have “aban-
doned” or “slept on” their rights, which under contract law doc-
trine, is possibly sufficient to negate those rights.108
Furthermore, contract law generally provides a rich, well-
developed doctrinal environment; a good example is the availabil-
ity of remedy against an anticipatory breach of contract.109  Howev-
er, contract law is largely built on the assumption that creditors 
know, or can know (and prove), what they are entitled to.  For 
shareholders, no remedy against “anticipatory breach” is possible, 
because the shareholder has nothing specific enough to anticipate. 
Another important doctrinal problem is that under contract 
law, “the drafting burden [is] on the party asserting the right[.]”110
Hence, it could have been claimed that the unknown shareholders 
should have had, in Co-Op’s constitutional documents, express 
clauses saying that they hold quasi-property rights, unlimited in 
time, toward the corporation’s net worth; and regulating many 
other situations that might occur, no matter how remote.  Such 
clauses are practically not found in any constitutional documents. 
Similarly lurking are statute of limitations arguments, which can-
not be raised as easily against owners of property or quasi-
property (equity) rights.111
107  Although the contract approach itself might not necessarily say so, equity 
is the main source of the customs and implied covenants embodied in shares.  See
infra Part 6. 
108 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-309(1) (2018) (“The time for shipment 
or delivery or any other action under a contract if not provided in this Article or 
agreed upon shall be a reasonable time.”); Contracts Act (General Part), 5733-1973, 
§ 41, SH No. 694 p. 118 (Isr.) [hereinafter: Israel Contracts Act] (“If no time has
been agreed on for the fulfillment of an obligation, it has to be fulfilled a reasona-
ble period after the formation of the contract, at a time of which the creditor has
given notice to the debtor a reasonable period in advance.”).
109 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-610 (2018) (“When either party repudi-
ates the contract with respect to a performance not yet due . . . , the aggrieved par-
ty may . . . resort to any remedy for breach . . . .”); Contracts Act (Remedies for 
Breach of Contract), 5731-1970, § 17, SH No. 610 p. 16 (Isr.) (“If a party indicates its 
intention not to perform a contract, or if it appears from the circumstances that 
[the party] will be unable or unwilling to perform [the contract], the other party is 
entitled to remedies according to this Act even before the date set for the perfor-
mance of the contract . . . .”). 
110  Bratton & Wachter, supra note 102, at 1820. 
111 See, e.g., Peter Watts, Some Aspects of the Intersection of the Law of Agency 
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To a large extent, the contractual approach is associated with 
the school of law and economics and the “nexus of contracts” theo-
ry.  Under these disciplines, a contract is simply a contract; one 
contract may differ from another in terms, but not in general na-
ture.  Hence, shareholders are presumably just another group of 
stakeholders in the corporate nexus.112  It is worth noting that ac-
cording to the nexus of contracts theory, the corporation itself is an 
aggregation of contracts.113  However, that statement is wrong. 
How can “a contract” (or any number thereof) sue someone in 
court, own property, or do anything else?  More correctly, the cor-
poration is a person; it is not the nexus of contracts, but the central 
party to the nexus of contracts.114
Of the four approaches discussed in this Part of the Article, the 
contract approach, equally with the trust approach,115 is probably 
the least wrong when it comes to shares.  The share relationship is, 
at a basic level, a contractual relationship between shareholder and 
corporation.116  When a person owns a share, that person primarily 
with the Law of Trusts, in EQUITY, TRUSTS AND COMMERCE 29, 45 (Paul S Davies & 
James Penner eds., 2017) (“In many jurisdictions, limitation periods do not apply 
to actions for failure to account brought against an express trustee.”). 
112 See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 15 (1996) 
(“[S]upplying capital to the firm is simply one of many transactional relationships 
to which ownership can be tied, and there is nothing very special about it.”); 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 271, 274 n.8 (1986) (“There is no fundamental difference between 
debt and equity claims from an economic perspective.”).  The answer to this line 
of argument is that, although non-residual creditors might sometimes lose part or 
all of their positive law claim, this does not modify the claim’s intrinsic content, 
which is not residual, is often fixed, is represented by some concepts (such as 
money and time) external to the corporation, and is governed by some normative 
framework external to corporate law.  For creditors, what fluctuates is not their 
claim’s content, but the probability of receiving it.  Creditors’ rights may be negat-
ed when the corporation becomes insolvent, which is the exception; most corpora-
tions are not insolvent.  The content of creditors’ claims can change only accord-
ing to external law, such as contract or bankruptcy law.  The rule, and the general 
perception of being a “creditor,” is that creditors have a relatively stable claim, 
and they usually get it.  In contrast, residual claimants’ positive law claim is in-
trinsically non-fixed and entirely dependent on the corporation.  Their claim is al-
ways fluctuating, even when the corporation is not insolvent, and even if it is very 
successful.  Therefore, shareholders are indeed special and different than non-
residual creditors. 
113 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the 
Market for Corporate Charters, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 365, 369 (1988) (“The corporation is 
a nexus of contracts.”). 
114 See infra Part 5.2. 
115 See infra Part 5.3. 
116  In addition to the other relationships arising from shares: the shareholder-
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owns a claim toward a corporation.  However, by design, that 
claim is exceptionally vague and ill-defined.  It is never put well 
into words—neither in contract, nor in law.  It is far removed from 
the concept of a contract as we normally think of it.  As a result, 
whenever we discuss the contractual approach, we must remember 
that the “share contract” is singularly exceptional, among all the 
corporation’s relationships.  It should never be described in terms 
of contract law alone.  Rather, it is intertwined with another nor-
mative framework—equity.  Part 6 of this Article expands on that 
distinction. 
5.2.  The Property Approach 
At the other end of the spectrum, some have argued that 
shareholders “own” the corporation,117 or are the true owners of 
the corporation’s assets.118  This approach is related to the “aggre-
gate theory” of the corporation, which contends that a corporation 
is just a grouping of other individuals, usually its shareholders.119
Property rights are eternal; they do not have a maturity date. 
Under this approach, the result in Co-Op may be justified:  proper-
ty rights cannot be taken away, absent some exceptional circum-
stances, even if their owner fails to demand those rights or show 
shareholder and shareholder-third party relationships.  See supra pp. 277–78. 
117 See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Cor-
poration, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–65 (1992) (“In the first conception, the corpo-
ration is seen as the private property of its stockholder-owners.”); Katsuhito Iwai, 
Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Compara-
tive Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 592 (1999) (“[W]hat does a corpo-
rate shareholder own?  The corporation, of course.  It is the corporation itself as a 
“thing” that a corporate shareholder legally owns.  A corporate shareholder is lit-
erally a holder of a corporate share, a bundle of participatory and pecuniary rights 
in the corporation.”). 
118 See, e.g., VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN CHARITABLE 2 (1882) (“[T]he rights and duties of an 
incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties of the persons who 
compose it, and not of an imaginary being.”), quoted in Gregory A. Mark, The Per-
sonification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1458 
(1987). 
119 See, e.g., Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM. J.
COMP. L. 39, 42 (2000) (“The aggregate or partnership model of the corporation, 
which was prevalent in the 19th century, assumed [a role as the “owners” of the 
corporate enterprise] for shareholders . . . .” (citation omitted)).  On the aggregate 
theory, see generally Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation is a Person: The Language of 
a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563, 566 (1987). 
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up in court to defend them.  Certainly, they can be eliminated 
much less easily than purely obligatory rights. 
However, the property approach is also mistaken.  A corpora-
tion is a person.120  It exists separately from any other person, in-
cluding its shareholders.  Like other persons, a corporation can en-
ter into obligatory relationships and can own property.  A 
corporation is not and cannot be property.  Shareholders do not 
own the corporation; they own shares.121  While it is meaningful to 
discuss the ownership of a right toward a corporation, it is unclear 
what might it mean, in both philosophical and property law terms, 
to “own” a corporation—another person, with interests and voli-
tion of its own.122  Furthermore, the corporation is the full owner of 
its own assets,123 including that portion amounting to its net worth 
120 See, e.g., DGCL § 122 (detailing a list of “powers” held by every Delaware 
corporation, generally similar and often identical to the capacities of a natural per-
son); Israel Companies Act § 4 (“A company is a legal person capable of any right, 
duty and act that is consistent with its character and nature as an incorporated 
body.”); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 453–54 (1882) (“This corporation, like 
others, is created a body politic and corporate . . . .  [It] may make contracts, com-
mit torts, and incur liabilities, and may sue or be sued in [its] corporate name in 
regard to all of these transactions.  The parties who deal with [the corporation] 
understand this, and that they are dealing with a body which has these rights and 
is subject to these obligations, and they do not deal with or count upon a liability 
to the stockholder whom they do not know and with whom they have no privity 
of contract or other relation.”); Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) 30 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (“[O]nce the company is legally incorporated it must be 
treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities appropri-
ate to itself . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“Unless its 
articles of incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation has perpetual dura-
tion and succession in its corporate name and has the same powers as an individ-
ual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and af-
fairs . . . .”); ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 63, at 77 (“The corporation is 
considered a separate person in the eyes of the law.”); John C. Coates IV, State 
Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 806, 818–35 (1989) (discussing in detail the “natural entity theory” of the cor-
poration); Schane, supra note 119, at 592–609 (providing legal and linguistic analy-
sis of the concept of corporate personality). 
121 See, e.g., YEDIDIA Z. STERN, HA’BA’ALUT BA’HEVRAH HA’ISKIT: TE’ORYAH, DIN,
METSI’UT [THE OWNERSHIP OF A CORPORATION: THEORY, LAW, REALITY] 129 (2008) 
(“Shareholders, as their name also attests, hold a right of ownership in a share and 
not a right of ownership in the company.”). 
122 See id. at 136 (“The company is an entity with interests of its own, that dif-
fer from those of any other actor . . . .  The company is meant to act independently 
of any other entity to promote those interests.”); infra note 145 and accompanying 
text. 
123 See, e.g., DGCL § 122(4) (“[Every corporation created under this chapter 
shall have power to] [p]urchase, receive, take by grant, gift, devise, bequest or 
otherwise, lease, or otherwise acquire, own, hold, improve, employ, use and oth-
erwise deal in and with real or personal property, or any interest therein . . . [.]”); 
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(shareholders’ equity).  Shareholders, as other creditors may do, 
have entered into a contract, not a possessory relationship, with the 
corporation.124  That contract is the constitutional documents, along 
with the legal and equitable norms they necessarily absorb.  In 
summary, a corporation is not property, and its own property be-
longs to it, not to its shareholders.  Therefore, a property approach 
to the nature of shares cannot hold. 
5.3.  The Trust Approach 
The trust approach would turn to trust law, viewing the corpo-
ration125 as a trustee, where shareholders are the beneficiaries and 
the corporation’s net worth is the trust property.  Seemingly exem-
plifying this approach is A. A. Berle’s famous 1931 article.126
If this approach is correct, the Co-Op decision can be rather eas-
ily explained:  shareholders have a trust claim toward their frac-
tions of the corporation’s net worth; that claim, somewhat similar 
to a property right as discussed above,127 does not have a maturity 
date (unless otherwise specified in the terms of the trust; there was 
no such stipulation in Co-Op’s constitutional documents), so 
shareholders own a right that is unlimited in time. 
Once again, upon closer inspection, both trust law and corpo-
rate law do not support this approach.  First, trust law is conserva-
tive.  It is geared toward different purposes than corporate law.  By 
default, the trustee has to maintain the trust property,128 not engage 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“[Every corporation has 
power] to purchase, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, and own, hold, improve, 
use, and otherwise deal with, real or personal property, or any legal or equitable 
interest in property . . . [.]”).  The same proposition is implicit in Israel Companies 
Act § 4.  In addition, references to the company’s own property are spread 
throughout that statute, which also never mentions any proprietary link between 
shareholders and the company’s assets. 
124 See supra notes 4, 72. 
125  In a different variation, the corporation’s directors are the trustees or fi-
duciaries for shareholders.  That approach may equally be refuted, see infra Part 
5.4. 
126 See A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1049, 1049 (1931) (arguing that “all powers granted to a corporation . . . are . . . ex-
ercisable only for the . . . benefit of . . . shareholders”, and that this is analogous to 
limitations on the power of trustees). 
127 See supra Part 5.2. 
128 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302 (2018) (instructing trustees as to 
“authorized investments”); Trust Act, 5739-1979, § 6, SH No. 941 p. 128 (Isr.) 
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in complex, risky activities, typical of the modern corporation.  A 
chief consideration in trust law is the welfare of the beneficiary.  In 
corporate law, shareholders are important, but their interests are 
not nearly as overriding as those of trust beneficiaries. 
Second, a trust is a narrowly and strictly articulated concept. 
For example, in Israel, it is defined as “a relation to an asset accord-
ing to which a trustee has to hold or act upon it for the benefit of a 
beneficiary or for another goal.”129  The “asset”—some piece of 
property—is a key component of any trust.  Indeed, trust law is 
property-oriented, but the modern corporation is not simply a 
keeper of assets.  It is an active and dynamic person, engaging in a 
host of acts that are often unrelated to safeguarding shareholders’ 
investment.  For example, when SpaceX develops a new type of 
Mars-going rocket,130 besides being a risky use of corporate funds 
(related to the first point above), it is also an activity that has abso-
lutely nothing to do with the work of a trustee.  Abiding by the 
narrow strictures of trust law would not have allowed many mod-
ern corporations to exist, and would hinder the interests of both 
corporations and shareholders.131
Third, there is little support in positive law to the concept of 
the corporation being a trustee for shareholders.  A survey of the 
corporate statutes of Israel, Delaware, the MBCA, and the U.K. re-
veals that none of them offer such a proposition.  Furthermore, 
courts have repeatedly held that the corporation is not a fiduciary 
for its shareholders.132  Since a trustee is one type of fiduciary,133 it 
[hereinafter: Israel Trust Act] (“Those trust funds that are not required for [the 
trust’s] ongoing needs, the trustee is obliged to hold or invest as is efficient to main-
tain the principal and make returns . . . .” (emphases added)). 
129  Israel Trust Act § 1. 
130 See, e.g., Stephen Clark, Musk: Atmospheric tests of interplanetary spaceship 
could happen next year, SPACEFLIGHT NOW (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://spaceflightnow.com/2018/03/13/musk-atmospheric-tests-of-
interplanetary-spaceship-could-happen-next-year [https://perma.cc/9LJJ-P7VN].  
Space Exploration Technologies Corp., also known as SpaceX, is a Delaware cor-
poration.  See Division of Corporations - Filing, DELAWARE.GOV,
https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/ecorp/entitysearch/NameSearch.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/6GKQ-BNT4] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (search for entity 
name “Space Exploration Technologies Corp.” or file number 3500808). 
131 Cf. Kornhauser, supra note 106, at 1450 (“Unlike contract, which allows 
much discrimination in allocating entitlements among parties to the agreement, 
trust does not seem adequately flexible to explain the complex allocation of obli-
gations and privileges among this web of actors.”). 
132 See, e.g., In re Stillwater Capital Partners Inc. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 556, 
573 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“A corporation does not owe a fiduciary duty to its share-
holders . . . .”); Alessi v. Beracha, 849 A.2d 939, 950 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Earthgrains 
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is all the less plausible to see the corporation as shareholders’ trus-
tee. 
Fourth and very pointedly, even when Berle wrote of share-
holders’ rights in trust, he did so by analogy.  The analogy is to eq-
uity.  Berle says so explicitly: 
[I]n every case, corporate action must be twice tested:  first,
by the technical rules having to do with the existence and
proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules
somewhat analogous to those which apply in favor of a [trust
beneficiary] to the trustee’s exercise of wide powers grant-
ed to him . . . .134
“Somewhat analogous” is far from “identical.”  In fact, 
throughout Berle’s paper, “equity” and its inflections appear more 
frequently than “trust”:  52 and 38 times, respectively.135  Quite 
plainly, Berle meant to say that shareholders have equitable, or 
more-than-legal, more-than-contractual rights.  The liberty Berle 
took in using “trust” for the title of his article is partly understand-
able, because trust law is a branch of equity.  A right in trust is one, 
very common type of equitable right.  Yet, as the discussion above 
illustrates, trust law is a specific area of jurisprudence, adding its 
own rules and conventions on top of those of general equity.  Eve-
ry corporation is an equitable obligor; not every corporation is a 
trustee.136  The trust approach, like the contract approach, comes 
[(defendant corporation)] owes no fiduciary duty to Alessi [(plaintiff sharehold-
er)].  I will not require Earthgrains to remedy Alessi’s injury without a valid legal 
theory for holding Earthgrains liable.”). 
133 See, e.g., Trust Code Summary, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Trust%20Code 
[https://perma.cc/P4MD-J57Y] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (“A trustee is a fiduci-
ary, sometimes described as the utmost fiduciary.”). 
134  Berle, supra note 126, at 1049 (emphasis added). 
135 See id. (search for the phrases “equit” and “trust” over the entire docu-
ment).  Moreover, many uses of the word “trust” in Berle’s article are as part of a 
name, such as “Fidelity Trust Company”, id. at 1064, so the actual balance favors 
“equity” even more. 
136  Of course, a corporation can also become a trustee, usually by entering 
into a trust contract.  Some corporations, such as trust companies and money 
managers, are primarily devoted to such activity.  The trust beneficiary is an equi-
table but non-residual creditor of the corporation.  The beneficiary’s rights are 
grounded in a field of law (trusts) that is external to corporate law, and they relate 
to some asset that is not entirely the product of the corporation’s fortunes.  On the 
distinction between residual claims and those grounded in external reality, see su-
pra p. 276. 
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relatively close to the truth, but still requires qualification.  Even 
when, as this Article urges, we adopt a broad, holistic view to pro-
tect substantive rights, precision is important. 
5.4.  The Fiduciary Approach 
According to another approach, which presumably reflects 
most law in the United States, what shareholders own is a direct 
claim toward the corporation’s fiduciaries.  For example, a com-
mon reading of the famous Dodge v. Ford decision137 implies that 
directors owe their duties not only to the corporation, but also di-
rectly to shareholders.  No other group of creditors enjoys those du-
ties.  This can be taken to mean that shareholders and directors are 
parties to the same relationship, which gives rise to a heightened 
duty toward shareholders, co-existing with directors’ duties to-
ward another person—the corporation.  Some Delaware cases 
seemingly imply the same.138  This position accords with a plural-
istic view of fiduciary law, which allows for the recognition of mul-
tiple, separate types of beneficiaries within the same fiduciary ar-
rangement. 
However, this approach, as well as the assertion that it reflects 
current American law, are both incorrect.  First, even if it did mir-
ror U.S. law, the pluralistic view is globally an exception.  Other ju-
risdictions, including Israel,139 the U.K.,140 and most civil law Euro-
137  Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
138 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) 
(“[D]irectors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests 
of the corporation and to act in the best interests of its shareholders.”); Cres-
cent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 979 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Directors 
have an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and 
the stockholders alike.”).  But see infra pp. 298–300 (explaining that the mergers 
and acquisitions context, where the cases mentioned in this footnote arose, is an 
exception partly allowing for direct duties toward shareholders). 
139 See Israel Companies Act §§ 252(a) (“An officer owes toward the company 
a duty of care . . . .”), 254(a) (“An officer owes a duty of loyalty to the compa-
ny . . . .”).  The term “officer” includes a director, see Israel Companies Act § 1.
140 See Companies Act 2006 § 170(1) (UK) (“The general duties specified in 
sections 171 to 177 are owed by a director of a company to the company.”).  See 
also D. D. Prentice, Directors, Creditors, and Shareholders, in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF 
TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 73, 73 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 1992) (“It is a 
generally accepted principle of company law that directors owe their duties to the 
company and not to the company’s creditors or to its shareholders . . . .”). 
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pean countries,141 take the monistic view:  directors and similar fi-
duciaries owe their duties only to the corporation.  In turn, the cor-
poration owes various obligations to others—contractual, tort, eq-
uitable, environmental, or any other kind.  Like any person, the 
corporation is required to obey positive law, including share law, 
and meet its obligations.  Yet, this has nothing to do with extend-
ing fiduciaries’ duties, beyond their duty to the corporation.142
Second, from a normative standpoint, this approach is bad law.  
A core tenet of fiduciary law is that a fiduciary may not be the 
servant of two masters.143  In other words, under fiduciary law, di-
vided loyalty is breached loyalty.144  The interests of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders can and do diverge.145  Therefore, this du-
141 See Klaus J. Hopt, Directors’ Duties to Shareholders, Employees, and Other 
Creditors: A View from the Continent, in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF TRUSTS AND
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 115, 116 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 1992) (“The general rule 
in most European countries is that directors have direct duties and liabilities only 
to their company.”). 
142  This can be stated in terms of corporate purpose: the for-profit corpora-
tion’s purpose is the lawful pursuit of profit.  See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 11 
(“The purpose of a company is to act according to business considerations to max-
imize its profits . . . .”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 
(Del. Ch. 2010) (“I cannot accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that . . . seeks not to 
maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation . . . .”).  The 
“lawful” part is not mentioned in these sources, but it is obvious: everyone must 
obey positive law; even if a corporation wanted to have a non-lawful purpose, by 
definition, law cannot give cognizance to such an attempt.  Directors and other 
fiduciaries are duty-bound to promote the achievement of the corporation’s pur-
pose.  As pertains to the corporation’s relationship with shareholders, this relates 
to both the “lawful” (the corporation must obey share law) and the “pursuit of 
profit.”  When fiduciaries cause the corporation to not operate this way, they steer 
the corporation away from its purpose and thus breach their duty to the corpora-
tion. 
143 See, e.g., supra note 68 (citing judicial decisions holding that a fiduciary is 
bound to act single-mindedly for the interests of the beneficiary); EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 77, at 38 (“[A] manager told to serve two masters . . . has been 
freed of both and is answerable to neither.”). 
144 See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 9, at 183 (“[T]he duty of loyalty can sustain only 
one interpretation—the monistic interpretation.  A pluralistic approach and a du-
ty of loyalty are contradictory in the most basic sense—definitionally, in fact—so 
an attempt to interpret and apply the duty according to this approach counters 
[the duty of loyalty’s] principles and values.  Such an attempt amounts to an elim-
ination of the duty of loyalty . . . .”). 
145  The benefit of shareholders is closely related, but not identical, to the ben-
efit of the corporation.  The two may diverge in various situations, including the 
distribution of a dividend or a share buyback, the mergers and acquisitions con-
text, or a decision on voluntary dissolution.  This divergence was also examined 
in a well-known Delaware Court of Chancery opinion.  See Credit Lyonnais Bank 
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (illustrating a situation where a corporation, its sharehold-
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ality is neither desirable nor practicable. 
Third, this approach is structurally flawed.  Even if sharehold-
ers did enjoy direct duties owed by directors, that would not be of 
much help, because directors are not the owners of the corpora-
tion’s assets; the corporation is.  If, for any reason, the corporation 
loses a certain amount of wealth (an indirect loss for shareholders), 
that amount does not necessarily go into directors’ pockets.  This is 
particularly true when the loss results from a breach of the duty of 
care, rather than the duty of loyalty; or when it results from no fi-
duciary breach at all, but from the action of a third party, which di-
rectors could not practically have prevented.  Moreover, the larger 
the amount, the less likely it is that directors (or their insurers) can 
or will fully compensate for it.  In any case, the economic claim 
held by shareholders is toward the corporation and its net worth, 
not its directors and their net worth. 
Fourth, this approach is also flawed from another structural 
perspective.  Shareholders and directors are not parties to the same 
contract.  Each director is party to a contract with the corporation, 
an “employment contract” of sorts, heavily laden with terms of fi-
duciary law (often unwritten and implied).  These contracts are ini-
tially entered into when the corporation is created and its first di-
rectors embark upon their roles.146  They are separate from another 
contract—the corporation’s constitutional documents, also coming 
into force the moment the corporation is formed.147  That contract is 
recognized, either by statute or case law,148 to involve the corpora-
tion and its shareholders as parties.  The one person who is party 
ers and its creditors each have a different interest as to the same business deci-
sion).  This non-identity is further reflected in the difference between various 
“time frames” toward which the corporation may be oriented.  The corporation 
may operate for its long-term benefit, or some other time horizon lawfully deter-
mined by its fiduciaries.  See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 
A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (“[Directors’] broad mandate includes a conferred au-
thority to set a corporate course of action, including time frame, designed to en-
hance corporate profitability. . . . [A]bsent a limited set of circumstances . . . , a
board of directors . . . is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value
in the short term . . . .” (citation omitted)).  While this should also benefit share-
holders, as claimants toward the corporation and the residual of its wealth, it does
so in a manner that might be objectionable to some, or even the majority of,
shareholders.  This is far from the pretense that the corporation and its sharehold-
ers are the same, have the same interests, or can be the object of the same duties.
146 See supra note 72. 
147 See, e.g., DGCL § 106; Israel Companies Act § 16 (“A company’s article of 
incorporation . . . is in force from the time of its incorporation.”). 
148 See supra notes 4, 72. 
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to both contracts is the corporation.  This, too, makes plain that 
shareholders’ rights come to them from the corporation. 
Fifth, careful examination reveals that even Dodge v. Ford sup-
ports the monistic view:  directors owe their duties only to the cor-
poration.  Dodge v. Ford never says that shareholders directly bene-
fit from fiduciary duties,149 but only that shareholders are special, 
compared to all other creditors.  That is because “[a] business cor-
poration is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders.  The powers of the directors are to be employed for 
that end.”150  Clearly, the topic Dodge v. Ford entertains is the pur-
pose of the corporation, not the identity of fiduciary law beneficiaries. 
The rights of shareholders are channeled through the corpora-
tion—they are a product of the existence and organization of the 
corporation.  They do not directly flow from directors, whom 
Dodge v. Ford instructs as to carrying on the business of the corpora-
tion.
Even when not relying on Dodge v. Ford, for example in Dela-
ware,151 the “direct fiduciary” interpretation is misguided.  Given 
the weight of positive and normative evidence against a fiduciary 
approach to shares, as presented in this section, decisions and oth-
er materials to such effect should be read accordingly.  Where “du-
ties to the corporation and its shareholders,” or similar language, is 
employed, its correct construction is “duties to the corporation, 
who in turn owes to shareholders.”  This reading fully conforms 
with existing law, while correcting a certain imprecision, which 
tends to occur for several reasons.  To begin with, shareholders’ 
claim is closely linked to the corporation’s well-being, which direc-
tors are duty-bound to advance.  The more the corporation 
achieves its purpose, usually the greater the benefit of shareholders, 
assuming correct operation of share law.  This close relation, be-
tween the welfare of residual claimants and that of the corporation, 
might easily motivate the inaccurate wording.  Courts write as if 
the two are identical, so there is no “translation” process between 
them, and there is not much difference between saying “the corpo-
ration” and “its shareholders.”  As this Article demonstrates, that 
assumption is untrue.  The relation is not an identity; equating the 
149  In fact, the word “fiduciary” is never mentioned in the decision.  See
Dodge v. Ford.
150 Id. at 507 (emphases added). 
151 See supra note 138. 
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two is, at most, a general metaphor.152
The phrasing inaccuracy might also arise from the fact that 
shareholders’ rights are grounded in equity-based share law, and 
equity is closely related to fiduciary law.  In essence, courts are us-
ing “fiduciary” as code for “equity.”  They are trying to convey 
that shareholders are not regular, arm’s length creditors, but equity 
claimants, with more-than-legal, more-than-contractual rights, jus-
tified by power and information asymmetries, similar to those 
found in fiduciary relationships.  That is entirely accurate; yet, it 
does not turn shareholders into fiduciary law beneficiaries.  Fidu-
ciary law and equity are not synonymous.  Different types of equi-
ty claimants exist.153  This distinction has far-reaching practical im-
plications.  Fiduciary law is strict.  With the duty of loyalty at its 
heart, it requires the fiduciary to self-abnegate and to treat all bene-
ficiaries with the same, extremely high standard of conduct.154
Loyalty is not a matter of degree.  Equity, the taxonomical parent 
of fiduciary law, operates more broadly:  it can inject flexibility 
where required.  It enables us to fine-tune the concept of share-
holders, recognizing they are separate from the corporation, and 
cannot be the object of the same duties, while also realizing they 
are different from non-residual creditors, and must be protected 
appropriately.  In fact, Delaware law submits to this distinction.  It 
concedes that direct duties, owed by directors to shareholders, are 
an exception, arising only in situations such as those invoking 
Revlon duties.155  Moreover, the Unocal and Revlon standard of re-
152 See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 9, at 199 (“[T]he [duty of loyalty] itself is to-
ward the company.  Shareholders are beneficiaries in a conceptual and indirect 
manner . . . .”); Paul L. Davies, Directors’ Fiduciary Duties and Individual Sharehold-
ers, in COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 83, 83–84 (Ew-
an McKendrick ed., 1992) (discussing “the doctrine that the duties of directors are 
owed to shareholders collectively” in a way that reveals no practical difference 
from duties “to the company”; further mentioning that “directors’ duties . . . in-
volve obligations owed . . . [to a] group not normally limited to the existing share-
holders of the company”, but also including future and “potential sharehold-
ers”—which confirms that the only actual, identifiable person, to whom those 
duties can run, is the company).  See also supra note 145.  A purpose-based formu-
lation of corporate law can easily bridge this conceptual gap, by clarifying that the 
fiduciary’s duty, toward the corporation, is to promote the achievement of the 
corporation’s purpose, which is the lawful pursuit of profit, which in turn (by op-
eration of share law) also benefits shareholders.  See supra note 142. 
153 See infra pp. 303–05. 
154 See supra notes 68, 69, 144; infra pp. 304–05. 
155 See infra pp. 298–300. 
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view is an “intermediate standard”156 of “enhanced scrutiny”,157
above the business judgment rule, but below the entire fairness re-
quired by the duty of loyalty.158  This is precisely the flexibility af-
forded by equity, and forbidden under fiduciary law.  Delaware 
itself, the seeming focal point of “direct fiduciary” language, in fact 
adopts a nuanced, equitable approach to share law. 
Sixth, another proof that even the American (and specifically 
Delaware) view is monistic, as in other jurisdictions, comes from 
the distinction between derivative and direct actions.  If directors 
owed directly to shareholders, or if the corporation’s “middleman” 
status was otherwise eliminated, there would be no difference be-
tween harm to the corporation and harm to its shareholders.  Every
lawsuit against directors (or any other defendant, for that matter) 
could then be brought as a direct action, in the name of sharehold-
ers.  In reality, the existence of, and insistence on, derivative ac-
tions demonstrate that only the corporation is the beneficiary of di-
rectors’ duties.  Shareholders may assert a breach of those duties 
only indirectly, on behalf of the corporation.  Practically, this dis-
tinction is extremely consequential, as any plaintiff who tries to 
navigate the unique procedural hurdles of derivative litigation 
quickly learns.159
156 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard 
for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 
248 (1989) (“[T]he Delaware courts’ most recent response to the tension between 
the intrinsic fairness standard and the business judgment standard in the takeover 
context [is a]n intermediate standard of review mandating that management’s de-
fensive tactics must be “reasonable in relation to the threat posed” by a hostile of-
fer.” (citation omitted)). 
157 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
184 (Del. 1986) (discussing “the enhanced scrutiny which Unocal requires of direc-
tor conduct.”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) 
(“When a board addresses a pending takeover bid . . . there is an enhanced duty 
which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the 
business judgment rule may be conferred.”). 
158 See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 156, at 247 (“[T]he intrinsic fair-
ness test[ does] not seem adequate [(due to over-strictness)] when courts must 
evaluate defensive measures that implicate . . . [management’s] loyalty to share-
holder interests.”).  If management really owed to shareholders a full duty of loy-
alty, the same as it owes to the corporation, then according to fiduciary law prin-
ciples, see supra notes 68, 69, 144, it would be impossible to diverge downwards 
from the entire fairness test.  Clearly, then, that is not what management owes to 
shareholders. 
159  For the rules governing the distinction between direct and derivative ac-
tions, and the pretrial stages of a derivative action in Delaware, see Tooley v. Don-
aldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004) (holding that the 
distinction between derivative and direct claims turns solely on “who suffered the 
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Furthermore, not only shareholders can file derivative lawsuits; 
sometimes, creditors can do so as well.160  In any case, the action is 
brought on behalf of the corporation and for the corporation’s benefit. 
The fundamental idea behind Gheewalla161 is that just like share-
holders, if creditors are to be righted for a wrong they suffered, 
they have to address the corporation; their rights are channeled 
through the corporation; they do not have direct claims toward an-
yone else.  The ultimate, indirect outcomes of fiduciary duties and 
their breach can be complex (such as harm to creditors, rather than 
or in addition to shareholders), but those duties are owed to the 
corporation, who is itself the distributor of wealth (or other legal 
effects) to both shareholders and creditors, and the object of claims 
by them. 
Seventh, contrary to the common yet mistaken reading of 
Dodge v. Ford and the “direct fiduciary” Delaware decisions, multi-
ple other landmark cases and leading authorities, from Delaware 
itself, support the same proposition as this Article:  the corporation 
alleged harm” and “who would receive the benefit of any . . . remedy”); Rales v. 
Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933–34 (Del. 1993) (determining whether to allow a deriv-
ative action to proceed, where the board that would consider the pre-suit demand 
is not the same board that committed the alleged harm); Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 
A.2d 767, 775–76 (Del. 1990) (holding that by sending a demand letter, the plaintiff
concedes that the board’s decision not to pursue the action should be reviewed
under the business judgment rule, thereby practically negating the plaintiff’s de-
rivative claims; thus, establishing a universal non-demand rule, where the adjudi-
cation on the merits of a derivative action is centered on the issue of demand ex-
cusal in the pretrial, motion to dismiss stage); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814
(Del. 1984) (establishing the test to determine whether a demand on the board is
excused prior to filing a derivative action).  See also infra note 244.  In Israel, every
derivative action involves a preliminary certification stage, consisting of a trial in
itself, whereby the court determines if the plaintiff may represent the corporation
and proceed to litigate the main case.  In that preliminary stage, the court is in-
structed to consider, first, whether conducting the lawsuit would be in the benefit
of the corporation (taken to require a prima facie showing of a cause of action) and,
second, whether the plaintiff acts in good faith.  See Israel Companies Act § 198(a).
Similarly to Delaware, the actual adjudication on the merits usually occurs in the
preliminary stage.  The main idea is that derivative actions are different, and usu-
ally more complicated to bring and maintain, than direct actions.
160 See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 204 (allowing creditors of a company to 
file a derivative action if it arises from certain causes of action, mainly unlawful 
distribution to shareholders); N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. 
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007) (“[I]ndividual creditors of an insolvent 
corporation have no right to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
against corporate directors.  Creditors may nonetheless protect their interest by 
bringing derivative claims on behalf of the insolvent corporation . . . .” (emphases 
omitted)). 
161  930 A.2d 92. 
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is the beneficiary of directors’ duties, while shareholders have a 
claim toward the corporation, derived from its well-being—in any 
case, a claim different than that which the corporation holds to-
ward its fiduciaries.162
Eighth, to be certain, shareholders also do not normally owe fi-
duciary duties to one another.  This is especially true with “regu-
lar,” non-controlling shareholders, not otherwise acting in fiduci-
ary capacity (for example, the tens of thousands known 
shareholders in Co-Op).163  That is so for a good reason:  contrary to 
a fiduciary position, share ownership carries far more rights than 
duties.  This conforms with the generally held perception of shares, 
arising mainly from the fact that shareholders pay for their shares 
and correctly expect to become “creditors” or claimants, not the 
opposite (debtors or obligors).  Even those shareholders who are
fiduciaries owe their duties to the corporation.164  What all share-
162 See, e.g., Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101 (“It is well settled that directors owe 
fiduciary duties to the corporation.  When a corporation is solvent, those duties may 
be enforced by its shareholders, who have standing to bring derivative actions on 
behalf of the corporation because they are the ultimate beneficiaries of the corpora-
tion’s growth and increased value.” (first and last emphases added) (citation omit-
ted)); Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (distinguishing shareholders from the corpo-
ration, in the context of discerning direct claims from derivative claims); 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (“[Direc-
tors’] broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of 
action . . . designed to enhance corporate profitability. . . . [D]irectors, generally, 
are obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in its best interest[.] . . . 
[A]bsent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of direc-
tors . . . is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short
term . . . .” (citation omitted)); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The
Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L. J. 629, 636 (2010) (“[T]he
director’s job demands affirmative action—to protect and to better the position of
the corporation. . . . [E]very act must be taken for a proper corporate purpose[.] . . .
[A] loyal fiduciary must protect the corporation . . . .” (emphases added) (citation 
omitted)).
163 See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 192(a) (stating that all shareholders must 
act “in good faith”, which is merely a recitation of the general normative standard 
applied to every act in private law, by any person, at any time—that is, a non-
equitable, non-fiduciary standard, not specific to shareholders.  This standard 
originates from Israel Contracts Act §§ 12, 39, 61(b)); infra note 165. 
164 See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 193 (specifying three types of sharehold-
ers, mainly a “controlling shareholder” and a shareholder having decisive power 
in a shareholder meeting, who owe a duty of fairness to the company); Pepper v. 
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (“A director is a fiduciary. . . . So is a dominant or 
controlling stockholder or group of stockholders. . . . Their dealings with the cor-
poration are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or en-
gagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or 
stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its 
inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested there-
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holders do owe to one another is some set of equitable duties.165
Consistent with a recurring theme of this Article, those duties are 
equitable, but not fiduciary; they are part of share law, not fiduci-
ary law.  The important difference between the fiduciary-
beneficiary and shareholder-shareholder relationships has also 
been pointed out in scholarship.166
Ninth, while there are certain situations where directors can be 
said to have a direct duty toward shareholders, they are the excep-
tion, not the rule.  These situations, in the U.S. generally known as 
“Revlon mode,” arise mainly in the mergers and acquisitions con-
text, when a corporation is nearing the end of life in its current 
form—a “breakup” or a “sale of control”, in the language of the 
Paramount decisions.167  This is an equitable construct, acknowledg-
in.” (citations omitted).  Regarding the quote’s final words, see supra pp. 293–95 
(explaining that where “duties to the corporation and its shareholders,” or similar 
language, is employed, its correct construction is according to the monistic view)); 
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *63 (Del. Ch. June 
21, 1991) (“[W]hen a shareholder, who achieves power through the ownership of 
stock, exercises that power by directing the actions of the corporation, he assumes 
the duties of care and loyalty of a director of the corporation.”). 
165 See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 192(b) (“A shareholder shall not act with 
unfair prejudice toward other shareholders.”).  In Israel, this is the only statutory 
duty that applies to all shareholders (besides the non-shareholder-specific good 
faith duty, see supra note 163).  The law of unfair prejudice is not part of fiduciary 
law.  See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 9, at 211 (“[T]he law of unfair prejudice is not 
based on fiduciary relations supported by duties of loyalty.”). 
166 See, e.g., Tan Cheng-Han & Wee Meng-Seng, Equity, Shareholders and Com-
pany Law, in EQUITY, TRUSTS AND COMMERCE 1, 9–10 (Paul S Davies & James Penner 
eds., 2017) (“[I]f the stated basis is that shareholder power must be exercised not 
for the benefit of the shareholder but for others, this is not the correct principle 
that operates in a shareholder dispute . . . .  This is because there is a fundamental 
difference in the relationship between partners inter se and between partners and 
the partnership (which is fiduciary), and between shareholders inter se or be-
tween shareholders and the company (which is not).  Accordingly, . . . the test of a 
power that must be exercised for the benefit of another is not an appropriate test 
where shareholders are concerned.”). 
167 See Paramount v. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (“[A]bsent a limited set of circum-
stances as defined under Revlon, a board of directors . . . is not under any per se
duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term[.] . . . [T]here are, generally 
speaking . . . , two circumstances which may implicate Revlon duties.  The first . . . 
is when a corporation initiates [a transaction] involving a clear break-up of the 
company. . . . [The second is when] a target abandons its long-term strategy and 
seeks an alternative transaction also involving the breakup of the company. . . . If, 
however, the board’s reaction . . . is . . . not an abandonment of the corporation’s 
continued existence, Revlon duties are not triggered . . . .” (citations omitted)); Par-
amount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47–48 (Del. 1994) 
(“There are few events that have a more significant impact on the stockholders 
than a sale of control or a corporate break-up.  Each event represents a fundamen-
tal (and perhaps irrevocable) change in the nature of the corporate enterprise from 
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ing that when directors make decisions affecting shareholders’ 
own legal and financial positions, in a manner not channeled 
through the corporation, the person standing to gain or lose from 
directors’ actions is not the corporation, but shareholders.  This 
“channeling principle” might apply in situations outside strict 
Revlon mode;168 at any rate, these are exceptions.  We then extend 
the usual scope of director obligations, importing fiduciary du-
ties169 into the ad hoc director-shareholder relationship.  As if to 
emphasize that this is the exception, some of the important author-
ities discussing the rule—duties toward the corporation—do so in 
the mergers and acquisitions context.170  Outside such situations, 
a practical standpoint.  It is the significance of each of these events that justifies . . . 
focusing on the directors’ obligation to seek the best value reasonably available to 
the stockholders . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
168  Such situations include those where the corporation’s interests have be-
come extremely minimized, as in Revlon itself, or where the corporation’s interests 
are simply not being affected.  Consider, for example, an interference with share-
holders’ voting rights, see Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 
(Del. Ch. 1988) (requiring “compelling justification” for “board acts done for the 
primary purpose of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power”, while 
discussing fiduciary duties owed by directors to shareholders).  In these unique 
situations, the effect on shareholders is unrelated to what the corporation does, or 
what happens to it.  The corporation does not vote in its shareholder meeting; 
shareholders do.  The remedy goes to the shareholders, not the corporation.  Gen-
erally, fiduciaries might commit actions that affect shareholders’ standing in rela-
tion to the corporation—in other words, the very content of their rights under 
share law.  Shareholders should be appropriately protected even where fiduciar-
ies’ usual duties, to the corporation, are not at issue. 
169 But see supra notes 154–158 and accompanying text (explaining that be-
cause Unocal and Revlon give rise to an “intermediate standard”, lower than entire 
fairness, it is not the uniformly high standard imposed by the duty of loyalty). 
170 See, e.g., Paramount v. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (“Delaware law imposes on a 
board of directors the duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.
. . . This broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of 
action . . . designed to enhance corporate profitability. . . . [D]irectors, generally, are 
obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in its best interest . . . .” (em-
phases added) (citation omitted)); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (“[Once the company was for sale,] [t]he 
duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate 
entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ 
benefit. . . . The directors’ role [before the change was] defenders of the corporate
bastion . . . .” (emphases added)); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
946, 954–58 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he board’s power to act derives from its fundamental 
duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockhold-
ers[.] . . . [T]he board had a supervening duty to protect the corporate enterprise,
which includes the other shareholders, from threatened harm.” (emphases add-
ed)); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 802 (Del. Ch. 
1988) (“[T]he duties the board always bears [are]: to act . . . in the good faith pur-
suit of corporate interests and only for that purpose.” (emphases added)). 
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particularly during the “going concern” phase of corporate exist-
ence, directors owe their duties to the corporation,171 and share-
holders’ rights come to them from the corporation.  In any event, 
figuring out what directors owe shareholders (in monetary or other 
terms) necessitates an inquiry of share law.  It requires answers to 
questions such as “why do shares have value?” and “which rules 
and principles apply in this share-related situation?”, all relying on 
a satisfactory theory and law of shares. 
Under the fiduciary approach, the holding in Co-Op is not only 
unjustifiable, it is impossible.  That is because in Co-Op, there was 
no breach of fiduciary duty by anyone.  The liquidator performed 
his job diligently, trying to locate as many shareholders as possible. 
Other fiduciaries, such as the corporation’s administrative person-
nel through the years, also cannot be held responsible:  the failure 
to keep an updated shareholder register is the corporation’s own act, 
not any fiduciary’s.  As a rule, corporations bear their own rights 
and duties; it is the corporation who had a duty to correctly main-
tain this register.172  There is also no reason to assume this was 
some fiduciary’s personally interested act, since none would have 
gained any benefit from one group of shareholders, rather than an-
other, receiving the funds.  Even if the corporation’s fiduciaries 
somehow did wrong, the third point of discussion in this section 
applies:173 these people would likely not have US$15 million, or 
anything close to that, just lying around; nor are most of them alive 
today; nor would damages of such scope be an appropriate sanc-
tion for a relatively small omission (at the time it was made); nor 
could the fiduciaries (or their heirs) be required to pay such 
amounts to the unknown shareholders, when the obvious solution, 
which fits the parties’ pre-liquidation expectations, is the one 
reached by the Court:  just keeping the corporation’s money undis-
tributed, allowing the unknown shareholders to claim it when they 
do.  All along, the shareholders’ claim was toward funds in the 
corporation’s, not any fiduciary’s, pocket.  Clearly, Co-Op is a cor-
171 See, e.g., ROTMAN, supra note 66, at 512 (“By analogy with the application 
of Revlon duties, it would seem logical that so long as the corporation remains vi-
able as a going concern, directors and officers retain fiduciary duties to act in the 
corporation’s best interests.”). 
172 See Israel Companies Act § 127 (“A company shall administer a share-
holder register.”), § 130(a) (“In the shareholder register [the following] shall be 
registered[:] . . . The name, identification number and address of each shareholder, 
all as submitted to the company[.] . . .”). 
173 See supra p. 292. 
2018] Share Law 301
porate law case, but not a fiduciary law case.  It is a case in share 
law. 
5.5.  Summary of the Four Approaches 
As we now see, in reality, none of the approaches surveyed 
above is the law.  Indeed, like many174 other creditors, shareholders 
are parties to a contract with the corporation.  It is perfectly correct 
to say that shareholders are “creditors”—as long as we keep in 
mind that they are a singularly unique type of creditors.  Their con-
tract is inherently coupled with extra-contractual, equitable norms. 
Without this qualification, and the special treatment stemming 
from it, the shareholders’ contract would be practically meaning-
less, and certainly not align with the parties’ actual expectations 
and the generally accepted perception of shares. 
It is also true that shareholders have some sort of claim related 
to the corporation’s net worth, but that claim is not a property 
right, nor is it identical to a trust beneficiary’s claim toward a trus-
tee or trust property. 
Finally, it is correct that shareholders have rights different than 
those of all other creditors, but they do not have direct claims to-
ward directors or other fiduciaries.  Rather, the corporation itself, 
who is the beneficiary of its fiduciaries’ duties, is the vessel 
through which shareholders’ rights flow. 
In summary, the rights, or even the existence, of shares and 
shareholders cannot be adequately explained by contract, property, 
trust or fiduciary law.  This should hardly serve to weaken or ob-
scure them:  “Doctrinal formalism has been no match for human 
nature’s inclination towards fairness and justice.”175  So, where do 
they come from? 
174  Many, but not all, creditors have a contract with the corporation.  For ex-
ample, tort law injured parties are involuntary creditors, having no such contract.  
They may be grouped together with non-residual contract creditors in that the 
rights of both arise primarily in law, not equity. 
175  LARRY A. DIMATTEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS 150 (2001). 
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6. EQUITY AS THE FOUNDATION OF SHARE LAW
Equity is the field of jurisprudence meant to promote justice 
and fairness in situations where regular “law” is unfit or insuffi-
cient for that purpose.176  As this Article demonstrates, that is pre-
cisely what happens with shares:  first, shares have characteristics, 
such as textual (contractual and legal) ambiguity and the phenom-
enon of residuality, which make them impossible to comprehend 
in familiar legal terms.  Second, all the seemingly applicable areas 
of law (contract, property, trust and fiduciary law) are maladjusted 
to treat shares.  Trust and fiduciary law are branches of equity. 
Yet, equity is a field in its own.  Other branches of it may also exist. 
As it turns out, an important branch of equity is share law. 
There are many angles from which to explore the link between 
shares and equity.  This Part of the Article turns to the following: 
residuality, the equity contract, and historical and linguistic con-
nections. 
176  This idea is inherent to equity, both conceptually and historically.  See, 
e.g., Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle’s Conception of Equity (Epieikeia), 18 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 119 (1942) (explaining Aristotle’s view of equity as a supplement to
law, whenever the latter has to be rectified for achieving justice); F. W. MAITLAND,
EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 3–6 (1909) (describing the rise
of equity as a response to inadequacies in the administration of law, especially
what we today call power and information asymmetries: “Though these great
courts of law have been established there is still a reserve of justice in the king.
Those who can not [sic] get relief elsewhere present their petitions to the king and
his council praying for some remedy. . . . Very often the petitioner . . . complains
that for some reason or another he can not [sic] get a remedy in the ordinary
course of justice and yet he is entitled to a remedy.  He is poor . . . , his adversary
is rich and powerful . . . , or has by some trick or some accident acquired an ad-
vantage of which the ordinary courts with their formal procedure will not deprive
him. . . . The complaints that come before [the Chancellors] are in general com-
plaints . . . which [the ordinary courts] ought to redress.  But then owing to one
thing and another such wrongs are not always redressed by courts of law.”).  The
analogy, between Maitland’s plaintiff and the modern shareholder (if not for the
protections of equity), is apparent.  For some of Maitland’s insights on the devel-
opment of corporate law and shares, see F. W. Maitland, Trust and Corporation, in
STATE, TRUST AND CORPORATION 75 (David Runciman & Magnus Ryan eds., 2003)
[hereinafter: Maitland, Trust and Corporation] (chronicling the origins of trusts and
the rise of corporations).  See also Joshua Getzler, Frederic William Maitland - Trust
and Corporation, 35 U. QUEENSLAND L. J. 171 (2016) (exploring the background and
key thesis of Maitland’s work).
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6.1.  Equity and Residuality:  Two Links 
The concepts of “equity” and “residuality” are related in two 
ways.  First, equity is a normative framework needed in a situation 
where a claimant’s rights are residual, wholly dependent on anoth-
er person.  That is because, similarly to other equitable relation-
ships, the claimant is severely disadvantaged in power and infor-
mation, compared to his obligor (in this case, mainly the 
corporation).  The second link between “equity” and “residuality” 
lies in the fact that equity is a residual normative framework—
simply, it is the one left over after all others fail to accommodate a 
given situation. 
First, a shareholder, while not a trust177 or fiduciary law benefi-
ciary,178 is situated in a very similar position to these types of actors. 
Members of all three groups may be termed “equity claimants.” 
That is because, like the other two, a shareholder is not a regular 
contractual party.  A shareholder is inherently disadvantaged vis-à-
vis his obligor—in this case, mainly the corporation.179  This inferi-
ority is in terms of both power (the ability to affect one’s legal posi-
tion) and information (the ability to know what that position is). 
This results from the unique phenomena explicated above:180 first, 
the share contract (constitutional documents) is exceptionally un-
detailed, compared to other contracts regularly entered into in pri-
vate law.  Second, the shareholder’s claim relates to the ever-
fluctuating residual, or difference between the corporation’s assets 
and liabilities, so it is not grounded in any fact of external reality; 
the shareholder’s claim is entirely dependent on the corporation. 
As with any person, the corporation’s fate can result from its own 
deeds, or from acts done to it by others.  In any case, shareholders 
can hardly do anything to control these actions.  They have some 
governance power, but it is practically limited to appointing other
people and hoping they, and the corporation, do the right thing. 
Shareholders must accept what the corporation hands them, good 
or bad, with little recourse to any legal claim.  Yet, that is not what 
177 See supra Part 5.3. 
178 See supra Part 5.4. 
179  In addition to the other relationships that arise from shares: the share-
holder-shareholder and shareholder-third party relationships.  See supra pp. 277–
78. In each of these, as well, a shareholder might stand in a position of power or
information asymmetry to one or more of the other parties.
180 See supra Part 3. 
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the parties opt for:  the corporation ought to try and succeed, with 
an understanding that this will also protect and grow shareholders’ 
investment.  Shareholders give their money to the corporation, 
who now owns it; yet, there is a sense that shareholders continue 
to own an interest in it, somehow different than that of a “regular” 
creditor.  A mismatch exists between the parties’ rights and the le-
gal tools available to address them.  Therefore, justice and simple 
reason require that the share relationship not be seen as a regular, 
arm’s length relationship under “law” only, but rather, as one that 
invokes the protections of equity. 
The substantive content of shareholders’ equitable claim is sim-
ilar, albeit different, than that of other equity claimants.  For in-
stance, under trust, fiduciary, and share law, the claimant enjoys a 
quasi-proprietary right toward property owned, held, or managed 
by another person.  This is not a full proprietary right under prop-
erty law; it is also not a mere obligatory right under contract law. 
It is something in-between, and the questions pertaining to it are 
answered in the field of equity. 
The major difference between the various equity claims is that 
trust and fiduciary law impose the duty of loyalty, but share law 
does not.  That duty requires total self-abnegation by the trustee or 
other fiduciary,181 while a corporation can, and in many respects 
must, operate for its own benefit.182  Another illustration of non-
fiduciary equity lies in the operation of courts:  standards of review 
for actions affecting shareholders per se and the corporation are dif-
ferent.183
Shareholders’ lack of fiduciary claims can become very conse-
quential:  take, for example, a shareholder facing bankruptcy, 
which would be avoided only if the shareholder received a divi-
dend from the corporation.  If the corporation, or even its directors, 
were fiduciaries for the shareholder, they would have to pay the 
dividend, consistent with fiduciary principles of self-abnegation 
and acting only in the beneficiary’s interest.184  However, such duty 
181 See supra notes 68, 69. 
182 See supra notes 142, 145. 
183 See supra notes 154–158 and accompanying text (explaining that although 
direct duties toward shareholders are often referred to as “fiduciary” duties, they 
may give rise to less stringent, “intermediate” standards, inconsistent with fiduci-
ary law principles). 
184  One might respond that the “fiduciary” (whether the corporation or its 
directors) presumably owes duties not to any specific shareholder, but to share-
holders “collectively” or to a “fictional shareholder.”  See, e.g., Davies, supra note 
152; Caleb N. Griffin, The Hidden Cost of M&A, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 70, 80 n.24 
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clearly does not exist in positive law, or normatively:  the corpora-
tion is meant to pursue its own benefit and its own plans (which a 
large dividend might upset); corporate decisions, including those 
on dividends, must accord with the corporation’s interests. 
Of course, that the corporation is not shareholders’ fiduciary 
does not mean it can do whatever it wishes, even if that harms 
shareholders, or otherwise violates the terms of the relationship. 
The strong link, between the corporation’s well-being and that of 
its shareholders,185 is guarded by equity.  The translation of the 
former into the latter is achieved through the workings of share 
law, many of which are discussed in Part 7 of this Article.
Second, equity may be viewed as a residual normative framework,
designed to provide conceptual and doctrinal infrastructure for 
dealing with situations where other fields of jurisprudence are in-
sufficient, irrelevant, or would lead to incorrect results.  As this Ar-
ticle demonstrates, the origin and nature of shares, and the rights 
of shareholders, cannot be explained through “law”—contract and 
property law.186  Even two branches of equity—trust and fiduciary 
law—have specific characteristics that similarly preclude them 
from serving that purpose:  trust law is built on narrow definitions 
and does not correspond to the nature of the modern corpora-
tion;187 corporate fiduciary law is indeed an important part of cor-
porate law, but it pertains to a separate relationship, that involving 
directors and other fiduciaries, to which the corporation is party, 
but shareholders are not.188  The corporation itself also is not 
(2018) (citing sources that discuss the “fictional shareholder”).  However, such a 
statement is meaningless in terms of fiduciary law, which deals with very strict 
obligations to actual persons.  Practically, duties to a “fictional shareholder” are 
indistinguishable from duties to the corporation (an actual, identifiable person). 
There is no reason, then, to misapply the unique norms of fiduciary law, by misi-
dentifying the parties to the various relationships.  “Fictional shareholders,” 
“shareholders as a whole” and similar phrases simply place us back in the frame-
work of share law, as discussed in this Article. 
185  Most of the time, that link appears obvious: a gain for the corporation is 
an indirect gain for shareholders.  Practically, they may realize it through such 
events as the distribution of a dividend, or selling their shares in the secondary 
market.  In any case, these are channeled through share law: shareholders cannot 
reach any of the corporation’s assets or interests, except through their shares and 
the legal framework governing them.  Furthermore, it is possible for the corpora-
tion’s interests to diverge from those of its shareholders.  See supra notes 86, 145. 
186 See supra Parts 5.1, 5.2. 
187 See supra Part 5.3. 
188 See supra Part 5.4. 
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shareholders’ fiduciary.189  Shareholders have claims similar to 
those found in fiduciary law (in that both are more-than-
contractual, non-arm’s length), but uniquely, no one owes them a 
duty of loyalty.  Yet, they invest fortunes, in money or effort, to ac-
quire their shares.190  Due to this and related reasons (such as de-
fending legitimate expectations and encouraging further invest-
ment), they undoubtedly have rights, deserving of protection.  We 
face a situation where four different, well-developed areas of law 
cannot serve as the foundation of those rights.  What is left is equi-
ty itself, or more specifically, equity-based share law. 
The Co-Op decision illustrates both of these links between equi-
ty and residuality.  First, the Court treats shareholders’ claim to-
ward the rights arising from their shares as having some quasi-
proprietary traits.  This is exemplified by the Court not mentioning 
any statute of limitations or similar issue, which is consistent with 
the rights of an equity claimant, rather than a purely contractual 
party.191  Of course, this is also demonstrated by the final result in 
the case:  the Court treats the unknown shareholders’ rights as 
quasi-proprietary, first, when it defends their claims’ continued ex-
istence (rather than distributing the money to the known share-
holders), and second, when it orders the creation of a trust for an 
unlimited period, where the unknown shareholders’ funds will be 
held.  Since proprietary rights, unlike obligatory (contractual) ones, 
are generally unlimited in time (they do not have a “maturity 
date”), this conforms with a quasi-property, or equity, approach. 
From another typical perspective, the Court recognizes that the 
unknown shareholders are a weak, disadvantaged party.  Despite 
possessing a considerable financial claim, they do not even know 
about it.  The unknown shareholders are completely unable to de-
fend their interests.  The power and information asymmetries here 
are apparent.  They are even more extensive than in most equity 
cases.  These shareholders truly need the protection of equity, and 
the Court does not turn its back on them:  it acts as a court of equi-
ty.192
Second, Co-Op also exemplifies how equity serves as a residual 
189 See supra Part 5.3, specifically supra note 132. 
190 See supra notes 2, 103. 
191 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
192 Cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“[T]he court 
of equity is at all times open to complaining shareholders having a just griev-
ance.”). 
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normative framework.  That is because the Court’s decision simply 
cannot be explained any other way.  As the opinion shows,193 the 
Court never finds it necessary to delve into substantive contractual, 
property, trust, or fiduciary law analysis.  Even if it tried, Part 5 
above illustrates how these approaches are simply incorrect, or 
(especially the fiduciary approach) completely irrelevant to the 
facts of the case.  Furthermore, despite the Court browsing through 
many of those, no statutory—that is, “law”—provisions actually 
establish the outcome.  Effectively, the Court takes the equity ap-
proach for granted.  The treatment of shareholders as equity claim-
ants operates behind the scenes of the decision:  what the Court is 
essentially doing, throughout the lengthy opinion, is trying to find 
some legal exception to the equitable rule of shareholders’ more-
than-contractual, quasi-property rights.  When the Court finds no 
such exception, it does what it perceives as obvious, and orders the 
conservation of the funds for the unknown shareholders’ benefit. 
6.2.  Shares as Equitable Rights of Contractual Origin 
Another way to explain the link between shares and equity, 
briefly discussed above,194 employs a fairly straightforward idea: 
shareholders have equitable rights, bundled into shares, because 
the corporation and its shareholders have entered into a contract 
that calls for such rights.  In other words, corporate constitutional 
documents are a contract that also gives rise to an equitable rela-
tionship.  This statement is nothing far-reaching:  a trust contract195
with a trustee196 operates the same way.197  The contract-equity du-
ality naturally extends into corporate law, as the Delaware Court of 
193 See supra pp. 266–69. 
194 See supra pp. 284–85. 
195  Also often called a “deed of trust” or “trust instrument.” 
196 See, e.g., Israel Trust Act § 2 (“A trust is created according to law [or] ac-
cording to a contract with a trustee . . . .”). 
197  The argument here is not that an equitable relationship is purely or main-
ly contractual (and can be contracted around), as has been claimed in regard to 
fiduciary relationships, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract 
and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & ECON. 425 (1993).  Rather, the argument is that more-
than-contractual obligations can be imposed with the aid of a contract.  People can 
agree to be bound by certain legal norms, including the norms of equity.  In other 
words, the parties can create a stone that the contract cannot lift.  More accurately, 
they invoke a pre-existing stone: equity. 
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Chancery had vigorously emphasized.198
In effect, the parties voluntarily summon the norms of equity to 
be part of their relationship.  They do so not in explicit writing—it 
would be unusual to find constitutional documents that state “the 
norms of equity are part of this document for all intents and pur-
poses”—but, in accordance with contract law rules of construction, 
through intent and implied covenants.  The parties, necessarily un-
aware of the extremely wide range of eventualities that might oc-
cur (as Co-Op vividly illustrates), absorb equity into their agree-
ment, because that is the only way to deal with this lack of ability 
to look into the future.199
The injection of equitable norms into the shareholders’ contract, 
and not into others (such as bonds), is justified because a residual 
claim contract simply cannot ever be detailed enough to protect 
shareholders from the possibilities that uniquely attach to their 
claim.200  Even if it could, constitutional documents are just not 
very detailed in practice, due to the parties’ natural efficiency mo-
tives, pushing them to comply with legal dictates and not much 
more.201  Unlike shareholders, bondholders have a claim to a cer-
tain (or contractually determinable) amount of money, at a certain 
(or contractually determinable) date.  That claim is grounded in 
facts of reality—concepts of money and time—that lie outside the 
corporation.202  If a bond contract is breached, bondholders will 
promptly know that and will likely seek remedy, emanating either 
from the bond itself or from external legal default rules.203  Similar-
198 See, e.g., Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 664 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“An essen-
tial aspect of our form of corporate law is the balance between law (in the form of 
statute and contract, including the contracts governing the internal affairs of cor-
porations, such as charters and bylaws) and equity . . . .  Stockholders can entrust 
directors with broad legal authority precisely because they know that that author-
ity must be exercised consistently with equitable principles . . . .” (citing Berle, su-
pra note 126; Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971))). 
199 See, e.g., Tan & Wee, supra note 166, at 12 (“The common thread . . . is that 
reasonable shareholders would not generally contemplate the occurrence of such 
circumstances within companies of which they are members (even though there 
was no express discussion or agreement between them on such matters) and equi-
ty will therefore not allow the exercise of strict legal rights to maintain this uncon-
templated status quo.”). 
200 See supra Part 3. 
201 See supra notes 5, 6. 
202  On the distinction between residual claims and those grounded in exter-
nal reality, see supra p. 276. 
203 See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 9, at 232 (“In the [arm’s length] relationship [be-
tween debtor and creditor], the person who suffers a breach is basically aware of 
his interests, and when a breach occurs he knows about it—that his property or 
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ly extensive laws also protect other creditors, such as employees. 
In the share context, however, neither the contract itself nor legal 
default rules are designed to answer all questions that can possibly 
arise, or even those that frequently do arise.  Shareholders must
have equity in their contracts because otherwise asserting a 
“breach” would almost never succeed.  On purely legal-contractual 
grounds, it is impossible to prove that a dividend “should” be dis-
tributed,204 or that shares have been allocated to new owners for 
“too low” a price,205 or that shareholders, as in Co-Op, have “quasi-
property” rights, unlimited in time.  Equity is well-versed in pre-
cisely these kinds of inconvenient arguments. 
As this Article shows, the majority of share-related concepts 
and norms are simply not written anywhere; they seem to be taken 
“for granted.”  It is as if the parties are somehow told:  “you do not 
have to think of this in advance; when questions arise, people just 
know what to do.”  Of course, people would not know what to do, 
if not for equity, designed to provide answers that cannot be found 
elsewhere.  As a result, like every director employment contract206
implicitly absorbs the norms of corporate fiduciary law, every cor-
poration’s constitutional documents implicitly absorb the norms of 
equity-based share law.207
The outcome reached by the Court in Co-Op precisely squares 
with the above.  Every time a Co-Op shareholder assumed this po-
sition, the corporation and the shareholder agreed to a contract. 
That contract is the corporation’s constitutional documents, and 
these contain equitable norms.  It is implicitly perceived by the par-
ties that shareholders have an equitable claim, which, as Co-Op
demonstrates, makes it a quasi-property claim.  Accordingly, it is 
unlimited in time, and is “stronger” than a mere contractual claim 
in other respects as well.208  Indeed, discussing “quasi”-property 
rights, which straddle the line between several legal disciplines, is 
body were damaged or that his contract was not fulfilled.”). 
204 See supra note 83. 
205 See supra note 84. 
206  That is the contractual arrangement, unwritten in part, that governs the 
relationship between a director and the corporation.  See supra note 72; supra pp. 
292–93. 
207 Cf. Tan & Wee, supra note 166, at 15 (“Although a contractual approach 
has judicial support, it operates only by analogy and it must not be forgotten that 
the basis of the court’s jurisdiction lies in equity.  Any contractual analysis must 
ultimately be able to support relief in equity.”). 
208 See supra p. 283. 
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not easy.  Yet, aside from being time-honored,209 this usage is una-
voidable, due to the complexity of human affairs.  Situations and 
relationships, commercial or otherwise, are not made to fit into 
pre-existing molds.210
6.3.  Other Perspectives on the Share-Equity Link:  History and 
Language 
The close relation between the concepts of shares and equity 
can also be examined from two more perspectives:  historical and 
linguistic.  Historically, modern corporations developed as crea-
tures of equity.  By the 17th century, “joint stock companies” began 
to surface in England.211  In practice, they were very similar to 
partnerships.212  The analogy is that in a partnership, partners have 
the power to influence the legal position of each other, in various 
ways not pre-defined in contract or otherwise, thereby necessitat-
ing the protections of equity; in a company, that power is vested 
mainly with the company itself, and acts toward its shareholders. 
However, partnership law only partly and ineffectively responded 
to the needs of rapidly growing corporations during the 18th and 
19th centuries.213  As a result, “real” company law developed, re-
taining equity as its foundational concept.214  Corporate law 
changed considerably over the years, but equity remains at its 
core.215  As this Article illustrates, the range of situations that 
shareholders can find themselves in is remarkably wide.  Equity 
responds to this fact as it guides the daily practice and adjudication 
of corporate law. 
209 Cf. Maitland, Trust and Corporation, supra note 176, at 109 (“quasi is one of 
the few Latin words that English lawyers really love . . . .”). 
210 Cf. LEVENSTEIN, supra note 58, at 61 (“All law, no matter its content or era, 
is flawed . . . .  Equity could not plausibly surmount this very human limitation, 
but its charge is nevertheless to attempt the impossible.”). 
211 See, e.g., Tan & Wee, supra note 166, at 1. 
212 See id.
213 See id. at 2. 
214 See id. at 4 (“[A]s the business organisation that was adopted in early 
company law was based on a fusion of partnership and trust law, together with 
the law of agency, which were all heavily infused by equitable doctrines, compa-
ny law was susceptible to the influence of the law of equity.” (citation omitted)). 
215 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); Sample v. 
Morgan, 914 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 2007) (two judicial decisions, reached 88 years 
apart, both pointing to equity as a fundamental norm of corporate law). 
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The linguistic connection between “shares” and “equity” is 
practically taken for granted.  This link does not necessarily prove 
that the two should be related—other sections of this Article deal 
with that.  Rather, it is one proof that they are related, on a very in-
tuitive, culture-wide level.  This connection can be seen in the in-
terchangeable use of the phrases “share,” “stock,” and “equity.” 
For example, the word “equity” might simply be used instead of 
“shares.”216  A textbook might introduce the various types of finan-
cial instruments that a corporation can issue, grouping shares un-
der the title “Equity Securities”.217  The phrase “shareholders’ equi-
ty” is equivalent to “the corporation’s net worth,” or assets minus 
liabilities (obligations to non-residual creditors).  “Shareholders’ 
equity” is very widely used and appears regularly in, among other 
places, corporations’ financial reports218 and the press.219  At a web 
forum devoted to English linguistics, an explanation, generally 
similar to that presented in this Article, was offered in regard to the 
link between the two concepts.220
7. TOPICS IN SHARE LAW
What else is part of share law?  The previous Parts of this Arti-
cle mainly discuss the equitable principles of share law.  Yet, these 
are only a fraction of that field.  This Part offers a non-conclusive 
list of topics in share law, frequently encountered by businesses, 
216 See, e.g., ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 63, at 145 (using the title “Legal 
Character of Equity” for a section on the characteristics of shares). 
217 See ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, THE LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN BUSINESS 
FINANCING: A GUIDE FOR CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 20 (1994) (describing the basic 
types of equity securities). 
218 See, e.g., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Form 10-K, SEC.GOV (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/000119312518057033/d437
858d10k.htm [https://perma.cc/KU4G-H848] (annual report mentioning the 
phrase “shareholders’ equity” 28 times). 
219 See, e.g., Sui-Lee Wee, After Wanda Deal, Chinese Property Developer Faces 
Debt Risk, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/business/dealbook/china-debt-wanda-
sunac.html [https://perma.cc/TCL3-Q9HH] (“In 2016, the company’s net gearing 
ratio—a measure of total debt to shareholders’ equity—rose to 121.5 per-
cent . . . .”). 
220 See Kevin Beach, Reply in thread titled “Equity - companies and corporations”,
WORDREFERENCE.COM (Dec. 14, 2010),
https://forum.wordreference.com/threads/equity-companies-and-
corporations.2007192/#post-10036633 [https://perma.cc/TER8-5C93]. 
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lawyers, judges, legislators, and scholars.  This list is meant to 
serve as a guide for further inquiry, tying these topics together un-
der the share law classification. 
1.   Statutory share law.  As mentioned above,221 corporate stat-
utes, such as the Delaware General Corporation Law and
the Israel Companies Act, contain multiple sections dealing 
with shares.  These statutory provisions, and the myriad is-
sues they cover, are part of share law.  Some of these issues 
are also discussed below. 
2.   Share allocation and dilution.  Shares are a sensitive and ma-
nipulable way to represent claims toward a common pool
of wealth.  For example, when new shares are allocated for 
less than the economic value of each current share, wealth 
indirectly flows from current to new shareholders.  This is a 
core issue of share law, also addressed in litigation and 
scholarship.222
3.   Dividends and buybacks.  A transfer of economic value from
a corporation to its shareholders, by virtue of them being
shareholders, is known as a distribution.  These actions in-
clude dividends and buybacks.223  This is a hotbed of legal 
issues, some among shareholders themselves (for example, 
if the distribution is not made equally), some between 
shareholders and the corporation,224 and some between the 
corporation and its creditors.225
4.   Various aspects of mergers and acquisitions.  These are, after
all, transactions in shares.  M&A law might sometimes
seem to focus on issues of corporate fiduciary law, such as 
directors’ duties on either side of the Revlon threshold; 
221 See supra note 6. 
222 See, e.g., supra note 84; Mira Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 701 (2011). 
223 See, e.g., Israel Companies Act § 1 (defining “Dividend” and “Distribu-
tion”). 
224 See, e.g., supra note 83 and accompanying text.  The opposite situation is 
also possible: if an unlawful distribution occurs, see infra note 225, the corporation 
might gain a right of rescission toward the shareholder.  See Israel Companies Act 
§ 310.  This right may also be enforced derivatively by creditors, see supra note 160.
225 See, e.g., DGCL §§ 160(a), 170–174 (establishing mandatory rules to de-
termine when a corporation is allowed to make a distribution to its shareholders, 
requiring that distributions not “impair” the corporation’s capital, or that they be 
made out of the corporation’s profits); Israel Companies Act §§ 301–305, 307, 309–
313 (establishing mandatory rules to determine when a company is allowed to 
make a distribution to its shareholders, requiring, without exception, that it main-
tain its ability to meet all obligations to creditors). 
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however, for such issues to arise, there has to be some (ac-
tual or planned) deal—a share transaction, which must also 
conform with share law.  For instance, when can shares be 
taken away, or even cancelled, without their owner’s con-
sent?  When is it permissible to diverge from the rule of 
equality among identical shares?226
5.   Appraisal rights.  Appraisal is rooted in equitable considera-
tions; the power and information asymmetries inherent to
shares make a determination of their true value, when they 
are taken from their owners,227 involve more than looking 
at their market price, if they have one at all.  This topic lies 
deep within share law; tellingly, appraisal requires no fidu-
ciary breach.228
6.   The distinction between shares and other securities.  This topic
is important in the general structure of corporate law,229 as
well as in the preferred share context.230  It is also critical in 
accounting:  when a corporation gets money for a newly is-
sued security, those funds have to be placed, in the balance 
sheet, under either “liabilities” or “shareholders’ equity.” 
226  For example, in Unocal, the corporation announced a self-tender offer, 
aiming for a large buyback of its shares; the offer excluded one shareholder, who 
was trying to acquire control of the corporation at the time.  This unequal treat-
ment, of shareholders having the exact same security, was deemed lawful.  See
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953–54, 955 (Del. 1985) (find-
ing that “in the acquisition of its shares a Delaware corporation may deal selec-
tively with its stockholders”, if the action is not “inequitable”).  Federal securities 
law was later amended to prohibit a discriminatory self-tender offer.  See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13e-4(f)(8) (2006) (“No issuer or affiliate shall make a tender offer unless: . . .
The tender offer is open to all security holders of the class of securities subject to
the tender offer[.]”).  However, unequal treatment of identical shares is still possi-
ble in other M&A-related settings, as with the poison pill, where a rights issue can
be made to some shareholders and not others.
227  The question of which shareholders are entitled to appraisal rights is an-
swered quite differently in different jurisdictions.  See, e.g., DGCL § 262 (granting 
appraisal rights to shareholders voting against a cash-out merger); Israel Compa-
nies Act § 338 (granting appraisal rights to offerees in a potentially coercive tender 
offer).  Appraisal rights may also arise outside of the M&A context, albeit excep-
tionally.  See, e.g., Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay 
for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L. J. 223, 251–54 (1962) (discussing appraisal rights follow-
ing amendment of constitutional documents). 
228 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Importance of 
Being Dismissive: The Efficiency Role of Pleading Stage Evaluation of Shareholder Litiga-
tion, 42 J. CORP. L. 597, 648 (2017) (“[T]he petitioners in [statutory appraisal] litiga-
tion . . . need not plead any breach of fiduciary duty . . . .”). 
229 See supra Part 4. 
230 See supra pp. 280–81. 
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Therefore, share law must provide clear rules in this area. 
7.   Share-related securities.  Such securities include warrants,
convertible bonds, rights issues, restricted share units
(RSUs), and other convertibles.  As with shares (and in dif-
ferent ways, suited to the characteristics of each security), 
equity is involved here.  These securities also include 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and similar instru-
ments, giving rise to issues regarding their owners’ precise 
legal standing—in other words, to what extent are they like 
regular shareholders. 
8.  Multiple-class equity, as opposed to “one share, one vote”.  This
is a highly salient issue.  Even in Israel, where the stock ex-
change is explicitly prohibited by statute from listing equity 
securities of companies with more than one class of 
shares,231 recent case law has emerged on this topic.232  All 
the relationships dealt with in share law are affected by this 
choice:  the shareholder-corporation (as some shareholders 
are left without any meaningful say on the corporation’s af-
fairs), shareholder-shareholder (as shareholders of different 
classes have diverging interests, and might more readily act 
adversely to one another), and shareholder-third party rela-
tionship (the main third party being the corporation’s fidu-
ciaries, who are often personally interested in the existence 
of multiple share classes).233
9.   Secondary market share transactions.  Here, share law interacts
with securities law.  Such transactions may also lie outside
securities law, as in the case of private corporations.  Quan-
titatively, most share transactions are in the secondary 
market, not involving the issuing corporation.  This topic 
includes various aspects of the routine trading of shares on 
stock exchanges, in addition to other practices—for exam-
ple, equity decoupling, where different rights arising from 
231 See Securities Act, 5728-1968, § 46b, SH No. 541 p. 234 (Isr.). 
232 See CC (TA) 40274-09-15 Perrigo Co. plc v. Mylan N.V. (Oct. 28, 2015) 
(Isr.), https://www.nevo.co.il/psika_html/mechozi/ME-15-09-40274-859.htm 
[https://perma.cc/J9NR-DMB8] (holding that in certain circumstances, mainly 
due to policy considerations such as the promotion of securities market activity, 
shares of a foreign corporation with multiple classes of authorized shares may be 
registered for trading on an Israeli stock exchange). 
233  For recent discourse on this topic, see, e.g., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Perpetual 
Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against Corporate Royalty, SEC.GOV (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-against-
corporate-royalty [https://perma.cc/HTQ6-ACW3]. 
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a single share (voting, dividends, etc.) are contractually 
transferred, by a shareholder, to different owners.234
10.  Non-economic changes to shares.  This topic involves actions
such as a share split and share consolidation (or “reverse
share split”), as well as the allocation of bonus shares.  As a
rule, these actions represent no transfer of economic value
from one person to another.  Yet, they exemplify how
shares are sensitive to various errors and manipulations.
The seemingly benign “non-economic” transaction might
actually cause a transfer of wealth.  This can happen, for
example, when a shareholder owns a number of pre-
transaction shares that does not wholly divide by the con-
solidation ratio.  If a corrective measure is not taken (name-
ly, the payment of cash or other compensation for the frac-
tional share), some of the shareholder’s claim “disappears,”
or usually, is transferred to other shareholders.  Another
aspect of this topic relates to the shareholder-third party re-
lationship.235  Brokers, banks, online financial information
platforms and others may commit errors, often uninten-
tionally, in the context of non-economic share transac-
tions—for example, treating the share price as if it actually
changed.  Unless these mistakes are recognized and cor-
rected, the loss of legal and economic rights gives rise to a
legally enforceable claim.
11. Shareholder registration.  How does one know who the cor-
poration’s shareholders are?  Usually, through a dedicated
list, administered by the corporation:  the shareholder regis-
ter.  This becomes more complex with public corporations,
whose shareholders change very rapidly.  An important is-
sue in this area is nominee companies, such as Cede & Co.,
who appear in public corporations’ shareholder registers as
“street name” holders.  In Israel, the real, ultimate share-
holders are also the full legal shareholders, for all intents
and purposes;236 it would be advantageous to minimize any
234 See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty 
Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006) [hereinafter: 
Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying]; Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard S. Black, Debt, Equi-
ty, and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, in
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM 349 (William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery 
eds., 2015) [hereinafter: Hu & Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling]. 
235 See supra pp. 277–78. 
236 See Israel Companies Act § 132 (stating that “a nominee company shall 
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confusion around this issue in other jurisdictions as well.237
Also within this topic is the issue of bearer shares.238
12. Shareholder meetings and voting.  While shareholders are
normally not fiduciaries for the corporation, their choices
might still bind it; however, no individual shareholder can
do so.239  Rather, shareholders must go through the mecha-
not be considered a shareholder of the [issuing public company], and the shares in 
its name are owned by those entitled to them . . . .”, and that upon a shareholder’s 
request, the shareholder’s name shall be registered in the issuing company’s 
shareholder register, in respect to the appropriate number of shares, substituting 
the nominee company’s name).  The nominee company is not even a trustee, as it 
never owns the shares.  It is part of a mechanism related only to registration. 
237  Shares are exceedingly sensitive to various misunderstandings to begin 
with, and the current nominee system in the U.S. makes the situation far worse, 
bordering on the absurd.  See, e.g., Matt Levine, Banks Forgot Who Was Supposed to 
Own Dell Shares, BLOOMBERG (July 14, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-07-14/banks-forgot-who-was-
supposed-to-own-dell-shares [https://perma.cc/92EH-AU6H] (discussing specif-
ic cases of nonsensical outcomes under the U.S. nominee system).  For an over-
view, see David C. Donald, The Rise and Effects of the Indirect Holding System: How 
Corporate America Ceded its Shareholders to Intermediaries (Sept. 27, 2007), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017206 
[https://perma.cc/JLT8-WGSP].  Reform is clearly needed in this area, possibly 
requiring changes to both state corporate law and federal securities law, to pro-
duce a rule similar to that in other jurisdictions, see supra note 236. 
238  The ownership of a bearer share is not determined using a central regis-
ter, but through a share warrant, which is usually a transferable paper document, 
governed by both share law and negotiable instruments law.  Expectedly, this cre-
ates its own set of issues.  It can rather easily give rise to situations similar to those 
encountered in the Co-Op case, see supra Part 2.  For example, in Switzerland, in 
2018, legislation has been proposed to convert all bearer shares, of all private 
companies, into registered shares, by operation of law.  However, the proposal 
includes the following: “After the expiry of the grace period [for surrendering 
share warrants to the issuing company], shareholders who have not identified 
themselves will definitively lose all rights attached to the shares.  Their shares will 
be deemed void and the company will need to issue, in place of such void shares, 
new shares as treasury shares.”  Daniel Jenny & Florian Jung, Farewell to bearer 
shares and introduction of criminal sanctions for violations of transparency obligations?,
LEXOLOGY (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f8b31110-c8c2-4099-a0f8-
043e05d3d49a [https://perma.cc/YAQ6-5427].  Given the nature of shareholders’ 
rights, as discussed in this Article, it is clear why that proposal is extremely prob-
lematic.  Furthermore, owners of bearer shares are especially prone to being una-
ware of their shareholding and not contacting the issuing corporation, thereby in-
advertently and unjustifiably being placed at risk of their rights “disappearing.”  
There are many alternatives to the excessive proposal quoted above; one would be 
adopting a similar solution to that reached by the Co-Op Court: registering the 
shares in the names of trustees, or a comparable arrangement, for the benefit of 
the unknown shareholders. 
239  If a shareholder does individually (or in cooperation with others) have the 
power to bind the corporation, or materially influence its course of action, that 
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nism of voting in shareholder meetings.  This topic is in very 
high currency, particularly in the U.S., due to the activist 
shareholder phenomenon.240  It interacts with other topics 
listed here, such as the relation between share law and cor-
porate fiduciary law.  This arises both in director elections, 
and in voting on other proposals, as when shareholders 
seek to constrain management from pursuing certain activi-
ties.  This topic also relates to other issues, such as vote 
buying241 and circular share ownership.242
13. Other shareholder governance rights.  These mainly include
access to information.243  Such rights are necessary to mini-
mize the information asymmetries that shareholders are in-
herently subject to.  This topic has far-reaching implications
for other areas of corporate law, including the conduct of
shareholder owes fiduciary duties to the corporation.  See supra note 164.  Yet, it is 
possible for many dispersed shareholders, in their meeting, to lawfully reach a 
decision—even one that seriously affects the corporation—with no prior agree-
ment or coordination among themselves, and with none of the shareholders ow-
ing any fiduciary duty.  This is another unique aspect of share law. 
240 See generally INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM (William W. Bratton & Jo-
seph A. McCahery eds., 2015); LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A
PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION (2011). 
241 See, e.g., Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982) (defining vote 
buying and upholding the legality of such agreements, if they are not fraudulent 
or disenfranchising); Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 234; Hu & 
Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling, supra note 234. 
242 See, e.g., DGCL § 160(c) (suspending the voting rights arising from shares 
owned by the issuing corporation itself, or by another corporation, if the majority 
of the latter’s voting shares are owned by the issuing corporation); Speiser v. 
Baker, 525 A.2d 1001 (Del. Ch. 1987) (broadly construing DGCL § 160(c), by sus-
pending the voting rights attached to shares owned by a corporation effectively
controlled by the issuing corporation).  In Israel, this pertains to the concept of va-
cant shares, also known as treasury shares or dormant shares.  Such shares are 
created whenever a corporation buys back shares it formerly issued, without im-
mediately cancelling them.  See Israel Companies Act § 308.  Hence, this also re-
lates to the topic of buybacks, see supra p. 312.  Vacant shares provide neither vot-
ing rights nor any other right.  See Israel Companies Act § 308. The principle 
operating here is that it is impossible to contract with oneself; every contractual 
relationship (in this case, that arising from the constitutional documents) must 
have at least two parties; therefore, a corporation cannot be its own shareholder.  
See Israel Contracts Act § 2 (requiring the involvement of at least two persons for 
the formation of a contract).  This is a broader, more exact principle than that in-
voked by Delaware law, which seeks mainly to prevent directors from voting the 
shares of the same corporation they are serving.  In Israel, when a direct subsidi-
ary corporation acquires shares issued by its parent, these become semi-vacant 
shares: they provide no voting rights, for similar reasons to Delaware’s, while 
maintaining all other rights.  See Israel Companies Act § 309(b). 
243 See, e.g., DGCL § 220; Israel Companies Act §§ 184–187, 198a. 
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shareholder litigation.244
14. Procedural aspects of shareholder litigation.  For example, when
fiduciary law beneficiaries file a complaint in court (either
themselves or through others, as in a derivative action),
they may enjoy a shifted burden of proof, placed on the fi-
duciary-defendant.245  The law recognizes that power and
information asymmetries prevent administration of justice
under the usual procedure, designed for arm’s length dis-
putes.  These asymmetries are shared by all equity claim-
ants, including shareholders.  How do, or should, modified
procedural rules apply to (non-derivative) shareholder
claims?
15. The relation between share law and the law of corporate purpose.
As discussed above, share law—and indeed, the very exist-
ence of shares and shareholders—is closely tied to ques-
tions of corporate purpose.246  Under positive law, the for-
profit corporation’s purpose is the lawful pursuit of prof-
it.247  Shareholders have an equitable claim toward those
profits, along with the rest of the corporation’s net worth.
This is widely known as “shareholder primacy,” but in fact,
it is simply the corporation, like a natural person, being al-
lowed to lawfully act for its own benefit.  Yet, there is an
equitable sensitivity here:  for example, if a legislature an-
nounced that corporations are no longer allowed to have
profits, or that their assets must go to some stakeholders ir-
respective of their pre-existing rights, the corporation itself
244 See, e.g., Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 2017 Del. LEXIS 34, at *1 
(Del. Jan. 18, 2017); Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 179 A.3d 824, 831 
(Del. 2018) (decisions ultimately dismissing a derivative action filed in Delaware, 
on behalf of Walmart Inc., after the plaintiffs “did exactly what this Court has 
suggested on numerous occasions, namely, use the “tools at hand” to inspect the 
company’s pertinent books and records before filing a derivative complaint.”  
While the Delaware plaintiffs were engaged in the highly preliminary inspection 
stage, which “lasted nearly three years” due to defendants’ resistance, a federal 
court dismissed a less factually detailed complaint, filed by other shareholders.  
On grounds of estoppel, this led to the dismissal of the Delaware complaint). 
245 See, e.g., Michael W. Stockham & Mackenzie S. Wallace, Fiduciary Duty 
Litigation and Burden Shifting, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/trialevidence/articles/wint
er2014-0314-fiduciary-duty-litigation-burden-shifting.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z2ZU-LKMF] (“The entire fairness standard . . . [requires] the 
defendants to prove the entire fairness of the transaction . . . .”). 
246 See supra pp. 273–75. 
247 See supra note 142. 
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might not be the only one harmed.  Due to the nature of 
shareholders’ claims, the effect of such a decision could be 
legally and equitably limited, and it might be successfully 
challenged, by the corporation as well as by shareholders. 
16. The relation between share law and corporate fiduciary law.  The
two are distinct, but related.  For example, when the law
gives fiduciaries the power to commit certain acts, such as
amending the constitutional documents, it also narrows
shareholders’ exercise of that power.248  As another exam-
ple, when a corporation is in Revlon mode, or other situa-
tions where directors’ effect on shareholders is not chan-
neled through the corporation, a direct relationship is
formed between its directors and shareholders.249  The in-
teraction between the two fields also appears in situations
where a shareholder, such as a controller, is considered to
be a fiduciary.250
8. CONCLUSION
Classification and precision are important parts of any legal in-
quiry.  Under-categorization or over-generalization can lead to se-
rious difficulties in resolving actual issues, both in and out of court, 
involving very tangible rights.  As Part 2 above details, the 2017 
Co-Op case, which concluded a dispute concerning approximately 
US$15 million, is a clear-cut example of such an occurrence. 
That case, and the legal conundrum it presented (before being 
correctly decided), illustrate how corporate law suffers from a per-
sistent strain of under-analysis:  as shown in Parts 3 and 4 above, 
we readily discuss issues of corporate fiduciary law, which is the 
law of the relationships between the corporation and its fiduciaries, 
248  In Delaware, see DGCL § 109(a) (“[A]ny corporation may, in its certificate 
of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the di-
rectors . . . .”).  The bylaws exist along with and pursuant to the certificate of in-
corporation.  See DGCL § 109(b).  Moreover, any amendment to the certificate of 
incorporation can only be proposed by directors.  See DGCL § 242(b).  In Israel, 
fiduciaries cannot amend the company’s article of incorporation; that power is 
always reserved to shareholders.  Directors, as well as certain shareholders, can 
propose an amendment, but only the shareholder meeting may affect the change.  
See Israel Companies Act §§ 20, 57(1), 58(a), 66. 
249 See supra pp. 298–300. 
250 See supra note 164. 
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such as directors.  Yet, we have not previously paid enough me-
thodic attention to a separate field, also at the heart of corporate 
law:  share law—the law of shares, shareholders, and their rela-
tionships with the corporation, with one another and with third 
parties. 
Although they inform each other, share law is distinct from 
corporate fiduciary law.  Part 5.4 above proves that for the most 
part, shareholders are not owed fiduciary duties.  This distinction 
is practically significant, given the strict obligations, primarily the 
duty of loyalty, imposed by fiduciary law.  Under established law, 
the corporation itself, not anyone else, is the object both of its fidu-
ciaries’ duties, and of shareholders’ and other creditors’ claims. 
Many corporate cases might involve no breach of fiduciary duty, 
yet, a substantial amount of wealth may be at stake. 
Furthermore, Part 5 above reveals that all the jurisprudential 
sources regularly invoked to explain shares—two of them part of 
general “law” (contract and property), the other two offshoots of 
equity (trust and fiduciary law)—explain only parts or certain as-
pects of the share phenomenon; none does so fully or flawlessly. 
Because shares represent a residual claim, they inherently give rise 
to power and information asymmetries, a central factor making 
them impossible to address through “conventional” legal classifi-
cations.  Yet, the total value of shares in the world, their im-
portance in the modern economic structure and human life, and 
their prominence within the governance structure of every corpo-
ration, demand that we examine shares in a more coherent manner. 
When no other source can explain the existence of, or govern 
the adjudication and resolution of questions relating to, certain le-
gal phenomena, a “residual” normative framework applies:  equi-
ty.  From its origins to the present day, equity is designed to enable 
justice-making where it cannot be reached under “law”—in other 
words, through the classifications we are familiar with.  Trust and 
fiduciary law are themselves branches of equity; yet, the properties 
of each preclude them from serving as the foundation of share law. 
We are left with equity itself.  Unsurprisingly, the word “equity” is 
synonymous with “shares,” and “shareholders’ equity” has long 
been interchangeable with “the corporation’s net worth,” which is 
the size of the economic claim held by shareholders.  As Part 6 
above explains, shares and equity are related in multiple ways, and 
on the most fundamental level.  In the case of shares, equity is not a 
“complement” or conscionable “exception” to contract and written 
law; rather, from the outset, equity is the core expectation of the 
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parties to share-based relationships. 
The nuanced understanding of corporate law, from which the 
concept of share law directly results, also informs other hotly de-
bated topics:  namely, corporate personhood and corporate pur-
pose.  The “shareholder/stakeholder” debate is often framed as a 
dichotomy, replete with catchphrases like “shareholder primacy,” 
but this Article suggests there is a third way, strongly supported 
both positively and normatively:  the corporation, a separate per-
son, exists to achieve its own purpose, which is the lawful pursuit 
of profit; shareholders have an equitable (not proprietary or fiduci-
ary, nor contractual) claim toward the corporation; by definition, as 
residual claimants, they rank below all other creditors or stake-
holders—whose rights are determined outside of corporate law.  It 
would be beneficial to consider how this more refined account 
might promote the resolution of that long-standing, high-stakes 
controversy. 
Share law, equally with corporate fiduciary law, is a major field 
of classification within corporate law.  It is the framework for con-
ceptualizing, analyzing, and resolving share-related issues.  These 
issues have existed since the emergence of corporations, but their 
legal treatment has been plagued with various theoretical, doctri-
nal, and practical misunderstandings.  That kind of legal vacuum is 
not an unalterable fact of life.  This Article, for the first time, pro-
poses the concept of share law, allowing us to treat share-related 
issues comprehensively, within a well-defined legal paradigm, 
based on unifying principles, and capable of meeting the specific 
challenges that shares, by definition, give rise to.  Through this 
lens, Part 7 above examines a multitude of high-currency topics 
encompassed by share law, including dividends and buybacks, as-
pects of mergers and acquisitions, appraisal rights, multiple-class 
equity, shareholder voting and activism, and shareholder litiga-
tion.  Lawyerly, judicial, and scholarly inquiries into share law 
should continue, around the world, on a disciplined, methodic ba-
sis.  Hopefully, this Article serves as a starting point for those fac-
ing other questions surrounding that unique creature of human en-
terprise, the corporate share. 
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ABSTRACT
Modern corporate law scholarship focuses on flexible, dynamic ques-
tions: should multiple-class shares be permitted?  To what extent should
staggered boards be implemented?  Even when making the more struc-
tural inquiry—what is a corporation, and what is its purpose?—corporate
jurists tend toward generalizations: perceiving corporate law as either con-
tract law, property law, or public law, and being either shareholderists
(“shareholder primacy” advocates) or stakeholderists (“corporate social re-
sponsibility” advocates).  In these accounts, fiduciary duties presumably
run directly to shareholders or stakeholders.  However, as this Article dem-
onstrates, careful examination of corporate law (in Delaware and many
other jurisdictions) reveals that all of these prevailing conceptions are,
positively and normatively, inaccurate.
This Article offers a new paradigm through which to examine corpo-
rate law.  It provides an integrative theory, fully congruent with both ex-
isting law and policy analysis, showing that corporate law is not any other
field, but has its own structure, with uniquely beneficial economic and
practical implications.  At the heart of corporate law’s anatomy is a simple,
yet profound, fact: the corporation is a person with a purpose.  The corpo-
ration itself has Hohfeldian relationships with its stakeholders, sharehold-
ers, and fiduciaries.  The benefit of both stakeholders and shareholders is
derived from the degree to which the corporation attains its purpose (for
example, the lawful pursuit of profit).  Directors and other fiduciaries, in
turn, have an obligation to cause the corporation to achieve its purpose.
While corporate purpose, personhood, stakeholders, shareholders,
and fiduciaries are all subjects of heated discussion, this Article is the first
to tie them together, providing a fully self-explanatory picture of their mu-
tual interactions.  Doing away with both the “contract/property” and
“shareholder/stakeholder” dichotomies, this Article applies the theory to
several high-currency topics, including shareholder activism, corporations’
constitutional rights, the rise of LLCs and other “alternative” corporations,
mandatory arbitration, and Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act.
At each turn, the purpose-based theory of corporate law produces more
refined conclusions, and charts a way forward—from conceptions devised
in the 1980s, to a nuanced framework, capable of providing better answers
to the many issues corporate law faces in its current state of flux.
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asafraz@pennlaw.upenn.edu. I am thankful to Mitch Berman, Danielle D’Onfro,
Jill Fisch, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Larry Hamermesh, Herb Hovenkamp, Amir
Licht, Josephine Sandler Nelson, Gideon Parchomovsky, Elizabeth Pollman, David
Skeel, and participants at the 2019 National Business Law Scholars Conference at
UC Berkeley School of Law. © 2020 Asaf Raz.
(523)
524 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65: p. 523
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
I. THE TRUE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531
A. The Corporation’s Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533
B. The Corporation’s Personhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
C. The Corporation’s Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548
D. The Corporation’s Residual Claimants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557
E. The Corporation’s Fiduciaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563
II. APPLYING THE PURPOSE APPROACH TO THREE CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 566
A. Shareholder Activism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 567
B. Corporations’ Constitutional Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570
C. Alternative Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 573
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581
2020] PURPOSE-BASED THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW 525
INTRODUCTION
CORPORATE law1 is in an identity crisis.  Its two most fundamentalquestions—“what is a corporation?” and “what is the corporation’s
purpose?”2—are either answered very differently by different commenta-
tors, or (more often) not addressed at all.  In the latter case, judges, law-
yers, and scholars tend to focus on less structural and more modifiable
issues, such as topics in corporate governance (from staggered boards,
through shareholder activism, to dual-class shares), and treat them as if
they are the entirety of corporate law.3  The first two questions operate in
the background, usually unspoken and “taken for granted.”  As a result,
1. In this Article, the terms “corporate law” and “corporation” are used in a
broad sense, corresponding to what is often known as “business associations law”
(an unsatisfactory phrase by itself, since some corporations have a non-business
purpose).  Other terms, such as “organizational law” (tying together both corpora-
tions and non-corporate organizations), are also inadequate.  Corporations in-
clude more than the type of entity known as “corporation” in Delaware and similar
jurisdictions, see Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1
(2020).  Rather, corporations encompass all entities that have the set of character-
istics discussed in this Article. See infra Part I.  These entity types include the
Delaware “corporation,” in addition to the company, cooperative, voluntary asso-
ciation, some partnerships, and others, as far as the range of corporate laws in
a given jurisdiction allows.  They include both for-profit and other-purpose corpo-
rations. See Asaf Raz, Share Law: Toward a New Understanding of Corporate Law,
40 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 255, 258 n.1 (2018) (utilizing the same approach).  This is
more than a linguistic issue: it is crucial for this Article’s thesis, recognizing that all
corporations have certain unifying traits, even if they differ in some details (such as
the corporation’s purpose, the title of its governing statute, or its internal govern-
ance rules).  For similar statements, see VISA A.J. KURKI, A THEORY OF LEGAL PER-
SONHOOD 7 (2019) (“I use ‘corporation’ in the British sense, meaning ‘artificial
person’[, not the] American sense of ‘large for-profit company.’”); Elisabeth de
Fontenay, Individual Autonomy in Corporate Law, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 183, 191
(2018) (“The ‘corporation’ . . . may be viewed as a compendium of different forms
of organization, rather than as a single form.  While these different forms com-
prise many overlapping terms and judicial doctrine, each has a core of distinct
terms, supplied both by statute and by the common law.”).  If a reader so wishes, it
is possible to substitute the term “entity” for “corporation” (while noting that, in
the common usage of the word, many things besides corporations are entities).
This Article distinguishes “corporations” in the narrow sense—mainly by referring
to them in quote marks, for example, “Delaware corporation”—from corporations
in the more general sense.
2. See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation,
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264 (1992) (“[T]he most basic questions [are:] What is a
corporation?  What purpose does it serve?”); David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate
Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 183 (2013) (“[The law of corporate purpose] is
the most important issue in corporate law, and one of the most important questions
in contemporary social organization.”).
3. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The
Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 806 (1989) (“When people refer to
‘corporate theory,’ they are generally talking about one of three things.  Most
often, they are arguing about corporate governance and corporate behavior.  Less
often, they are raising the more abstract topic of corporate purpose . . . .  Rarely,
however, do they raise the most abstract issue of all: what is a corporation?” (foot-
notes omitted)).
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the participants in the corporate law sphere are not speaking the same
language;4 each is “pulling the blanket” in a different direction, generat-
ing fragmented, ineffective discourse.5
Yet, these questions are more than theoretical.  Diverging answers can
lead to massively different outcomes for real-life problems.  In fact, a
proper understanding of corporate law’s structure—the set of phenomena
directly resulting from the concept of a “corporation,”6 and attaching to
every such entity—delineates the boundaries of the debate on each of the
lower-level, dynamic choices.  Interdisciplinary approaches, such as law
and economics or law and society, are useful in determining whether,
when, and how staggered boards or multiple-class shares (among many
other debates) should be implemented.  However, such discourse must
exist within a certain framework, making clear whose welfare we are maxi-
mizing, who are the actors on the playing field, and who owes what kind of
obligations to whom.
Today, the foundations of corporate law appear to be in flux, and not
for the first time.  The current landscape is largely reminiscent of the
1980s, when the “hostile takeover” wave ignited a wide-ranging debate on
the fundamental nature of the corporation and its purpose.7  A well-re-
4. Corporate law suffers from strong divergence even in regard to the words
used by different judges, lawyers, scholars, and other participants.  Consider the
following: “agency costs,” “business judgment rule,” “company” and “corporation,”
“corporate” and “unincorporated,” “corporate governance,” “corporate social re-
sponsibility,” “entrepreneurship,” “equity,” “fiduciary,” “firm,” “internal affairs,”
“nexus of contracts,” “personhood” and “entity,” “private ordering,” “property”
and “investor ownership,” “separation of ownership and control,” “shareholder pri-
macy.”  Which of these terms do you use in your opinions, memoranda, or articles?
In contrast, which appear redundant or unimportant?  Rest assured, some think
that those should be at the center of corporate law discourse.  In fact, they might be
discussing the very same issue, using different phrases.  This miscommunication
comes at an enormous cost to the corporate law community, since each participant
must guess which terms the current audience is familiar with, and risk losing listen-
ers’ comprehension if different expressions are used.  This Article offers a com-
plete structural theory of corporate law, which enables all participants to correctly
handle each of the concepts above (and many others), based on just five building
blocks. See infra Part I.
5. See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover
Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1072
(2002) (“[T]he major participants in the debate seem to be talking past each
other. . . .  [T]heir basic conceptions are . . . fundamentally at odds . . . .”).
6. In this regard, corporate law is similar to any other legal area.  For exam-
ple, contract law, at its core, is about the unmodifiable concepts attaching to the
idea of a “contract.”  The contract itself cannot change what a contract is.  On the
distinction between higher-level, “structural” and lower-level, “dynamic” meanings,
see infra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
7. The roots of that controversy can be traced to the 1932 debate between
Merrick Dodd and Adolf Berle. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) (advocating for a stakeholderist
approach); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) (defending a more shareholderist approach).  How-
ever, for many following decades, the core questions of corporate theory did not
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garded8 article9 by Chancellor William Allen—also one of the most impor-
tant judicial figures of that period—delves into these questions,
concluding there are just two possible answers.  Allen calls them the “prop-
erty” and “entity” conceptions.10  In this Article they are referred to as
shareholderism and stakeholderism, respectively.  Consistent with Allen’s di-
chotomy, modern corporate discourse generally perceives them as the
only options, and most corporate jurists find themselves in one of these
camps.  By and large, shareholderism is associated with the law and eco-
nomics movement,11 while stakeholderism is advocated by those espous-
ing more communitarian views.
According to shareholderists, the corporation is property—specifi-
cally, the property of its shareholders—or, at most, an aggregate (“nexus”)
of contracts, and its purpose is to increase shareholders’ wealth.12  A pre-
sent-day illustration of this approach is the phenomenon of shareholder
activism, particularly by hedge fund managers.13  According to
stakeholderists, the corporation is a person, or entity, separate from its
shareholders; yet, unlike natural persons, the corporation is not free to
lawfully pursue its own benefit—rather, it must promote the open-ended
interests of various stakeholders (such as employees and consumers), be-
yond the rights they already have under non-corporate law.14  A recent
demonstration of this approach is Senator Elizabeth Warren’s proposal to
impose a legal duty on corporations to promote “general public bene-
enjoy much salience—which the 1980s takeover wave changed. See Allen, supra
note 2, at 263 (“The 1980s were turbulent years for corporation law.  Twenty years
earlier it had seemed that every interesting question in corporation law had been
completely answered . . . .”); Coates, supra note 3, at 807 (stating, in a 1989 article,
that “arguments over the nature of the corporation died several decades ago,” but
“[t]he legal concept of the corporation is currently in flux”).
8. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 773 (2015) (calling Allen’s arti-
cle “a wonderful essay that all corporate law students should read, [in which]
Chancellor Allen dilated on the two major traditions in American corporate law”).
9. Allen, supra note 2.
10. Id. at 264.
11. This association is not exclusive. See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers, Scott B.
Guernsey & Simone M. Sepe, Stakeholder Orientation and Firm Value (Dec. 27, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3299889 [https://
perma.cc/SF9Y-66LN] (using empirical economic analysis to argue for stronger
stakeholder orientation); Joel Edan Friedlander, Corporation and Kulturkampf:
Time Culture as Illegal Fiction, 29 CONN. L. REV. 31, 61–114 (1996) (using historical,
cultural, and theoretical analysis to argue for stronger shareholder rights).
12. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2, at 264–65, 266–70.
13. See infra Section II.A; see also William W. Bratton, Hedge Fund Activism,
Poison Pills, and the Jurisprudence of Threat, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANG-
ING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? 156, 156 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall
Stuart Thomas eds., 2019) (“Hedge fund activism is to corporate law’s early twenty-
first century what the hostile takeover was to its late twentieth century.”).
14. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2, at 265, 270–72.
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fit.”15  Neither conception ever won over the other;16 shareholder activism
and Senator Warren’s proposal are two examples among many ongoing
debates.  As new battles unfold, the mysteriously repetitive pronounce-
ments of corporate law’s demise17 will continue to turn out flatly mis-
taken.  As Chancellor Allen proclaimed at the previous round,
“[e]verything old became new again.”18
The 1980s left us with two ways of thinking, and they divide the corpo-
rate law community to this day.  It is time to ask: do we really have only
these two to choose from?  Are the underlying motivations of shareholder-
ists and stakeholderists—economic and communitarian, respectively—ac-
tually served by what they say about corporate law?19  As this Article
reveals, corporate law itself—both positive law and normative analysis, in
both Delaware and other U.S. and international jurisdictions—does not
15. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018).  Another
recent stakeholderist proposal, garnering much scholarly and media attention, was
the 2019 Business Roundtable statement. See Business Roundtable Redefines the Pur-
pose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’, BUS. ROUND-
TABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-
redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-
americans [https://perma.cc/S2LS-DSYN].  However, the Business Roundtable
members (several corporations’ fiduciaries) do not have any legal right or power
to single-handedly “redefine” any corporation’s purpose.  That purpose is dictated
by law, and can only be changed through law.  By definition, just as corporations
cannot lawfully breach the law, see infra Section I.C, and shareholders cannot law-
fully receive more than what is left after the corporation meets all of its other
obligations, see infra Section I.D, so are corporations legally required to act toward
their purpose, see infra Section I.A, and their fiduciaries are legally required to
cause them to do so, see infra Section I.E.  Accordingly, this Article expands upon
attempted legal reforms in the stakeholderist direction, not unilateral statements
expressing subjective wishes that the law was different.
16. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Pri-
macy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 (2002) (“[T]he debate over the social role
of the corporation remains unresolved.”).
17. See, e.g., Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for
Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962) (“[C]orporation law, as a field of
intellectual effort, is dead in the United States. . . .  We have nothing left but our
great empty corporation statutes . . . .  [These are] shivering skeletons.”); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439 (2001); William W. Bratton, The Separation of Corporate Law and Social Welfare,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 789 (2017) (“Today’s corporate legal theory centers
on a small-scale policy discussion . . . .  If anything, the scope of corporate legal
theory will narrow even more. . . .  [C]orporate law will look more and more like
the rest of private law . . . .”); Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corpo-
rate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 263 (2019).
18. Allen, supra note 2, at 264.
19. For the (negative) answer, see infra Section I.B (explaining how corporate
personhood, and the overall structure of corporate law—which differs from con-
tract or property law—promote the long-term, large-scale creation of economic
value); infra text accompanying notes 151–52 (explaining how employees, consum-
ers, and other stakeholders are always less well-protected by corporate law than by
non-corporate law).
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(and likely never did)20 support either the shareholderist or the
stakeholderist conception.  Each view is correct on some issues, and errs
on others.
This Article’s account of corporate law is centered around a simple,
yet profound, idea: the corporation is a person with a purpose.  This state-
ment has far-reaching implications.  Contrary to both prevailing ap-
proaches, fiduciaries (such as directors and officers) owe their duties
neither to shareholders, nor to stakeholders.  In fact, their loyalty runs
(and, under fiduciary law principles, must run) to one person: the corpora-
tion.  Fiduciaries’ mission is to cause the corporation to achieve its pur-
pose—which might be the lawful pursuit of profit (in the case of for-profit
corporations),21 or any other lawful purpose (such as those of benefit and
nonprofit corporations).22
In turn, the corporation owes various obligations to others, both stake-
holders and shareholders.  The protection of stakeholders23 is embedded
in the mandatory requirement that the corporation act lawfully, that is,
meet all obligations under positive law24 (which is mainly non-corporate
20. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 317 (quoting the 1847 case of Smith
v. Hurd, fully conforming with the theory presented in this Article).
21. Indeed, being an entity does not necessarily entail being a “social” entity.
Cf. Allen, supra note 2, at 271 (“[The] social entity conception sees the purpose of
the corporation as not individual but social.”).
22. Uniquely, corporate law provides no dictate as to how to achieve this; the
corporation can do whatever it wishes to pursue this open-ended imperative, and
possibly even fail in doing so, without facing legal sanction. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2020) (stating that the corporation’s goals might be “to
engage in any lawful act or activity”); infra text accompanying notes 128–29, 151.
This challenges the reliance, typical in corporate law and economics, on ex ante,
“contract”-based planning.  Corporate law might exhibit contract-like traits in some
situations, but its main normative underpinning is equity. See infra Sections I.D
(discussing equity-based share law), I.E (discussing corporate fiduciary law).  Ac-
cordingly, ex post determinations and adjudication are necessary and beneficial;
they are inherent to the corporate framework.  Any attempt to operate on a fully
“contractual” worldview ignores what corporate law is, resulting in both ineffi-
ciency (smaller pie) and unfairness (transfers of the pie to those who are not sup-
posed to get it—usually, the stronger party, such as a corporation’s fiduciaries).
23. The term “stakeholder” most broadly refers to any person having a rela-
tionship with the corporation, including non-residual claimants, residual claimants
(mostly known as “shareholders”), and fiduciaries. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRA-
TEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46 (1984) (“A stakeholder in an
organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected
by the achievement of the organization’s objectives.”).  However, this Article em-
ploys a narrower definition, where “stakeholder” is any person with Hohfeldian
claims vis-à-vis the corporation, except for residual claimants and fiduciaries.  That is
because the latter two categories involve unique issues, which only corporations
give rise to, and which are treated within corporate law itself.  Therefore, each of
the three categories is considered in a separate section of this Article. See infra
Sections I.C, I.D, I.E.  In common usage, “stakeholder” typically denotes the first
category only.  It also seems preferable to “creditor” (used in the same sense in an
earlier article, see Raz, supra note 1) or “non-residual claimant.”
24. In this Article, “positive law” denotes the entire set of binding norms, as
opposed to wishes on what corporations might owe to certain people, or not owe to
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law—such as contract, employment, or environmental law).  The rights of
residual claimants (or shareholders) derive from the open-ended part of
the corporation’s purpose—for example, “the pursuit of profit.”  Since
that purpose must always be pursued lawfully, shareholders have the most
subordinated claim toward the corporation; the phrase “shareholder pri-
macy” is counterfactual.  Shareholders’ rights are not proprietary or fiduci-
ary, but also not merely contractual.  They are a unique product of
corporate law itself.
Therefore, corporate law consists of five building blocks: purpose,
personhood, stakeholders, residual claimants, and fiduciaries.  These, and
their mutual interactions, form the structure of corporate law.  This struc-
ture is unique to corporate law: a natural person can have neither direc-
tors, nor shareholders.  Modifying the content of one pillar does not alter
its very presence, nor the other elements.  A nonprofit corporation has a
different purpose than a for-profit corporation; yet, both are legal persons,
both are required to meet all of their legal obligations, both have residual
claimants with equitable rights, and both are entitled to have their fiducia-
ries loyally promote the corporation’s purpose.  A corporation’s managing
body may be staggered or not, comprised of inside or outside directors, or
be called a board of “managers” or “trustees” rather than “directors”; in
any case, its members owe fiduciary duties to the corporation—direct results
of the structure of corporate law.25  An identical set of economic, practi-
cal, and legal questions arise with respect to any corporation.  The theory
holds across time and jurisdictional boundaries, and is not subject to “pri-
vate ordering”; it is the foundation upon which contracting occurs.  Nor can
it be legislated around: if a statute truly eliminated one of the building
blocks, the resulting phenomenon would not be a corporation.
This Article proceeds as follows: in Part I, the purpose-based theory of
corporate law is presented in five sections, corresponding to the building
blocks of corporate law (purpose, personhood, stakeholders, residual
claimants, and fiduciaries).  Because present-day corporate law is mainly
split between shareholderist and stakeholderist views, as described above,
care is taken to introduce the new theory in terms of how it diverges from,
or builds upon, our existing conceptions.  Part II applies the theory to
others, or what the law “ought” to be. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 8, at 790 (“For
those who decry [certain behaviors by corporations], the solution must come from
. . . bodies of positive law that constrain corporate behavior . . . and cannot ration-
ally rest on calls for corporate directors to ‘be patriotic.’”).  Positive law encom-
passes a very broad set of norms.  It includes equity, see infra note 308, and it may
even include disobedience, when certain “laws” are unjust (or plainly unlawful)
according to some other normative source (such as human rights, or simple rea-
son).  For a discussion of situations where disobedience might be lawful in some
sense, see Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 731–48
(2019).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 212–17 (discussing the fact that, due to
the corporation being an artificial person, it must always have a natural person
acting on its behalf and for its benefit).
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three high-stakes policy issues: shareholder activism, the Citizens United v.
FEC26 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.27 decisions, and the rise of
LLCs and other alternative corporations.  In each case, the purpose-based
theory leads to more refined, often pointed, conclusions.
Not only is corporate law not “dead,”28 it is more important than ever.
Yet, modern corporate law “seems to be in insoluble theoretic disarray,
with scholars scrambling to assemble a giant puzzle of ill-fitting pieces.”29
This Article assembles the puzzle of corporate law.
I. THE TRUE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW
Questions of structure and anatomy serve an important function in
any legal discipline.  These structural inquiries attempt to discern what is
common to all members of a certain group, and how these phenomena
interact with one another.  In legal terms, this primarily gives rise to ques-
tions such as: what types of Hohfeldian rights and duties does a given actor
have, and toward whom?30  Which legal “toolboxes”—sets of rules, princi-
ples, and doctrines—govern each actor or situation?
Structural inquiries exist on a higher hierarchical level than the vari-
ous resolutions made within each toolbox, which are dynamic and change-
able, as opposed to the structure itself.  For example, even if the rules of
“capital lock-in” (which restrict shareholders’ ability to withdraw assets
from the corporation at will) are different among jurisdictions,31 at least
two building blocks are constantly present: “shareholder” and “corpora-
tion.”  Professors Balganesh and Parchomovsky describe this as the distinc-
tion between “structural” (or “jural”) and “normative,” dynamic
meanings.32  While “[t]he jural meaning refers to the structural core un-
dergirding a legal concept,” “[t]he normative meaning refers to the mean-
ing that . . . [the] concept . . . come[s] to be cloaked in as a result of
26. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
27. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
28. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
29. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 531, 533–34 (2005).
30. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Ap-
plied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
31. See Mariana Pargendler, How Universal Is the Corporate Form? Reflections on
the Dwindling of Corporate Attributes in Brazil, 58 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 9–19
(2019) (describing a trend in Brazilian courts of allowing shareholders, under cer-
tain circumstances, to redeem their shares, even when the corporation is not in
liquidation proceedings; also viewing this as a divergence from normal “corporate
law”).  As the discussion here demonstrates, even if some dynamic choices in Bra-
zil’s corporate law are unique, it is still corporate law, and the entities it governs
are corporations.
32. Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in
the Common Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241 (2015).  In that context, the term “dy-
namic” is substituted here for “normative,” simply because legal theorists mostly
use “normative” as the opposite of “positive,” which differs from Balganesh and
Parchomovsky’s usage.
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external interpretive influences, which may in turn be drawn from a vari-
ety of situational goals.”33  Applying this to our example, the fixed structure
(“shareholder” and “corporation”) is required for us to discuss the dynamic
question (“when should a shareholder be allowed to withdraw assets from
the corporation?”).
Within corporate law, the leading work in this area is Professor
Reinier Kraakman and co-authors’ The Anatomy of Corporate Law.34  As that
book argues, every corporation presumably has five “defining characteris-
tics”:35 legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated
management with a board structure, and investor ownership.36  One may
ask, however, why these five?  Indeed, “The Anatomy of Corporate Law does
not offer any general theory as to how the various elements of its typology
fit together.”37
This Part of the Article fills that gap.  It reveals that only one of the
five characteristics—corporate personhood—is a necessary feature of all
corporations.38  Other characteristics can be contracted around or other-
wise modified.  A corporation might feature non-limited liability;39 non-
transferable shares;40 non-delegated management;41 and a non-financial
investor (say, an employee) as its residual claimant.42  All these do not
make the entity any less of a corporation.  In other words, the latter four
characteristics are modifiable, dynamic choices; they do not define any of
the invariable, structural issues generated by the concept of the
corporation.
33. Id. at 1244.
34. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARA-
TIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (3d ed. 2017).
35. Id. at 31.
36. Id. at 5–15.
37. David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1540
(2004) (book review).
38. The authors of The Anatomy of Corporate Law make a similar statement. See
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 31 (“[O]f the five defining characteristics of the
corporate form, only one—legal personality—clearly requires special rules of law.
The other characteristics could, in principle, be adopted by contract . . . .” (foot-
note omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, c. 46 § 3(4) (UK) (allowing for a company
with “no limit on the liability of its members”).
40. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.27(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“The
articles of incorporation, the bylaws, an agreement among shareholders, or an
agreement between shareholders and the corporation may impose restrictions on
the transfer or registration of transfer of shares of the corporation.”).
41. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (2020) (“Unless otherwise pro-
vided in a limited liability company agreement, the management of a limited liabil-
ity company shall be vested in its members . . . .”).  Even in regard to a narrow-
sense “Delaware corporation,” the same person can be both shareholder and fidu-
ciary. See, e.g., infra Section II.A.  In a private corporation, there might be no dele-
gation of management at all.
42. See, e.g., tit. 8, § 152 (“The board of directors may authorize capital stock
to be issued for consideration consisting of cash, any tangible or intangible prop-
erty or any benefit to the corporation, or any combination thereof.”).
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This Part provides a new, more refined account of corporate law’s
anatomy, which applies to every corporation.  This inclusivity is possible
because the theory relies on a set of highly fundamental notions (for in-
stance, the concept of equity, or Hohfeldian rights and duties), which can-
not be contracted or legislated away.  As explained below, the five building
blocks of corporate law are purpose,43 personhood,44 stakeholders,45
residual claimants,46 and fiduciaries.47  They are structurally related to
one another, and particularly to the first building block—the corpora-
tion’s purpose.
This account resolves the “blanket pulling” problem described at the
beginning of this Article,48 as it provides a complete map of corporate law’s
structure.  For example, a commentator might recognize corporate per-
sonhood, yet believe that shareholders have purely “contractual” rights, or
that the corporation is a creature of public law;49 the structure presented
here confirms the first and corrects the latter two.  Consistent with this
objective, much of the discussion in this Part directly addresses, and cor-
rects, various misconceptions encountered in the corporate law commu-
nity.  Among other contributions, this more precise anatomy provides an
alternative to the shareholderist–stakeholderist dichotomy.  It also re-
sponds to other inaccurate, seemingly exclusive choices, such as between
“contract” and “property” theories of the firm.  Moreover, as Part II below
illustrates, this theory allows us to better understand and address a wide
range of current policy issues.
A. The Corporation’s Purpose
Every corporation has a purpose.  Corporations, which are legal per-
sons,50 are similar in this regard to natural persons (humans), also operat-
ing to achieve a certain life purpose.  A human may have a mix of life
purposes, and easily change them by simple choice.  One may wish to live
for the pursuit of economic profit one day, and move to a communal vil-
lage the next.  This fundamentally arises from the fact that a human being
is an end in oneself, with complete freedom to pursue happiness, within
the bounds of law.
43. See infra Section I.A.
44. See infra Section I.B.
45. See infra Section I.C.
46. See infra Section I.D.
47. See infra Section I.E.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 3–5.
49. See Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as Bad Corporate
Law, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 451, 458–77, 483–85.  For an example of “blanket pulling”
in the opposite direction, see Robert Anderson IV, A Property Theory of Corporate Law
(July 17, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3421009
[https://perma.cc/AM7G-LR2V] (correctly noting that shareholders are unique
claimants and have more than contractual rights, but incorrectly viewing share-
holders’ claims toward the corporation or its assets as property rights).
50. See infra Section I.B.
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In contrast, a corporation cannot feel happiness, at least not in the
human sense.  It is a legal person, whose existence is meant to increase
human well-being,51 albeit only through the concept of corporate per-
sonhood and the overall structure of corporate law.  Also, lacking its own
physical faculties, the corporation’s purpose must be determined by other
people—initially, its founders.52
The most important difference between corporations and humans is
that the former have a specific, non-easily-modifiable purpose.53  As Pro-
fessor Adam Winkler notes, “corporations are not truly ‘free’ in the way
that individuals can be.  A [natural] person can choose her own values,
preferring to prioritize personal wealth, social welfare, the environment,
or law and order.  A [for-profit] corporation, however, is legally obligated
to prioritize profit, at least in the long term.”54
Over the last few years, growing attention is being paid to the idea
that the core concept of corporate law—the building block around which
all others, including personhood, fiduciaries’ duties, and stakeholders’
and shareholders’ rights, are arranged—is purpose (rather than “con-
tract,” “property,” or “fiduciary law”).  Corporate purpose, and its place in
the matrix of corporate law, is the subject of rapidly expanding scholar-
ship.55  Recent papers by Professors Paul Miller and Andrew Gold discuss
purpose within a broader inquiry of corporate law’s structure; similarly to
this Article, these texts (part of the New Private Law movement) employ
an integrative approach, demonstrating that corporate law is not any other
field, but has its unique identity, combining numerous legal concepts and
traditions.56  Many of these works, however, are written from a
51. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 1629, 1663 (“[W]e owe no allegiance to corporations . . . without reference to
the idea that people are involved.”).
52. See Raz, supra note 1, at 273–74 (discussing founders’ role in setting the
corporation’s purpose), 275 (“[D]ue to the limits of the corporation’s physical
nature, there is simply no way it could determine its own purpose and goals without
other people, and the choices they make.”).
53. In some cases, that purpose might not be easily determined ex ante.  This
Section argues that at least in the most ubiquitous type of corporation—the for-
profit corporation (as well as many types of nonprofit corporations)—it can.
54. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS 388 (2018).
55. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, Purposive Loyalty, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881
(2017); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Personhood and
Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 260 (D. Gordon Smith
& Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018); David Ciepley, Corporate Directors as Purpose Fiducia-
ries: Reclaiming the Corporate Law We Need (July 29, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3426747 [https://perma.cc/7C4Y-JFSP].
56. See Paul B. Miller, Corporations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW
PRIVATE LAW (Andrew S. Gold, John C.P. Goldberg, Daniel B. Kelly, Emily L.
Sherwin & Henry E. Smith eds., forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3432033 [https://perma.cc/4KXQ-XYV6]; Paul B.
Miller & Andrew S. Gold, The Corporation as a Category in Private Law, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORIES (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin Zipursky eds.,
forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3453744 [https://perma.cc/J6XN-RXNA].
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stakeholderist perspective—essentially contrasting a “purpose” approach
with “shareholder primacy”—or choose not to elaborate on what is the
corporation’s purpose, instead only stating (correctly) that, whatever it is,
it shapes fiduciaries’ duties.
This Article takes the next steps: first, in the remainder of this Sec-
tion, it expands on the term “purpose” in corporate law, and provides a
positive and normative overview of the purpose of for-profit and other cor-
porations.  It then relates purpose to the other four building blocks of
corporate law, all arranged around the corporation’s purpose: per-
sonhood allows the corporation to achieve its purpose better than through
any non-corporate framework;57 stakeholders enjoy the requirement to
obey positive law, embedded in the corporation’s purpose (hence, there is
nothing wrong, and certainly not legally actionable, with a lawful profit-
seeking purpose);58 the rights of residual claimants are derived from, and
related via equity to, the corporation’s pursuit of its purpose;59 and fiduci-
aries’ duty is to act so that the corporation achieves its purpose.60  This
Article does not aim to discuss every question pertaining to corporate pur-
pose, of which there are many.61  Rather, it provides a theory of corporate
law as a whole, with purpose at its center.
The term “purpose” itself requires elaboration.  The corporation’s
ends are determined on two different levels.  The higher is what this Arti-
cle calls “purpose,” which is a somewhat more general statement—for ex-
ample, “the lawful pursuit of profit”—provided by law, and attaching to a
certain form of corporation.  The lower level is what may be called the
corporation’s “goals”—for example, “to engage in construction” or “any
lawful activity”—which are flexible choices, appearing in the corporation’s
constitutional documents, and possibly changing from one corporation to
another, even if both are of the same form.  Some corporate statutes, in-
cluding Delaware’s, refer to the corporation’s goals as its “purpose,”62 but
the difference is legally and practically significant.63
57. See infra Section I.B.
58. See infra Section I.C.
59. See infra Section I.D.
60. See infra Section I.E.
61. Such questions include, among others: who should be able to set the cor-
poration’s purpose?  Who should decide whether or not the corporation is acting
toward its purpose (shareholders, fiduciaries, courts, or someone else)?  How can
corporations’ purpose be encapsulated in one sentence (such as “the lawful pur-
suit of profit”), a much more compact purpose compared to that of human be-
ings?  How and to what extent can purpose be contractually determined or
modified?  While the answers are often quite clear under positive law, they leave
much room for policy debate.
62. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a) (2020) (“The certificate of incorporation
shall set forth: . . .  The nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or
promoted.  It shall be sufficient to state . . . that the purpose of the corporation is
to engage in any lawful act or activity . . . .”).
63. See George A. Mocsary, Freedom of Corporate Purpose, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1319, 1364–68 (discussing the difference between “strategic” and “tactical” cor-
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As suggested by the very existence of distinct terms, such as “non-
profit corporation,” “cooperative,” “voluntary association,” and “for-profit
corporation,” these different forms have different purposes, and in the
case of the latter, it is the pursuit of profit (which, as shown here, invaria-
bly means the lawful pursuit of profit).  From a legal standpoint, there is
nothing wrong with a person lawfully pursuing its own benefit: as Section
I.C below explains, no legal sanction can be imposed on a corporation
that acts in full accordance with law; this also means that the corporation
is free to pursue profit, as long it does not harm anyone else in any legally
sanctionable manner.  Indeed, a promoter establishing a new for-profit
corporation buys a “prepackaged product,”64 at least in part, and one of its
provisions is the corporation’s purpose.  A change of corporate form (and
purpose) is possible, but it must be done in a manner assuring that the
corporation still complies with all of its legal and equitable obligations.65
This simple statement—that the first part of the corporation’s pur-
pose (“lawful”) encompasses, by definition, all the protection stakeholders
are legally entitled to, and the second part (such as “pursuit of profit,” or
any other, once it is determined) can therefore not be subject to legal
challenge—provides a strong normative justification for corporations’ li-
cense to pursue their own benefit.  How do we know that, under positive
law, the for-profit corporation’s purpose truly is the lawful pursuit of
profit?  In Delaware, no section of the main corporate statute66 explicitly
says so.  This fact, however, can be clearly inferred from a variety of case
law and other sources, including formative cases of Delaware law.
For instance, 1989’s Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.67 de-
cision is generally regarded as a victory for the stakeholderist side.  In that
case, shareholder-plaintiffs failed to prevent a corporation, through its
board of directors, from implementing defensive measures meant to block
a high-premium, hostile tender offer.  The decision itself, however, reveals
a more nuanced picture.  The court discusses the corporation’s purpose—as
distinct from those of both its shareholders and stakeholders—and con-
cludes it is the pursuit of profit:
porate purpose, similar to the distinction made here between “purpose” and
“goals”).
64. See, e.g., Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and Its Limits in
the Delaware General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 846–47 (2008)
(“[M]andatory terms guarantee that certain core qualities are associated with the
particular ‘brand’ of business entity called a ‘Delaware corporation.’  The exis-
tence of that brand benefits all Delaware corporations by saving the expense inves-
tors would otherwise incur to investigate whether a particular entity had or lacked
any of those core qualities.” (footnote omitted)).
65. This requires the consent of those who have the authority to determine
the corporation’s purpose—initially, its founders, and later the corporation’s
residual claimants, to whom the founders’ authority passed, see Raz, supra note 1, at
273 n.75.  For detailed discussion of this point, see infra note 209 and accompany-
ing text.
66. Delaware General Corporation Law, tit. 8, ch. 1.
67. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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Delaware law imposes on a board of directors the duty to manage
the business and affairs of the corporation.  This broad mandate
includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of action
. . . designed to enhance corporate profitability. . . .  [D]irectors, gener-
ally, are obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in
its best interest . . . .68
The Paramount v. Time court does not elaborate much on where the
profit-enhancing mandate comes from.  Yet, even in a case shareholders
lost, the nature of the corporation’s own purpose seemed indisputable to
the court.
In the well-known footnote 55 to his Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland,
N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.69 decision, Chancellor Allen presents,
in great arithmetic detail, a situation where the corporation’s economic
interests diverge from those of any natural person—both shareholders and
stakeholders.  As the Chancellor then remarks,
[The optimal] result will not be reached by a director who thinks
he owes duties directly to shareholders only.  It will be reached by
directors who are capable of conceiving of the corporation as a
legal and economic entity. . . . [C]ircumstances may arise when
the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the
corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders
(or the creditors, or the employees, or any single group inter-
ested in the corporation) would make if given the opportunity to
act.70
Credit Lyonnais directly invokes two of corporate law’s building
blocks—personhood and fiduciaries—and correctly concludes that direc-
tors’ duties run to the corporate person.  Although Chancellor Allen does
68. Id. at 1150 (citation omitted) (emphases added).
69. No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
70. Id. at *108 n.55.  Chancellor Allen writes that directors’ duties run to the
entity “[a]t least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency,” id.
at *108, but not much in his substantive analysis turns on this; whether solvent,
close to insolvency, or insolvent, the corporation is supposed to act to increase (or,
at a minimum, protect) its net worth.  The words “at least” in the Chancellor’s
opinion are meaningful, given the many other Delaware cases surveyed through-
out this Article (including landmark cases such as Paramount v. Time), which dis-
cuss fiduciary duties to the corporation itself, yet did not arise in vicinity to
insolvency.  For detailed discussion of this point, see Production Resources Group,
L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 792 (Del. Ch. 2004) (clarifying, among
other things, that “the fact of insolvency does not change the primary object of the
director’s duties, which is the firm itself”).  The leading Delaware authority stating
this position (while extensively citing Production Resources) is North American Catholic
Education Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101–03 (Del.
2007) (“It is well settled that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation [ei-
ther when it is solvent or insolvent]. . . .  [D]irectors . . . have a fiduciary duty to
exercise their business judgment in the best interest of the insolvent
corporation.”).
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not explicitly mention “purpose,” his economic analysis (preceding the
above quote) makes clear that, in the first place, the corporation is there
to pursue a certain purpose—the maximization of its own economic
value—and, in turn, directors’ role is to cause the corporation to do pre-
cisely that.
Moving into the computer age, 2010’s eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark71 decision proceeds similarly to Paramount v. Time and Credit Ly-
onnais: it does not engage in deep-level analysis of the normative justifica-
tions for the lawful pursuit of profit, yet, it states that this purpose does
attach to the for-profit corporation.  As the court plainly remarks, “I can-
not accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that . . . seeks not to maximize the
economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation.”72  In another case
involving a technology company, 2013’s In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litiga-
tion73 decision states as follows:
[Directors’ decisions should] benefit the corporation as a whole
. . . by increasing the value of the corporation . . . .  [T]he duty of
loyalty therefore mandates that directors maximize the value of the
corporation over the long-term . . . .  [R]esidual claimants [are]
the ultimate beneficiaries of the firm’s value . . . .74
As Section I.E below also discusses, Trados makes clear both that the
corporation’s purpose is the lawful pursuit of its profit (or “value”), and
that this is separate from the effect on shareholders, who only ultimately
and conditionally—through the structure of corporate law—gain any ben-
efit from the corporation’s success.
Indeed, both Paramount v. Time and Trados are cases in which share-
holders lost, but the corporation’s purpose was determined to be the lawful
pursuit of profit.  This clarifies the difference between the purpose-based
theory, presented here, and so-called “shareholder primacy,” or
shareholderism generally.  Shareholders, who are fully distinct from the
corporation, might not see any direct blessing in the corporation’s profits.
A for-profit corporation might, for example, engage in building space
launch systems (as a certain well-known Delaware corporation does),75 un-
doubtedly a long-term, large-scale, capital-intensive mission.  Corporate
law mandates that the corporation’s profits and assets are its own—not its
shareholders’—and any access to them by shareholders is constrained by
the facts of corporate law (for example, the corporation’s discretion as to
whether or not to distribute a dividend, or its ability to deploy defensive
measures against a takeover).  Thus, even over an extremely long period,
71. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
72. Id. at 34.
73. 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013).
74. Id. at 36–41 (emphases added).
75. See Raz, supra note 1, at 288 n.130 and accompanying text (discussing
Space Exploration Technologies Corp., also known as SpaceX, in a similar
context).
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the corporation’s profit-seeking purpose can benefit the corporation, and
allow it to continue developing and expanding its operations—but not, in
any immediate or tangible way, its shareholders.  The latter have an equita-
ble, more-than-contractual claim toward the corporation, and are entitled
to its profits when it either decides to distribute them, or dissolves.76  That
claim, however, does not result in anything that can be called “share-
holder primacy.”  It exists within a framework—corporate law—that pro-
motes the corporation’s pursuit of its own purpose.
B. The Corporation’s Personhood
Every corporation is a person.77  This says a lot about what the corpo-
ration is not: while others have suggested that the corporation might be
“property,”78 an “aggregate” of other people,79 a “nexus” of contracts,80 a
“concession” from the state,81 or a “mediating hierarchy,”82 none of these
models fully cohere with the corporation’s true nature.  In short, the cor-
76. See infra Section I.D.
77. See, e.g., KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 5–8 (discussing “[l]egal per-
sonality” as a “core structural characteristic[ ]” of the corporation); Raz, supra note
1, at 286 n.120 (citing a broad range of statutory, case law, and scholarly sources to
that effect); infra text accompanying note 317.
78. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2, at 264–65 (“In the first conception, the corpo-
ration is seen as the private property of its stockholder-owners.”); Katsuhito Iwai,
Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative
Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 592 (1999) (“[W]hat does a corporate
shareholder own?  The corporation, of course.  It is the corporation itself as a
‘thing’ that a corporate shareholder legally owns.”).  For a refutation of the prop-
erty model, see, for example, Raz, supra note 1, at 285–87.
79. See, e.g., VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS OTHER THAN CHARITABLE 2 (1882) (“[T]he rights and duties of an incorpo-
rated association are in reality the rights and duties of the persons who compose it,
and not of an imaginary being.”), quoted in Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of
the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1458 (1987).  The
“aggregate” and “property” views, see supra note 78, although not identical, are
closely related. See, e.g., Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM.
J. COMP. L. 39, 42 (2000) (“The aggregate or partnership model of the corpora-
tion, which was prevalent in the 19th century, assumed [a role as the ‘owners’ of
the corporate enterprise] for shareholders . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
80. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302 (1983) (“An organization is the nexus of contracts, writ-
ten and unwritten, among owners of factors of production and customers.”);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (“The private
corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for
contracting relationships . . . .”).
81. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819) (“A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it . . . .”); see also Coates,
supra note 3, at 810–15 (discussing the artificial entity theory in detail), 831 (ex-
plaining how the artificial entity theory lost valence in modern reality).
82. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 276–87 (1999).
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poration is not a collection of anything—people, assets, contracts, or
rights.  Every corporation is one, single entity.  Other people can make
contracts with, or have rights toward (not “in”) the corporation, which
owns its assets, and itself is unownable.83  Each of the other views can have
some intuitive appeal, in some situations, but only this simple statement—
the corporation is a person—consistently adheres to law and day-to-day real-
ity.  A nexus of contracts cannot own property or make new contracts, only
a person can;84 the concession theory has nothing to do with the way cor-
porations come into existence today;85 the mediating hierarchy concept
might explain how the corporation’s fiduciaries ought to make decisions,
but does not describe the nature of the corporation itself; and so on.
The unifying motive behind the various inaccurate models of the cor-
poration, mentioned above, might be very simple: to some, the sentence
“the corporation is a person” sounds plain strange.  After all, humans are
persons, and other things are not, correct?  Not exactly.  The corporation
is a product of a certain field of law, administered by humans.  The same is
true of any other legal concept, including “right,” “duty,” “property,” “con-
tract” and “person.”  The corporation is a legal person, not a human.86  As
a rule, the corporation has the legal capacity of a human.87  Assuming that
the law’s overarching aim of promoting human well-being is pursued, law
is capable of making a certain phenomenon into a person, or “right-and-
duty-bearing unit.”88  The corporate person is no more a “fiction” than law
itself is a fiction.
83. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 1, at 286 (“Shareholders do not own the corpora-
tion; they own shares.  While it is meaningful to discuss the ownership of a right
toward a corporation, it is unclear what might it mean . . . to ‘own’ a corporation—
another person, with interests and volition of its own.” (footnote omitted)).
84. See, e.g., id. at 284; infra note 221 and accompanying text.
85. See infra note 283 and accompanying text.
86. This differs, for example, from Otto von Gierke’s more extreme views.
See, e.g., Friedlander, supra note 11, at 40 (“In the late nineteenth century, the
eminent German legal historian Otto Gierke theorized that when individuals
unite, spiritually and psychologically, for a common purpose they create a sepa-
rate, living person that has a will of its own.” (footnote omitted)), 76–83 (discuss-
ing in detail Gierke’s “Theory of the Corporation as Group-Person” and its
spiritual and collectivist allusions).
87. Some corporate statutes say so explicitly. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1501 (2020) (“[A] business corporation shall have the legal capacity of natural
persons to act.”).  There are things humans can do and corporations cannot—
some, because allowing them contradicts our understanding of other legal and
social institutions (for example, voting in the general election); and some, because
the corporation inherently lacks certain traits, see, e.g., In re Dole Food Co., 110
A.3d 1257 (Del. Ch. 2015) (preventing a corporation from serving as an expert
witness).  These are exceptions; the rule is that a corporation has the legal capacity
of a natural person.  This fact is supported by other parts of corporate law’s struc-
ture, namely, the existence of fiduciaries—humans through whom the corporation
operates in the physical world. See infra Section I.E.
88. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE
L.J. 655 passim (1926).
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To those for whom corporate personhood seems morally appalling,
three responses may be offered: first, corporate personhood has been de-
vised by humans, is ultimately meant to benefit them, and in fact does so,
as evidenced by The New York Times Company not going out of business
every time one of its shareholders dies.  Second, by their own communitar-
ian standard, these objectors do not offer a compelling alternative; would
it be better if the corporation was “owned” by its shareholders?  Third, the
objectors’ true discontent seems to be with the things some corporations
do—for instance, funnel excessive amounts of money to support political
candidates89—and not with corporations’ ability to do anything at all, while
bearing their own rights and duties (including the duty to obey the law90).
The question, then, is why must every corporation be a person?  Why
cannot at least some corporations, on the basis of either state law or pri-
vate ordering, be something else, say, an aggregate of shareholders?  The
answer lies at the most definitional level.  What distinguishes corporate law
is the existence of a corpus, or “body”—the corporate person.91  Far more
than a linguistic matter, the presence of a distinct legal person, bearing its
own rights and duties, allows corporate law to produce a unique set of
doctrinal, economic, and practical benefits.92 In turn, corporate law’s
unique benefits enable the corporation to achieve its purpose (for exam-
ple, the lawful pursuit of profit) better than any mechanism provided by
other legal frameworks.  Therefore, the law of corporate personhood can
be viewed as a means to an end—the promotion of the corporation’s pur-
pose.  Corporate personhood, like corporate law’s other building blocks,
revolves around corporate purpose.
Although a group of individuals can act toward a common purpose,
we are then not in the realm of corporate law; at most, we are dealing with
non-corporate partnership law,93 contract law, or trust law.  Each of these
come with their own doctrines, economic implications, and practices, dis-
tinct from those of corporate law.  For example, the human actors (or at
least one of them) can never enjoy full limited liability: lacking a separate
person to which duties attach, the individuals themselves bear those
duties.
89. See infra Section II.B.
90. See infra Section I.C.
91. See Macey & Strine, supra note 49, at 478 (“The very term ‘corporation’
derives from the Latin word corpus which translates into English as the word
‘body,’ which presents an entity that is authorized by the state to act as an
individual.”).
92. See, e.g., id. at 526 (“Unless such a separate entity is created . . . the basic
objective of the corporation, which is to create an economic framework for amas-
sing capital to be deployed in economic activity, cannot be reached.”); de
Fontenay, supra note 1, at 201 (“Recognizing the corporation as the owner of [its]
assets . . . is one of the defining features of the corporation and the key to its
success in fostering economic growth precisely because it prevents individual
shareholders from removing productive business assets at will.”).
93. See infra note 272.
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On the flip side, just as shareholders are offered limited liability, the
existence of a separate person—having its own characteristics and rights
(in addition to duties)—means that other individuals’ wishes and pur-
poses are not those of the corporation,94 and that fiduciary duties run to
the corporation, not to shareholders or stakeholders.95  Indeed, one of
the main justifications for having corporate law in the first place, as opposed
to contract, property, trust, or general fiduciary law, is that unlike these
frameworks, corporate law serves to limit each individual’s freedom of ac-
tion,96 thus promoting a purpose that is not fully congruent with, or
under the control of, any of the involved human actors.
It is therefore puzzling to see many scholars, particularly on the
shareholderist, or law and economics side, write about corporate law as if
it was concerned with an agency problem between only two actors, manag-
ers and shareholders.97  This kind of scholarship inexplicably ignores the
one person at the heart of corporate law: the corporation.  The ameliora-
tion of agency costs is the focus of much of corporate law; yet, these
agency problems are mainly between the corporation and its fiduciaries.
Crucially, the corporate person also does not have identity of interests with
its shareholders: multiple “agency problems,” as well as legitimately differ-
ing interests, exist between shareholders and the corporation, distinct from the
agency problems between the corporation and its fiduciaries.98  Put sim-
ply, “the corporation’s fortunes might not translate into those of its share-
94. See supra Section I.A.
95. See infra Section I.E.
96. See de Fontenay, supra note 1, at 195 (“[A] core goal of corporate law is to
. . . constrain individual behavior.  For this reason, it is a comparatively poor choice
of regime in which to expand individual rights.” (emphasis added)), 197
(“[C]orporate law serves to quash individual voices and actions by design . . . .”).  Of
course, the ultimate aim of corporations (and corporate law) is to enhance human
well-being. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 51, at 1663.  Precisely to this end, corpo-
rate legal mechanisms constrain involved actors’ behavior (as all law does; corpo-
rate law more structurally and evenhandedly so).
97. See, e.g., KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 29–30 (“The first [agency
problem] involves the conflict between the firm’s owners and its hired manag-
ers. . . . The problem lies in assuring that the managers are responsive to the
owners’ interests . . . .”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate
Governance, 95 VA. L. REV. 685, 686–87 (2009) (presenting the main debate in cor-
porate law as relating to conflicts between “managers” and “investors”); Zohar Go-
shen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and
Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 775 (2017) (“The subject of most corporate
law scholarship is the conflict of interests between managers . . . and
shareholders.”).
98. For detailed discussion of conflicts or disparities between shareholders
and the corporation, see Raz, supra note 1, at 272, 276–78, 282–85, 291 n.145,
293–95, 304–05, 311–19.  These issues are addressed in the field of share law, see
infra Section I.D, which is distinct from corporate fiduciary law, and is based on
non-fiduciary equity.  A clear example of share law is the law of appraisal: “Direc-
tors can satisfy their fiduciary duties even when a sales process is insufficient to
achieve the stock’s fair value under [DGCL] Section 262.”  Brief of Law, Econom-
ics and Corporate Finance Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners-
Appellees and Affirmance at 6, DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.,
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holders, or part of them.”99  Both law-and-economists and Delaware
jurists, generally mindful of corporate personhood,100 are likely glossing
over this very point when they use inaccurate, practically impossible
phrases such as “fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders.”101
As it turns out, law and economics scholarship itself attaches the high-
est import to the concept of corporate personhood (despite often not call-
ing it that, instead using terms such as “entity” and “firm,” all pointing to
the same phenomenon102).  Hovenkamp,103 Macey, and Strine104 provide
useful summaries of the major works in this area.
For example, it is one of the greatest law-and-economists of all time,
Ronald Coase, who in 1937’s The Nature of the Firm105 does not mention the
word “shareholder” or “stockholder” even once.  Rather, the “firm” is the
central actor.  It is the firm that decides, based on transaction costs,
whether to produce goods and services itself, or outsource certain tasks.
The firm as such acts, owns its property, and reaps the gains, or bears the
costs, of its activities.  The firm is the opposite of an aggregate of people
contracting with one another, what Coase refers to as the “price mecha-
nism.”106  Clearly, the firm—the corporation—is a distinct legal person.
To a large degree, The Nature of the Firm is a seminal text about the eco-
nomic meaning of corporate personhood.
Following a discussion of Coase’s article and its relation to modern
law and economics, Professor Jason Scott Johnston concludes that “the
role of corporate law is both more varied and more creative than either
Berle and Means or Easterbrook and Fischel presume, [as it is] a funda-
mental determinant of strategic bargaining over the terms of the corpo-
rate contract.”107  The fundamental, unwaivable structure of corporate law
172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017) (No. 518, 2016), http://www.chancerydaily.com.objects-
us-east-1.dream.io/upload/589a4ed825b0e.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3W2-VVM8].
99. Raz, supra note 1, at 260.
100. See, e.g., supra notes 49, 68, 70, 74 and accompanying text; infra note 220
and accompanying text.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 206–07.
102. On the linguistic difficulties plaguing the corporate law community, see
supra note 4.
103. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW 172–83 (2014)
(discussing, in a chapter titled “The Separation of Ownership and Control,” works
by, among others, Berle and Means, Marshall, Coase, Fisher, and Fama and Miller,
and explaining how they relate to the differentiation between corporations and
their shareholders).
104. Macey & Strine, supra note 49, at 463–77 (discussing important law and
economics works, mainly within the “nexus of contracts” and “separation of owner-
ship and control” theories, and explaining how they relate to corporate
personhood).
105. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
106. Id. passim.
107. Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of The Nature of the Firm on the Theory
of Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213, 244 (1993).  Johnston makes this observation
while discussing constrained rationality, which is one way to examine the central
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determines, among other things, the boundaries of “private ordering.”  In
another important conceptual work, Professors Rock and Wachter, ex-
panding on Coase’s article, remark that “firms [are] islands of conscious
power.  These islands [are] surrounded by seas, . . . namely markets.”108
The person bearing that consciousness (with the help of its human repre-
sentatives)109 is the corporation.
In modern law and economics, corporate personhood remains as sali-
ent.  Professors Hansmann and Kraakman, in their well-regarded 2000 ar-
ticle,110 explore the economic benefits achieved through “asset
partitioning”—simply, the fact that the corporation’s assets and obliga-
tions are its own, not its shareholders’ (and vice versa).  Asset partitioning
allows the corporation and its stakeholders to deal with one another far
more cheaply and conveniently, as they need not inquire into each share-
holder’s financial or legal situation.  This economic wizardry is made pos-
sible through a specialized legal framework—corporate law: “In the
absence of organizational law, it would be effectively impossible to create
the affirmative asset partitioning that is the core characteristic of a legal
entity.”111
Recently, law and economics scholar Marcel Kahan co-wrote: “What is
a corporation, and why does it matter? . . .  [H]ow courts characterize the
corporation significantly affects legal doctrines that impact not only the
corporation, but also third parties such as shareholders,”112 affirming both the
importance and the very existence of corporate personhood.  In essence,
the human-welfare-increasing function of the corporation is channeled
through the law of corporate purpose—”the lawful pursuit of profit”—and
is not dependent upon the individual, diverging, largely unascertainable,
and changing wishes of shareholders.113
phenomenon corporate law is meant to both facilitate and deal with: open-ended-
ness.  Due to this, involved actors’ rationality, or ability to assess what is going to
happen and act accordingly, is inherently constrained, and unique mechanisms
(namely, corporate fiduciary law and equity-based share law) are mandatorily
required.
108. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1697 (2001).
109. See infra Section I.E.
110. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organiza-
tional Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
111. Id. at 406.  For criticisms of that argument, and a refutation of those
criticisms, see infra notes 124–30 and accompanying text.
112. Helen Hershkoff & Marcel Kahan, Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate
“Contracts”, 93 WASH. L. REV. 265, 266–67 (2018) (emphasis added).
113. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155,
159–218 (2019) (“[S]tartups involve heterogeneous shareholders in overlapping
governance roles that give rise to vertical and horizontal tensions between foun-
ders, investors, executives, and employees. . . .  The value of the corporation itself
. . . best reflects the sum of the participants’ interests and it is to the corporation
that the fiduciary duty should be owed.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter,
Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law
History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 903 (2016) (“[I]t [is] not credible to equate
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The fact that corporations are wholly separate persons, distinct from
their shareholders and anyone else, is far from merely an academic issue.
It is highly practical, having profound implications at every turn of legal
life.  Many are discussed throughout this Article,114 but to give a taste of
how numerous the consequences of corporate personhood are, consider
the salient example of mandatory arbitration clauses in corporate charters
and bylaws.
In recent years, mandatory arbitration has become the most signifi-
cant barrier for the enforcement of private law rights in the U.S.115  In
essence, the arbitration clause has become the only truly binding part of
many consumer and employment contracts.116  A somewhat different
question, however, is what happens when such clauses are inserted into a
corporation’s constitutional documents.  Provisions of this kind would
mandate that all corporate law or “internal affairs” disputes (namely, law-
suits against the corporation’s fiduciaries, or by shareholders against the
corporation) shall be arbitrated, rather than litigated as a direct or deriva-
tive action in court.  Should they be valid and enforceable?  At least pre-
sumptively, no.
The reason is that corporate constitutional documents are simply not
contracts.  Rather, they are equity documents, meant to accomplish a
unique feat, possible only through a structured legal framework: the crea-
tion of a corporate person, and the pursuit of its purpose through loyal
fiduciaries, while meeting its obligations to both stakeholders and residual
the views of the corporation to those of its diverse and changing stockholders.”).
This point also bears on the “shareholders are stakeholders” argument, see infra
notes 170–74 and accompanying text.
114. For an additional example, in one case, corporate personhood led to a
$246 million greater award of attorneys’ fees. See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault,
51 A.3d 1213, 1252, 1263, 1265 (Del. 2012) (noting that, although 81% of the
derivatively-represented corporation’s outstanding shares were held by defendant
itself, “the corporation was harmed and the total recovery is awarded to the corpo-
ration . . . —not ‘nominally’ but actually,” so the $304 million fee award is based
on the entire amount of recovery).
115. Boilerplate arbitration clauses, at least in the U.S., usually mean that one
party’s rights are not truly channeled to alternative dispute resolution, but practi-
cally become unenforceable.  Among other reasons, that is because non-arbitra-
tion methods, such as the class action, are the only effective way to resolve certain
disputes, or even have them litigated in the first place. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Arthur R.
Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflec-
tions on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 322–31 (2013);
Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015).
116. For a detailed and troubling account of the practice of “deleting” rights
(including those presumably granted in the contract itself) through standard form
contracts, while asserting that such provisions truly arise from each party’s consent,
or have the power to completely override other sources of law, see MARGARET JANE
RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW
(2013).
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claimants.  As a series of articles by leading corporate law scholars117 has
recently shown, corporate constitutional documents have, at most, certain
contract-like traits, in some situations.  Primarily, these instruments are
meant to deal with the distinctive issues that arise in the corporate envi-
ronment.  Because the corporation itself is party to its constitutional docu-
ments,118 these are not merely agreements between shareholders and
managers; instead, they are a mechanism that must serve to promote,
rather than obstruct, the reason for the corporation’s existence in the first
place.119
The most pertinent problem, in this regard, is the absolute power and
information asymmetries between the corporation and its fiduciaries.120
For one, fiduciaries can amend the corporation’s constitutional docu-
ments in a practically one-sided manner (pointing to their non-consent-
based, non-contractual nature).121  Further, given the low observability of
fiduciaries’ conduct, and the unique, court-based enforcement mecha-
nisms of corporate law (namely, the derivative action), mandatory arbitra-
tion would in many cases rob the corporation of any meaningful way to
vindicate its rights.  It also would eliminate the information-revealing and
deterrence-generating effects of litigation in open court.122  When courts
face this issue, they must remain mindful of these fundamental facts—or
the enforceability of corporate law’s norms, governing some of the most
important institutions in our society, would be in existential danger.123
117. James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 257 (2015); Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate
Bylaws, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 373 (2018); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The
Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583
(2016).  Particularly, see Lipton, supra, at 587 (“[C]orporate governance arrange-
ments are not contractual.  Contract law is organized around a theory of con-
sent . . . .  Corporations, by contrast, are organized around principles more akin to
trust law . . . .”).
118. See, e.g., Macey & Strine, supra note 49, at 466 (“[T]he various constitu-
ents to the corporation must, of course, have counter-parties.  This counterparty is
an entity, namely the corporation itself.”); Raz, supra note 1, at 258 n.4, 272 n.72
(citing statutory and case law demonstrating that the corporation is party to its
constitutional documents).
119. On the impossibility of shareholders waiving the corporation’s rights, see
Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 722–23 (2011).
120. See infra Sections I.E, II.C.
121. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 117.
122. See, e.g., Roy Shapira, Mandatory Arbitration and the Market for Reputation,
99 B.U. L. REV. 873 (2019) (exploring the “reputational deterrence” generated by
litigation, and not by arbitration, in the information-asymmetrical environment
typical of corporate and securities law).
123. In the U.S., this topic is currently in flux. See, e.g., Cydney Posner,
Mandatory Arbitration Shareholder Proposal Goes to Court—As Chair Clayton Suggested,
COOLEY PUBCO (Mar. 25, 2019), https://cooleypubco.com/2019/03/25/
mandatory-arbitration-shareholder-proposal-complaint [https://perma.cc/PT2R-
CVFV].  The issue in the Johnson & Johnson case, discussed id., is the arbitration of
federal securities claims, but very similar rationales (i.e., power and information
asymmetries precluding actual “consent,” and the unique suitability of court-based
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Finally, recent scholarship has turned to the topic of alternatives to
corporations, including common law trusts,124 reciprocal insurance ex-
changes,125 and security interests.126  These works confront a basic ques-
tion: why “corporate law” and not trust law, contract law, or property law,
respectively?  Why cannot natural persons enter into highly complex, mul-
tilateral legal relationships, with help from non-corporate law concepts,
such as “constructive notice” and “agency?”
The answer is that they can, but it would be so costly and inconve-
nient that a relationship with an entity—a corporation—is vastly prefera-
ble.  Each of the frameworks discussed in these articles offer some
advantages, making them more useful than corporate law in some situa-
tions.  Yet, neither trusts, nor reciprocal contracts, nor security interests
offer all the benefits of a corporation, or do so in the very wide, flexible range
of situations which the corporation is fit to address.
For example, Verstein’s discussion of reciprocal insurance makes
clear that such arrangements are highly repetitive: the “attorney-in-fact”—
the natural person who signs new contracts, receives premium payments,
and distributes insurance benefits to a large number of subscribers127—
basically does that, and not much else.  The attorney-in-fact is bound by
the terms of the contracts with each insured party.  These are insurance,
not trade, manufacturing, or anything-else contracts.  Attorneys-in-fact
cannot, in their role as such, enter into new activities, as they have far less
than the general, unlimited legal capacity of a corporation.  The same is
true of any contract: the agreement has some terms and boundaries; it does
not say “do whatever you wish.”128
Yet, one type of legal instrument—corporations’ constitutional docu-
ments—says precisely that, and is predicated on the corporation’s general
capacity to act as a person.  Put simply, can anyone imagine Google oper-
procedures for resolving corporate law disputes) apply in regard to internal affairs,
state law claims.
124. See John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in
Anglo-American Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145 (2016).
125. See Andrew Verstein, Enterprise Without Entities, 116 MICH. L. REV. 247
(2017).
126. See Ofer Eldar & Andrew Verstein, The Enduring Distinction Between Busi-
ness Entities and Security Interests, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 213 (2019).
127. For a description of reciprocal insurance exchanges’ basic structure, see
Verstein, supra note 125, at 264–66.
128. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 117, at 279 n.91 (“[T]he requirement of defi-
niteness is not a matter that the parties can waive if they are to have a contract.
Indeed, it is tautological to argue that the parties can agree to an indefinite level of
performance, since there cannot be an agreement if parties do not know to what
they have agreed.”).  Some contracts might seem to be saying something similar to
“do whatever you wish”—for example, a lawyer’s retainer agreement or a physi-
cian’s medical care agreement—but even they are constrained by certain positive
law frameworks: legal ethics and medical ethics, respectively, along with general
fiduciary law.  In contrast, the corporation is not necessarily anyone’s fiduciary; it is
constrained only by corporate law’s imperative to pursue its purpose.
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ating not as a corporate entity, but as a web of reciprocal contracts among
billions of consumers, employees, managers and others?  Quite clearly not.
The existence of a central party, having its own rights, duties, identity and
traits, and surviving the death (or other disability, or just change of mind)
of any natural person, enables something special to happen.  Google, like
most corporations, engages in a host of dynamic acts and relationships,
undefined—and to a large extent, unimaginable—by anyone in advance.
This can only be achieved through corporate law, with its concept of per-
sonhood and its open-ended, equity-based dictates.129
It is no surprise, then, that Eldar and Verstein describe business enti-
ties as “enduring” in their article title, and conclude, “the species of entity
. . . will survive long after [other categories in private law have]
dissolved.”130
C. The Corporation’s Stakeholders
Theoretically, it is possible for a corporation not to have non-residual
claimants (in this Article referred to as “stakeholders”131).  A corporation
might be established, with its shareholders conveying to it some property;
beyond that, the corporation would engage in no other contract or rela-
tionship.  However, such a scenario, if it occurs at all, is exceedingly rare.
Practically, almost every corporation has stakeholders.  Corporations are
usually meant to carry out activities more complex than individuals can
effectively achieve; in turn, this gives rise to relationships with various
stakeholders, such as employees, consumers, financial creditors, and many
others.  Therefore, a complete theory of corporate law should have some-
129. Even the common law of trusts, see Morley, supra note 124, while
grounded in equity, offers less than corporate law’s combination of flexibility and
certainty.  For instance, “[t]rust law had always allowed a trust to persist after the
death, disappearance, or change of a beneficiary,” id. at 2194, but what about the
death or disappearance of a trustee?  Even if trust law did try to resolve these various
conundrums, the litigation and uncertainty costs surrounding them would be
much higher than those afforded by the widespread understanding of the corpora-
tion’s nature as a separate and enduring person.  Furthermore, trust law does not
provide the same open-ended, “any lawful act or activity” imperative as corporate
law, see supra note 22.  Instead, a trust relationship has an ex ante information
“anchor” in the form of trust property, for the loss of which the trustee is subject to
legal sanction. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 2 cmt. i (AM. LAW
INST. 2003) (“A trust cannot be created unless there is trust property in exis-
tence . . . .”), 5 cmt. a(2) (“In any event, and often crucial in determining the
character of a relationship, there can be no trust without identifiable trust prop-
erty.”), 100 (“A trustee who commits a breach of trust is chargeable with . . . the
amount required to restore the values of the trust estate . . . or . . . the amount of
any benefit to the trustee personally as a result of the breach.”).  Consequently,
trust law cannot facilitate the same range of unpredictable adventures as corporate
law.  The trustee’s actions are more constrained before-the-fact, compared to those
of a corporation; as a result, corporate law generates a much wider potential for
both risk and reward.
130. Eldar & Verstein, supra note 126, at 269.
131. See supra note 23.
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thing to say about stakeholders: what kind of rights and duties do they
have?  Which areas of law provide the tools to resolve the questions per-
taining to them?
As is typical in the present-day dichotomy of corporate law,
shareholderists and stakeholderists have different answers.  To start with,
many shareholderists follow a mode of thinking, quite common in the
U.S., which can be summarized as: “If it’s not happening in the headlines,
it’s not happening.”132  Accordingly, they concentrate on one term—”con-
tract”—to describe the innumerably diverse set of relationships a corpora-
tion might have with its stakeholders.  For example, in a 2009 article,
Judge Easterbrook broadly posits that “[i]n all of this there are no third-
party effects.  Competition and contracts promote efficiency . . . .  Stran-
gers to the finance and governance bargain, such as debt investors and
labor, arrange their affairs by their own contracts. . . .  [F]ree contracting
in a competitive system just has to promote everyone’s welfare.”133  This
sort of “headline” writing ignores the wide array of frameworks that com-
prise positive law (such as employment law, torts, environmental law,
trusts, fiduciary law, unjust enrichment, general equity, and so on, along-
side contract law), which binds every person, including corporations, and
which often has very little to do with “contract,” or any ex ante, bargained-
for set of choices.
In reality, there are “third-party effects,” power and information asym-
metries, and need for equity and nuance.  An employment relationship is
different than that between lender and borrower in the LIBOR market.134
The law pierces many veils; yet, we can never pierce law itself.  Thus, a
more accurate choice of words than “contract” would be “positive law.”  By
definition, no one is allowed to commit an unlawful act.135  Equally, it is
132. Chris William Sanchirico, Win or Lose on Amazon, Philly Needs to Get
Smart About Attracting New Businesses, PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 25, 2017), https://
www.inquirer.com/philly/opinion/commentary/amazon-hq2-philadelphia-
business-kenney-20171025.html [https://perma.cc/PGV9-YJGG].
133. Easterbrook, supra note 97, at 690.
134. Indeed, employment relationships generally form a large part of peo-
ple’s lives and identity, and give rise to many troubling issues. See, e.g., Milja
Milenkovic, 42 Worrying Workplace Stress Statistics, AM. INST. OF STRESS (Sept. 23,
2019), https://www.stress.org/42-worrying-workplace-stress-statistics [https://
perma.cc/9W3Z-Q5FE] (citing studies showing, among other things, that “[o]ver a
third of people said their job was a regular source of stress in 2018,” and that this
stress can often be attributed to specific, employer-dependent causes, such as
“poor communication practices by . . . employers” and “a heavy workload”).
135. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Agency, Authority, and Compliance, in THE CAM-
BRIDGE HANDBOOK OF COMPLIANCE (D. Daniel Sokol & Benjamin van Rooij eds.,
forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3462638 [https://perma.cc/QM8X-GM3H] (“Law is what you must
do—the rules and regulations originating from the sovereign, transgression of
which may lead to deprivation of property or, in some cases, liberty.”).  Addition-
ally, within corporate law, many cases establish that a corporation is never permit-
ted to act unlawfully (even to achieve profit), and its fiduciaries violate their duties
if they cause it to do so. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698
550 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65: p. 523
not possible to impose a legal sanction for a lawful act.  Law is imperfect,
but it can be reformed—which requires going through the democratic,
judicial, or regulatory process, and cannot consist of someone subjectively
“declaring” that a certain behavior is right or wrong.136  It is not always
easy to ascertain what positive law says, but it does say something, and does
not say anything anyone might wish for.137
Furthermore, the corporation’s relationships with its stakeholders are
such that a natural person might also enter (albeit often on a different
scale).  Both a corporation and a human can borrow money, have employ-
ees, or purchase goods and services.  As a result, it is general, non-corporate
law that provides the vast majority of norms governing corporations (and
anyone else).  The corporation’s obligations toward its employees or finan-
cial creditors are external to corporate law.  Legal or contractual changes
to those relationships do not modify corporate law.  Rather, those obliga-
tions are subsumed, as a whole, into the definitional requirement that the
corporation act lawfully.  Anything that happens within corporate law—
including the rights of residual claimants—happens only after that re-
quirement is satisfied.138
This fact—that non-corporate law regulates the corporation’s rela-
tionships with its stakeholders—has been firmly established in U.S. law
since at least 1877, when the Supreme Court decided Munn v. Illinois.139
There, an “unincorporated” company (a corporation140 not “chartered”
by the state) challenged a price regulation on the grounds that, lacking a
state-issued charter, the state has no power to tell the company how to run
an aspect of its business.  Rejecting this argument, Chief Justice Waite
found that any business “affected with a public interest”141 may be publicly
regulated.  In other words, regulation of corporations’ effect on the public
A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (foundational Delaware case on the issue); Marchand v.
Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019); In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No.
2017-0222-JRS, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1293 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019); In re Massey
Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS
83, at *73–74 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (“Delaware law allows corporations to pur-
sue diverse means to make a profit, subject to a critical statutory floor, which is the
requirement that Delaware corporations only pursue ‘lawful business’ by ‘lawful
acts.’  As a result, a fiduciary of a Delaware corporation cannot be loyal to a Dela-
ware corporation by knowingly causing it to seek profit by violating the law.” (foot-
note omitted)); Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L.
REV. 2013, 2017 (2019) (“Delaware courts have prioritized giving directors broad
latitude to take business risk by drawing a line at legal risk . . . .” (emphasis added)).
136. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 8, at 790.
137. See supra note 24 (discussing the meaning of positive law).
138. See Raz, supra note 1, at 275–76 (“[T]he residual interests . . . [are] those
left after all corporate obligations, of any kind, to all non-residual claimants are
satisfied, in practice or in capacity.”); see also id. at 274 n.77 (explaining how both
corporate and non-corporate law operationalize this ever-present requirement).
139. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
140. On the broad meaning of “corporation” as used in this Article, see supra
note 1.
141. Munn, 94 U.S. at 130.
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is not within the realm of corporate law; it does not flow from the corpora-
tion’s constitutional documents.  Rather, it is part of general law, which
applies to both corporations and natural persons.142
More recently, a leading figure of global corporate law went on to
express the same idea: according to Chief Justice Strine, “[a] corporate
law case is not a case about all laws, but about a law.  We are not environ-
ment protection law, labor law or antitrust law—you stay in your lane.”143
Strine advocates the same theme in a long series of scholarly articles,144
making clear that protecting stakeholders against externalities, while cer-
tainly lacking in the U.S. and around the world, is not part of corporate law.
Strine specifically concludes that “if interests such as the environment,
workers, and consumers are to be protected, then what is required is a
revival of effective externality regulation that gives these interests more
effective and timely protection,”145 contrasting “externality regulation”
with norms “within corporation law itself.”146  Other scholars have made
this point in various contexts,147 and a recent article by Professor Mariana
Pargendler “raises the possibility that the promise of corporate govern-
ance may have been overrated, . . . [as it] may crowd out potentially more
effective responses to the problems at hand.”148
The inherent difference, in structural terms, between corporate and
non-corporate law is the result of at least two factors.  First, corporate law
involves different actors.  The terms “corporation,” “shareholder,” and “di-
rector” result exclusively from the corporate framework.  There can be no
142. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal
Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1628–32 (1988) (discussing Munn and the other
Granger cases; noting that “Munn had been selected for a full opinion on state
power to regulate prices because the company was unincorporated,” that the
Court in these cases “[upheld] rate regulation of natural persons provided the
regulated market was ‘affected with the public interest,’” and that “Munn . . . made
corporate status irrelevant to the states’ power to regulate rates”).
143. Rita K. Farrell, At Top of Delaware Chancery Court, Adherence to Tradition,
N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/at-top-of-
delaware-chancery-court-adherence-to-tradition [https://perma.cc/7V5Z-4TT7]
(interviewing then-Chancellor Strine).
144. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr, Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence
from My Hometown, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 176, 177 (2017) [hereinafter
Strine, Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose]; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Strug-
gle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135,
145–46, 171–72 (2012); Strine, supra note 8, at 768, 786–93.
145. Strine, supra note 8, at 793.
146. Id. at 768.
147. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as the New
Corporate Law, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 325, 328 (2001) (“Laws offering models for
business organizations . . . cover relationships between the interested parties within the
organizations . . . .  None of these laws, however, regulates the businesses in which the
organizations engage.  Those . . . businesses are regulated by other laws, unrelated to
[their] organizational structures . . . .”); Larry E. Ribstein, The Important Role of Non-
Organization Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751 (2005).
148. Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L.
359, 402 (2016).
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director for a natural person; and, while a natural person does in some
sense have “residual claimants”—the person’s presumptive heirs149—they
have no legal standing during the person’s life, in terms of setting a pur-
pose, appointing fiduciaries, or any of the rights granted to shareholders.
Thus, special norms150 are required to regulate the relationships gener-
ated by the corporate framework, but not other relationships, which
equally attach to natural and corporate persons.
Second, corporate law differs from non-corporate law in the informa-
tion content of the legal norms.  Every legal field provides some set of im-
peratives.  The command might be detailed (“pay $100 to the bondholder
on July 1”) or undetailed (“act equitably with the trust property”), but it
exists.  Corporate law, in contrast, provides the most undetailed guidance
of all: it simply tells the corporation to “do whatever.”  A corporation can
literally act however it wishes, subject to only one imperative: “lawfully pur-
sue profit” (or any other purpose, depending on the type of corpora-
tion).151  Among other issues, this makes corporate law entirely unsuitable
to govern the substantive rights and duties of anyone other than the actors
affected by the open-ended part (“pursue profit”)—that is, the corpora-
tion, its residual claimants, and its fiduciaries—as opposed to those af-
fected by the close-ended part (“lawfully”), that is, stakeholders.
Crucially, attempting to set stakeholders’ rights within corporate law
would actually place stakeholders in an inferior position, compared to what
they have today.  That is because non-corporate law, with its more specific
and information-rich content, provides both better rights and better en-
forcement.  Legal actors need information to know (and act on) their
rights and duties.  Trying to enforce stakeholders’ rights within corporate
law would generate an extreme information asymmetry, between the
wished-for, subjective demands—nowhere found in positive law—of various
stakeholders, and what the corporation can know it is obliged to do, ascer-
tainable through law.152  This asymmetry is absolute and inevitable.  Even
149. See Raz, supra note 1, at 274–75.
150. Moreover, special mechanisms are required to enforce those norms, such
as the derivative action, which is a unique creature of corporate law.  The distinc-
tion between derivative and direct actions has far-reaching implications. See, e.g.,
id. at 295 n.159.
151. See supra Section I.A; supra note 22.  This point is embodied in the fact
that the corporation’s goals might be “to engage in any lawful act or activity.” DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2020).
152. The same holds true if the “do whatever (in the lawful pursuit of profit)”
imperative is augmented with seemingly more specific language, which actually
does nothing to resolve the asymmetry described here.  One example is saying that
the corporation must promote “general public benefit.”  Accountable Capitalism
Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018).  By design, law cannot provide any guide or
imperative to operationalize this abstract requirement.  Imposing such a “duty”
assumes law away, replacing it with after-the-fact, subjective determination of
whether the corporation acted “right” or “wrong.”  Among other issues, this kind
of legislation might violate the constitutional vagueness doctrine. See, e.g., Eugene
Volokh, The Void for Vagueness / Fair Notice Doctrine and Civil Cases, VOLOKH CONSPIR-
ACY (June 21, 2012, 12:19 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/06/21/the-void-for-
2020] PURPOSE-BASED THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW 553
if the corporation could somehow read stakeholders’ minds, there would
still be no logical way to say that the lawful is unlawful.  The only way to
align the corporation’s duties with stakeholders’ interests, in a legally en-
forceable way, is to change the law.  That happens all the time, in legisla-
tures, courts, regulatory agencies, and private agreements.  Still, if existing
law sets the minimum wage at x, it simply is not 2x, or 0.5x, unless the law
is changed.  Working to improve non-corporate law would be more fruit-
ful in both achieving desired societal goals, and not disturbing the equity-
based structure of corporate law.
Accordingly, statements that corporate law should promote “the ag-
gregate welfare of all who are affected by a firm’s activities,”153 “overall
social welfare,”154 or “cooperative economic activity”155 must be under-
stood in context.  They are not a recipe for arbitrariness.  Promotion of
social welfare does not entail creating “rights” (at cost to others) out of
whole cloth.  Rather, it means maximizing involved actors’ welfare, so that
claims are initially allocated in a just and efficient manner, and each of the
actors then receive their full legal claim.
Consistent with the purpose-based structure of corporate law, it is also
true that stakeholders’ interests, beyond their current positive law claims,
may be considered by the corporation, to the extent such consideration
advances the corporation’s purpose.  Among other cases,156 Paramount v.
Time provides a perfect example.  Time’s “journalistic integrity”157 is a
value it voluntarily adopted, under no legal obligation to do so.  None of
Time’s stakeholders have a legal claim to the preservation of “Time Cul-
ture.”158  Non-corporate law, including the First Amendment,159 permits
vagueness-fair-notice-doctrine-and-civil-cases [https://perma.cc/2AQ5-PXRQ]
(surveying case law applying the constitutional vagueness doctrine in administra-
tive law and other civil contexts; noting that the doctrine “is applicable to cases
that involve civil penalties and not just criminal liability”).
153. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 22.
154. Id. at 23.
155. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON
THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 343 (5th ed. 2016).  For a similar statement,
see William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose for Corporate Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713, 714
(2014) (“[B]usiness corporations exist to create wealth . . . .”).  To complete this
kind of argument, one should ask: whose wealth does a corporation create?  The
corporation’s (similar to natural persons, entitled to the fruit of their efforts, sub-
ject to meeting all legal obligations).  How do we know what legal claims other
people have toward the corporation?  Through law.
156. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)
(refusing to interfere in a corporation’s decision not to install lights in a stadium,
an expansion which allegedly would have led to higher revenue from nighttime
games; reasoning that the decision, which considered “the effect on the surround-
ing neighborhood,” might promote the “long run [economic] interest” of the
corporation).
157. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1144 (Del.
1989).
158. Id. passim.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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anyone to engage in publishing that lacks integrity.160  Yet, in the face of a
hostile takeover attempt, Time was allowed to defend this value, because it
promoted the corporation’s purpose—the lawful pursuit of profit.161
The legal response to an extremely significant national crisis—the
opioid epidemic—provides a perfect illustration of the framework dis-
cussed here.  In December 2018, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio denied pharmaceutical defendants’ motions to
dismiss the consolidated civil action filed against them.162  As the decision
shows, the defendants are the pharmaceutical corporations themselves, as sep-
arate legal persons—not their shareholders, employees, or fiduciaries.163
It is the corporation, having the same capacity as a natural person, that
dealt with the victims, and should pay for their injuries.  Furthermore,
none of the causes of action have anything to do with corporate law: the
plaintiffs seek remedies arising in such areas as tort law and unjust enrich-
ment; they were injured not as a corporation or shareholders, but as pa-
tients, consumers, family members, and public service providers.  If a
natural person committed the same acts the corporations are being sued
for, the case would look no different.
Moreover, if we somehow tried to apply corporate law in this case, it
would provide “null results”: nothing within corporate law tells the phar-
maceutical corporations whether their opioid marketing practices are le-
gally permissible.  Attempting to rely on corporate law, or even a more
“socialized” version thereof, would yield worse outcomes for the victims:
the corporations could simply claim that they acted in furtherance of
“general public benefit,”164 and any court proceeding would focus on in-
terpreting that ambiguous phrase, rather than utilize the much more spe-
cific, information-rich tools of tort law and the other causes of action,
developed over centuries of jurisprudence.
160. Again, within the bounds of positive law.  Defamation, for example, is
prohibited.  Yet, there are many kinds of lawful publishing that lack integrity—see
your closest tabloid.
161. See Paramount v. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (“[Directors’] broad mandate
includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of action . . . designed to
enhance corporate profitability.”); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos.
10866, 10670, 10935 (Consol.), 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at *22–86 (Del. Ch. July
14, 1989) (“[T]here is insufficient basis to suppose at this juncture that such con-
cerns [for the ‘Time culture’] have caused the directors to sacrifice or ignore their
duty to seek to maximize in the long run financial returns to the corporation . . . .
[W]here the board . . . continues to manage the corporation for long-term
profit . . . , the corporation has a legally cognizable interest in achieving that
plan.”), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
162. County of Summit v. Purdue Pharma L.P. (In re Nat’l Prescription Opi-
ate Litig.), No. 1:17-md-2804, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213657 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19,
2018).
163. See id. at *1–55 (listing the parties in the case; indicating that the vast
majority of defendants are corporations, while the few natural persons listed as
defendants are, according to a separate web search, physicians and pharmacists,
not related to a corporate defendant).
164. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018).
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Despite all this, many stakeholderists do not believe that a corpora-
tion meeting all of its legal obligations has done enough; they argue it
should still potentially be subject to legal sanction.  Aiming to somehow
import stakeholders’ claims into corporate law, they wish to transform the
corporation’s purpose from the lawful pursuit of its own benefit to an al-
truistic endeavor.  The final paragraphs of this Section consider several
important arguments to that effect.
At the outset, we sometimes encounter foggy metaphors, such as re-
ferring to stakeholders as if they are “constituent parts” of the corpora-
tion.165  Such physiological allusions are without merit, since the
corporation is a person—one entity, not “composed” of anyone else.166
Corporations are no more made up of shareholders and stakeholders than
natural persons are composed of the bank that holds their account and
the college to which they pay tuition.  Moreover, placing the corporation’s
fiduciaries in the center, and expecting them to divide their loyalties
among multiple stakeholders, shifts the focus away from where it is due:
the corporation itself, which is the beneficiary of its fiduciaries’ duties, and
the person serving as stakeholders’ counterparty.  As has been correctly
argued,167 such pluralization of fiduciaries’ duties only amounts to a grant
of unchecked power to fiduciaries, while producing little, or negative, ben-
efits for both the corporation, stakeholders, and shareholders.  In reality,
as described in this Section, what corporations have with their stakehold-
ers is an array of legal relationships, governed by legal norms.
Even when recognizing this, stakeholderists often fail to locate the
correct sphere in which to pursue desirable reforms: non-corporate law.
Rather, they call for ambiguous “corporate social responsibility” (CSR),
overlooking the central questions: how does the corporation—or anyone
else—objectively know what is socially responsible?  Even assuming that
“socially responsible” represents some better standard of conduct than
165. See, e.g., ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 155, at 284 (“To whom do direc-
tors owe loyalty?  The short answer is that they owe their duty to the corporation as
a legal entity.  Yet . . . [t]he ‘corporation’ has multiple constituencies with conflict-
ing interests, including stockholders, creditors, employees, suppliers, and custom-
ers.  To say that directors owe loyalty to the corporation masks conflicts among
these constituencies.” (footnote omitted)).  However, that is not the “short” answer
but the accurate one; the corporation should not be placed in quote marks; stake-
holders do not “constitute” the corporation, but exist separately from it and from
one another; and their mutual conflicts (or, more commonly, their conflicts with
the corporation) should be resolved according to law (as opposed to directors’
guesswork), just like other disputes among people.
166. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 1, at 285–87 (explaining why “aggregate” theo-
ries of the corporation are incorrect); supra Section I.B.
167. See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 42 n.16 (Del. Ch.
2013) (“[A] multivariate fiduciary calculus quickly devolves into the equitable
equivalent of a constituency statute with a concomitant decline in accountabil-
ity.”); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991) (“[A] manager told to serve two masters . . . has been
freed of both and is answerable to neither.”).
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“lawful,” how can legal institutions enforce that standard, when by defini-
tion, no legal sanction can be imposed for lawful behavior?
Recent scholarship168 has gone so far as to condemn governments for
doing precisely the right thing: regulating corporations through stronger,
clearer statements of positive law.  Instead, that article mysteriously de-
mands an overriding reliance on “CSR.”169  Proposals of this kind effec-
tively seek to turn corporations and their fiduciaries into omnipotent
private lawmakers, arbitrarily creating and enforcing their own rules as to
what is “responsible.”  The concept of law does not work this way.
Another line of argument is that, in essence, shareholders are stake-
holders.  Greenwood,170 Hart and Zingales,171 and Strine,172 to cite three
leading examples, correctly note that shareholders, in addition to the rela-
tionship they have with the corporation under share law, might often be
employees, consumers, or people otherwise affected by corporate actions.
Presumably, even under a “shareholder-oriented” view, corporate law
should therefore tend to the stakeholderist side.
This argument, however, looks under the wrong lamppost.  To begin
with, as this Article proves extensively, corporate law is not, cannot, and
should not be about shareholder primacy; rather, the corporation—sepa-
rate from its shareholders, and not meant to serve any of them individu-
ally173—is at the heart of corporate law, which aims to facilitate the pursuit
of the corporation’s own purpose.
Second, and more fundamentally, people engage in a variety of differ-
ent relationships with one another.  A dentist might also be a psychologist,
but a patient coming for a root canal does not expect marriage advice, and
vice versa.  Even if some patient did receive both treatments, each is gov-
erned by a separate contract or legal framework, and requires the doctor
to engage in a separate decision-making process (and, hopefully, not per-
form both at the same time).  Similarly, a shareholder might also be an
168. Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Inara Scott, Redefining Corporate Social Respon-
sibility in an Era of Globalization and Regulatory Hardening, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 167
(2018).
169. Id. passim.
170. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Man-
agers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996).
171. Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Wel-
fare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247 (2017).
172. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Per-
spective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE
L.J. 1870 (2017).
173. This is important in the context of the “shareholders are stakeholders”
argument, since different shareholders have diverging interests, both as sharehold-
ers and, certainly, as stakeholders.  One shareholder is an employee, but another is
not.  Even two shareholder-employees might experience different outcomes from
the same corporate action.  The fine-grained treatment offered by separate
fields—corporate law and non-corporate employment law—is far more capable of
handling the fine-grained distinctions between different people in varying
situations.
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employee and a consumer, but these are three distinct relationships, each
handled within a different toolbox, or set of legal norms (corporate law,
employment law and consumer protection law).  In fact, because shares
are residual claims, that shareholder is first and foremost an employee and a
consumer.  The corporation must meet all of its obligations under non-
corporate law before the shareholder as such can see any benefit.  Thus,
the “shareholders are stakeholders” argument does not add much to the
corporate law debate, since stakeholders are already as protected as possible
under non-corporate law.174
In summary, stakeholderists raise many valid arguments regarding the
shortcomings of existing law.  Very often, the protections afforded to em-
ployees, consumers, lenders, or the environment might be suboptimal.
Within the legal sphere, there is one way to deal with that: going through
the legal process to refine positive, binding law.  We ought to fix the law
where such reforms would be effective; we should not throw simplistic
statements into a toolbox incapable of handling them,175 hoping that cor-
porate directors (of all people)176 would somehow save the day.  As Profes-
sor Kent Greenfield observes, “corporations are people too (and they
should act like it).”177  This also means that no extra-legal, subjective
“norms,” conveyed in whichever three-letter acronym favored by a given
commentator,178 somehow bind corporations and not others.  The correct
three letters are “law.”
D. The Corporation’s Residual Claimants
Every corporation, at any given moment, has at least one residual
claimant.  As a previous article explains, “[t]he underlying reason for this
is that a corporation’s life can end . . . .  When that happens, the corpora-
tion’s interests . . . do not disappear. . . .  [O]nly rarely, if ever, do a corpo-
ration’s interests precisely equal its liabilities. . . .  [The] person entitled to
receive the difference, or ‘residual[,]’ . . . is the residual claimant.”179  Ad-
174. See supra text accompanying notes 151–52.
175. See, e.g., Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018)
(requiring that corporations act to further “general public benefit”).
176. See Strine, Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose, supra note 144, at 177 (“Pre-
tending that corporate boards—an odd recourse for ordinary people anyway—are
to be looked at as a source of protection and solace for workers, the environment,
and consumers dilutes the focus that is actually needed, which is on the protec-
tions from externalities that other constituencies deserve.”).
177. KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD
ACT LIKE IT) (2018).
178. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Corporate Purpose: ESG, CSR, PRI and Sustainable
Long-Term Investment, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 4,
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/04/corporate-purpose-esg-csr-
pri-and-sustainable-long-term-investment [https://perma.cc/RFC7-YSNM].
179. Raz, supra note 1, at 272–73.  As a result, even nonprofit corporations
have residual claimants.  The question “who would be entitled to receive the cor-
poration’s residual?” might sometimes be decided ex post (in the case of nonprofit
corporations, this would usually entail dedicating the residual to similar goals as
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ditionally, residual claimants play a crucial role at the opposite end of the
corporation’s life cycle: by default, they are the people who establish the
corporation, providing corporate law with entities to govern in the first
place.180  The question, then, is what is a residual claim?  What kind of
rights does a shareholder (or “member,” or “partner”) have, toward
whom, and governed by which legal framework?
A well-liked children’s toy consists of a box with an internal array of
mirrors, into which coins can be inserted.  When the user opens the top of
the box, the coin is nowhere to be found.  Only by following a certain
process, which requires accessing a hidden compartment, can the user re-
trieve the economic value stored in the box.  The structure of corporate
law places shareholders in a similar position.  The coin (shareholders’ eq-
uitable claim) always exists, but so does the box (the corporation).  Only
by going through the process (corporate law, and none else) may the
shareholder see any benefit.
What makes shares and shareholders’ rights so special is that they can-
not be explained by any legal framework other than corporate law; and
even within corporate law, nuances apply.  Allen and Kraakman put it sim-
ply: “[Shareholders] have no right to any periodic payment, nor can they
demand the return of their investment from the corporation.  Nor . . . can
they typically tell the firm’s managers what to do.”181  Thus, neither con-
tract law nor agency law govern shares.  From many additional aspects,
shareholders are not mere contractual parties.182  Other common “meta-
phors” are also misguided: as this Article demonstrates, the corporation is
an unownable person; and the corporation—not shareholders—is the
owner of its property.  Shareholders only own their shares (which are bun-
dles of rights toward, not “in” the corporation); the “property” or “investor
ownership” metaphors are empty vessels.183  Furthermore, shareholders
are not trust beneficiaries,184 or (the view most common in the U.S.) di-
rect beneficiaries of the corporation’s directors and officers under fiduci-
ary law.185  As a rule, fiduciaries’ duties run to the corporate person, not
to shareholders (or anyone else).  Moreover, the corporation’s interests
might diverge from those of shareholders, or part of them.186  Thus, even
within corporate law, share law is distinct from corporate fiduciary law.
The former deals primarily with the corporation’s obligations to share-
holders, and the latter—with fiduciaries’ obligations to the corporation.
those of the dissolving corporation), but in any case, some person would receive the
residual assets.
180. See id. at 273.
181. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 155, at 143.
182. See Raz, supra note 1, at 282–85.
183. See id. at 285–87.
184. See id. at 287–90.
185. See id. at 290–301.
186. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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As a result, the law of shares is not founded on concepts of contract,
agency, property, trust, or fiduciary law.  Rather, the basis of shareholders’
rights—quite simply, the answer to the question “why do shares have
value?”—resides in a concept of equity.187  The various “agency problems”
between the corporation and its shareholders are resolved with equitable
(but mostly non-fiduciary) tools, such as the law of share dilution, divi-
dends and buybacks, appraisal rights, shareholder voting, books and
records inspection, shareholder litigation, and other mechanisms.188
Nuance is key here: shareholders have lesser standing than fiduciary
law principals, and do not own the corporation or its property.  Yet, this
does not mean they are “merely owners of . . . certain contractual
claims.”189  The residual nature of shares makes them anything but cer-
tain.190  Shareholders’ “contract” with the corporation (its constitutional
documents) might, at most, resemble a contract, for specific purposes and
in some cases.  In fact, corporate charters and bylaws can better be de-
scribed as equity documents.  They rely on unwaivable legal and equitable
constructs, meant to respond to the problems generated by corporate
law’s power- and information-asymmetric nature.191
Importantly, the non-fiduciary nature of shareholders’ rights has an
exception.  Most of the time, whatever effect fiduciaries have on share-
holders is channeled through the corporation.  Yet, in some situations,
shareholders might gain a direct claim toward the corporation’s fiducia-
ries.  This exception only occurs in “a limited set of circumstances,”192
when the channeling principle is violated, and the fiduciary action at issue
does not materially affect the corporation itself.  That happens, for exam-
ple, in Revlon mode,193 when fiduciaries directly control the fate of share-
holders’ investment, while the corporation, nearing a “breakup,”194 has
187. See Raz, supra note 1, at 302–11.  Note that fiduciary law and equity are
not the same.  Fiduciary law is one branch of equity.  A person (such as a share-
holder) can have equitable rights, while not being owed fiduciary duties. See id. at
294–95, 303–05; supra note 98.  For a detailed illustration of equity as a distinct
concept from fiduciary law, and share law as grounded in non-fiduciary equity, see
Paul B. Miller, Equity, Majoritarian Governance, and the Oppression Remedy, in FIDUCI-
ARY OBLIGATIONS IN BUSINESS (Arthur B. Laby & Jacob Hale Russell eds., forth-
coming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3483563
[https://perma.cc/5FB9-HW94].
188. See Raz, supra note 1, at 311–19.
189. Macey & Strine, supra note 49, at 483.
190. See Raz, supra note 1, at 276–78, 282–85, 308–09.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 117–23.
192. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del.
1989).
193. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182 (Del. 1986) (“[Once the company was for sale,] [t]he duty of the board had
. . . changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximiza-
tion of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit. . . .  The direc-
tors’ role[, before the company was for sale, was to serve as] defenders of the
corporate bastion . . . .”).
194. Paramount v. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150.
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no skin in the game.  Other violations of the channeling principle can
occur.195  Again, these are special cases—particularly considering that
most corporations, most of the time, are a “going concern,” not in Revlon
mode, and not at the end of their lives.
Today, both shareholderists and stakeholderists tend to characterize
all corporate law in terms of fiduciary duties (to shareholders or others),
thus overlooking either the corporation’s personhood, or the principles of
fiduciary law, which require “single-minded” dedication to the beneficiary
(the corporation).196  The mischaracterization of all corporate law as fidu-
ciary law, and of shareholders as fiduciary law beneficiaries, generates sub-
tle faults with many practical consequences.  For example, while discussing
the case of Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc.,197 Professor Mark Ramseyer
comments that “[t]he opinion makes no sense . . . .  If the one [share-
holder] owed the three [other shareholders] a fiduciary duty, the three
owed the one the same.”198  In fact, the opinion makes a lot of sense, once
we recognize that neither shareholder owed the others a “fiduciary” duty;
rather, as controlling shareholders, they owed their duties to the corpora-
tion.199  Despite using less-than-optimal language, the court correctly held
the one dissenting shareholder, who prevented a distribution and thereby
caused the corporation to pay higher taxes, to have breached his fiduciary
obligations.
On the flip side, a more recent Massachusetts case illustrates the grave
outcomes a misreading of corporate law’s structure and nuances can bring
for shareholders as such.  Initially, 2017’s International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers Local No. 129 Benefit Fund v. Tucci200 decision seems to cohere
with the framework presented in this Article: as the court says, “the gen-
eral rule of Massachusetts corporate law is that a director of a Massachu-
setts corporation owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation itself, and not its
shareholders.”201  So far, so good, but in this case, the exception discussed
above applies; a channeling principle issue arose.  The facts in this case
are akin to Revlon mode: the question was whether directors acted to maxi-
mize the value of shareholders’ shares—not the corporation’s assets—when
195. See Raz, supra note 1, at 299 n.168.
196. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (“[I]t is
elemental that a fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to those
whose interests the fiduciary is to protect. . . .  [A] fiduciary . . . is bound to single-
mindedly pursue the interests of those to whom a duty of loyalty is owed . . . .”
(citation omitted)); Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc’y v. Mothew [1996] EWCA (Civ) 533,
[1998] Ch 1, 18 (appeal taken from Eng.) (a globally cited case on fiduciary law
principles, stating that “[t]he principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of
his fiduciary”).
197. 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
198. J. Mark Ramseyer, Introduction, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 1, 1 (J. Mark
Ramseyer ed., 2009).
199. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 1, at 297 n.164; infra Section II.A.
200. 70 N.E.3d 918 (Mass. 2017).
201. Id. at 926.
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they carried out a merger that forfeited those shares from their owners.  In
this scenario, as Delaware law correctly and equitably recognizes, directors
become ad hoc fiduciaries for shareholders.
The Tucci court, however, chose to forego a substantive, structural
(and economic) inquiry of corporate law, instead formalistically focusing
on two exceptions found in case law, neither of which apply here.202  The
court says that “undervaluing [the corporation] to secure the merger . . .
qualifies as a direct injury to the corporation”203—but how, exactly?  None
of the corporation’s assets changed hands; only shareholders’ stake was
affected.  The corporation is also not the sum of its shareholders. Tucci
begins with a correct statement of corporate personhood and fiduciary
law, but then essentially devolves into an “aggregate” view of the corpora-
tion.  The court affirms the dismissal of the case, reasoning that it should
have been filed as a derivative, rather than direct, action.204 Tucci is one
example, among many in this Article, of an under-recognition of corpo-
rate law’s anatomy, possibly leading to large-scale wealth transfers (in this
case, from public shareholders to an acquiring party), with no economic
or legal justification.205
Some jurisdictions, particularly Delaware, tend to use phrases such as
“fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.”206  If that ex-
pression is to be harmonized with the mass of other sources—including
from Delaware itself—surveyed throughout this Article, it can only be con-
strued as “duties to the corporation, which in turn owes equitable duties to
shareholders.”207  Delaware’s dualistic language might best be understood
as a form of reminder: not about fiduciary duties (which run solely to the
corporation), but about the corporation’s purpose, which is the lawful pur-
suit of profit.  That profit—ultimately (meaning a potentially unlimited
time), and only through the facts of corporate law (such as the corpora-
tion’s power to decide whether or not it distributes a dividend or makes a
share buyback; its fiduciaries’ ability to enact defensive tactics against a




204. See id. at 928.  Note that precisely because plaintiffs’ shares were taken
from them in the merger, they can no longer file a derivative action.
205. “Dell agreed to acquire all of EMC for approximately $67 billion.” Id. at
921–22.  If the case was not dismissed at the pleading stage, the parties would have
had the chance to prove whether or not that amount is adequate.
206. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993)
(“[D]irectors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests
of the corporation and to act in the best interests of its shareholders.”); Crescent/
Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 979 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Directors
have an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and
the stockholders alike.”).
207. See Raz, supra note 1, at 293–95.  This point is also supported by Dela-
ware’s Trados case. See infra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.
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There is also a deeper relation between share law and the law of cor-
porate purpose.  If an attempt was made to change a corporation’s pur-
pose without the due consent of its residual claimants,208 those claimants’
rights would be fundamentally affected, if not completely eliminated.  The
residual claim inherently depends on a certain assumption as to the corpo-
ration’s purpose; the pursuit of that purpose, by the corporation, is what
generates the value of the residual claim (albeit only ultimately and indi-
rectly).  When a for-profit corporation is required to cease lawfully pursu-
ing profit, or to distribute its current assets to stakeholders, irrespective of
their pre-existing positive law rights, this clearly negates the very content
of shareholders’ residual claim.  Therefore, in addition to the corporation
itself, residual claimants might have standing to challenge such attempts.
In other words, residual claimants have, as part of their equitable claim, a
right to have the corporation’s purpose remain what it is.209  Since the
corporation’s purpose must always be lawful,210 this does not impinge
upon the rights of anyone else.  By definition, the pursuit of profit, or any
other purpose, may not be subject to legal incursion, if it is made in full
accordance with law.
In summary, the structure of corporate law entails that residual claim-
ants—shareholders, members, or any other moniker attached to those
whose claim toward the corporation is defined solely by the phrase “what
is left after all obligations to other stakeholders are met”—do not “own”
the corporate person or its assets; are not directly owed duties by its fiduci-
aries; and have interests that might diverge from those of the corporation,
and from each other’s.  Yet, the residual nature of their claim, negating any
attempt to fully rely on ex ante, “contract”-based planning, also means
208. Senator Warren’s proposed Accountable Capitalism Act represents such
an attempt. See Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018).
209. Residual claimants might agree to a change of the corporation’s purpose
(which, in the case of such a uniquely fundamental change, might justify a require-
ment for the informed consent of all shareholders).  Alternatively, in some cases, it
might be possible for a corporation to change its purpose, if its residual claimants
receive other substantial, equitable remedy, such as appropriate compensation.
This point differs from the view that “power is purpose within the corporate pol-
ity,” Strine, Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose, supra note 144, at 180.  That view
assumes that solely because shareholders are granted the authority to elect direc-
tors, or similar corporate powers, they are the ones who benefit from the corpora-
tion’s pursuit of its purpose.  In fact, first, both stakeholders and shareholders have
this benefit (as the corporation’s purpose must be lawful).  Second, shareholders
have rights not because they have power; rather, they have some power because
that is generally assumed to be a good way to protect their rights, and those of the
corporation.  Even if a lawmaker eliminated or modified shareholders’ power to
elect directors, this would not alter directors’ duty to advance the corporation’s
purpose; and, as explained here, if an attempt was made to change the purpose
itself, shareholders’ rights would be protected by equity.  Note that this applies
regardless of the corporation’s specific purpose: if a nonprofit corporation ig-
nored its purpose and started pursuing profit, its residual claimants (for example,
charity beneficiaries) would have an enforceable claim against the corporation.
210. See supra Section I.C.
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they are not just another group of creditors in a “nexus of contracts.”
Their rights are less than fiduciary or proprietary, but more than contrac-
tual.  In fact, residual claimants are unique creatures of corporate law it-
self.  Specifically, their rights arise in the equity-based portion of corporate
law.  The total value of shares publicly traded on the world’s exchanges, in
2019, was more than $60 trillion.211  Understanding and respecting the
nature of residual claimants’ rights—which is equitable; no more, no
less—is of the highest importance.
E. The Corporation’s Fiduciaries
Every corporation, at any given moment, has at least one fiduciary—
another person, owing fiduciary duties to the corporation.  This fact is a
direct result of corporate law’s other building blocks: “A corporation is a
person, but not a natural person.  It does not have eyes and hands, or any
other bodily and cognitive capacities, entirely of its own.  Therefore, it al-
ways has to operate through someone else (the fiduciary), whom by design
it entrusts with acting in its benefit.”212  In other words, if the corporation
had no fiduciaries, it could simply not operate in the physical world.  In
turn, furthering the corporation’s benefit means acting to cause it to
achieve its purpose.213
The order of sections in this Part of the Article—beginning with the
corporation’s own purpose and personhood, moving to stakeholders, fol-
lowed by residual claimants, and ending with fiduciaries—is not acciden-
tal.  The corporation itself is at the center of corporate law, which aims to
create a legal environment enabling the pursuit of the corporation’s pur-
pose.  Without the corporate person, there would be no corporate law to
speak of.  The corporation must meet all of its positive law obligations to
stakeholders, who enjoy full seniority in claims for its assets.  Only then
may residual claimants see any benefit.  In contrast, the final group—fidu-
ciaries—are not claimants, but obligors.  Fiduciary law applies in a wide
variety of relationships, where inherent power and information asymme-
tries make one party (the beneficiary) wholly dependent upon the actions
of another (the fiduciary).  These include, for example, the lawyer–client,
doctor–patient, guardian–ward, and trustee–beneficiary relationships.214
In this situation, concepts of “contract” are inadequate: by definition, the
beneficiary cannot possibly know what actions the fiduciary might under-
take; any ex ante attempts to “plan” the relationship are doomed to fail-
211. See Stocks Traded, Total Value (Current US$), WORLD BANK, https://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRAD.CD [https://perma.cc/PFF5-
MKRC] (last visited June 30, 2020).  This should be considered in addition to the
value of shares issued by private, or non-publicly-traded, corporations.
212. Raz, supra note 1, at 270.
213. See supra Section I.A.
214. For additional examples of fiduciary relationships, see Evan J. Criddle,
Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 993, 994 n.1
(2017).
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ure, because the fiduciary might opportunistically use its superior power
and information to upset the beneficiary’s rights and expectations (includ-
ing would-be rights and expectations).215
It is clear, then, why a corporation—which is an artificial person,
wholly dependent upon other people for everything it does—has to be
owed fiduciary duties by those people (and cannot solely rely on some
other framework, such as contract).  The corporation is compelled to
blindly trust its fiduciaries to act in its benefit.216  Fiduciary rights arise
whenever certain conditions, primarily related to power and information
asymmetries, combined with an assumption of “trust and confidence,”217
are met.  By design, such conditions occur every time a new corporation is
formed, and continue throughout the entity’s existence.
In current discourse, much of corporate law is formulated in terms of
this last prong: corporate fiduciary law.  The corporation’s fiduciaries are
presumably meant to act either “for shareholders” or “for all stakehold-
ers.”218  This formulation is misguided.  Fiduciaries’ obligation is fixed: to
advance the corporation’s purpose.  That obligation, of course, is owed to
the corporation.  The true Archimedean point is the law of corporate pur-
pose, and the way it interacts with the other building blocks discussed in
this Article.
2013’s Trados decision219 summarizes this web of relationships rather
neatly.  As the Delaware Court of Chancery wrote,
[Directors’ decisions should] benefit the corporation as a whole,
and by increasing the value of the corporation, the directors in-
crease the share of value available for the residual claimants. . . .
[The “duties to the corporation and its shareholders”] formula-
tion captures the foundational relationship in which directors
owe duties to the corporation for the ultimate benefit of the entity’s
residual claimants. . . .  [T]he duty of loyalty therefore mandates
that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the long-
term . . . .  [R]esidual claimants [are] the ultimate beneficiaries of
the firm’s value . . . .220
215. See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism
(Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 15-13, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2617413 [https://perma.cc/ZL95-VNLZ].
216. See Raz, supra note 1, at 270.
217. Bristol & W. Bldg. Soc’y v. Mothew [1996] EWCA (Civ) 533, [1998] Ch 1,
18 (appeal taken from Eng.).
218. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS.
LAW. 101, 105–06 (1979) (attempting to prove that directors should entertain a
broad range of concerns, while discussing several legal norms that constrain the
corporation).  Of course, the corporation must obey the law. See supra Section I.C.
Yet, this has nothing to do with broadening directors’ concerns, beyond their duty
to the corporation: to further the corporation’s lawful purpose.
219. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013).
220. Id. at 36–41 (emphases added).
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Read carefully, Trados is exceptionally accurate in its analysis of corpo-
rate law’s anatomy.  First, the corporation’s purpose is the long-term pur-
suit of its profit (“increased value”).  Second, the corporation is a person,
as it must be to be owed duties by anyone.221  Third, the corporation is
required to meet all of its legal obligations (those discussed in Trados were
mainly toward preferred shareholders, or “contractual claimants”222).
Fourth, the corporation’s residual claimants have claims toward the corpo-
ration (or “entity” or “firm”), not toward directors; and their benefit is
only “ultimate,” meaning that it is channeled not through instant-gratifica-
tion concepts of “property” or “fiduciary law,” but through the freedom-
limiting, yet equitable, framework of Delaware share law.  Finally, the cor-
poration’s fiduciaries (namely, its directors) owe their duties to the corpora-
tion, to further its value-increasing purpose.  They are not “constituency
directors,”223 but corporate directors, subject to the structure of corporate
law.  Indeed, Trados gets right all five building blocks of corporate law.
As Section II.C below also discusses, attempts to ignore fiduciary law,
or entirely replace it with inaccurate conceptions of contract, ultimately
result in wealth transfers and outsized gains for fiduciaries (who remain
fiduciaries, even when surface-level reading of the law seems to indicate
otherwise).  Contract absolutists, claiming that “regulation” (actually,
law—just like any contract requires law)224 is imperfect, practically ignore
the fact that “contract” or pure “private ordering” is also far from perfect,
certainly in a field (corporate law) which is precisely about strong and weak
parties, open-endedness, and information asymmetries, requiring a cer-
tain core structure of the law, and negating any possibility of exclusive
reliance on ex ante bargaining.  As Professor Melvin Eisenberg succinctly
put it, “just because mandatory rules are imperfect does not mean that
markets would be better.  Commentators who stress the Nirvana Fallacy
are almost invariably themselves guilty of a mirror-image mistake which
might be called the Heavenly Market Fallacy.”225
221. See, e.g., Curtis Nyquist, Teaching Wesley Hohfeld’s Theory of Legal Relations,
52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 238, 239–40 (2002) (“[Hohfeld] argues that a legal relation is
always between two persons . . . .  [I]f someone has a Hohfeldian right, another
person has a duty.”).
222. Trados, 73 A.3d at 41.  Of course, the same applies not just for “contrac-
tual” claims, but those arising under any field of positive law.  In Trados, the pre-
ferred shareholders indeed had a contractual, non-corporate law mechanism to
determine their legal claim. See id. at 21–24, 38–39.  However, “preferred shares”
encompass a broad range of securities, with varying properties; a preferred share-
holder’s claim might be residual (at least in part), and therefore, determined
within corporate share law. See Raz, supra note 1, at 281.
223. On the idea of constituency directors, owing fiduciary duties directly to
certain shareholders or stakeholders (and therefore, necessarily not to the corpo-
ration), and the rejection of that idea both positively and normatively, see Trados,
73 A.3d at 42 n.16.
224. See infra note 285.
225. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1461, 1525 (1989).
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Despite these repeated attacks at the hands of contract absolutists,
fiduciary law remains salient.  Experience in fields besides corporate law—
for example, financial regulation—demonstrates the same: a recent paper
finds that “fiduciary duty leads broker-dealers to sell higher quality prod-
ucts,”226 characterized by lower fees and better returns.  As always, the eco-
nomic analysis must rest on a structural legal framework, telling us whose
benefit the law is there to maximize.  Broker-dealers, just like corporate
directors, might feel consternation at the restrictions imposed by fiduciary
law.227  Such feelings cannot modify the basic tenets of the relationship
(which fiduciaries enter voluntarily): the beneficiary’s welfare is at the
center, and the fiduciary must wholeheartedly act to this sole end.  In cor-
porate law, the beneficiary-corporation’s welfare equals the achievement
of its purpose.  Fiduciary law is the only toolbox designed for, and capable
of, resolving the unique problems arising in a situation of absolute power
and information asymmetries between multiple actors, one of whom is
meant to promote the other’s interests.  Since the corporation is a person,
but can only operate through others, on whom it utterly depends, corpo-
rate fiduciary law is a structural, unwaivable building block of corporate
law.
II. APPLYING THE PURPOSE APPROACH TO THREE CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
In a 1993 article, Professor Lyman Johnson remarks, “if discourse in
corporate law does not reflect matters of deep personal significance—that
is, if it is not carried on with our moral voice—I wonder if that discourse
will be important in the larger collective sphere.”228  Previous sections of
this Article touch upon issues such as the opioid crisis229 and forced arbi-
tration.230  This Part explores three topics in greater detail: shareholder
activism, corporations’ constitutional rights, and the rise of LLCs and
other “alternative” corporations.  These issues lie at the intersection of cor-
porate law and broader social life, deeply affecting both.  This Article’s
theory produces new, fundamental insights on each of these high-cur-
rency topics.
226. Vivek Bhattacharya, Gastón Illanes & Manisha Padi, Fiduciary Duty
and the Market for Financial Advice 45 (Nov. 8, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3281345 [https://perma.cc/ZT62-9P8Z].
227. See, e.g., de Fontenay, supra note 1, at 224 (“Corporate law cannot be
everything to everyone.  While individuals may chafe at various prohibitions, iso-
lated cases need not detract from the merits of an efficient regulatory design.”).
Note that the use of the term “regulatory” to describe fiduciary law is inaccurate.
See infra note 285.
228. Lyman Johnson, New Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1713, 1713 (1993).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 162–64.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 115–23.
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A. Shareholder Activism
Shareholder activism is the most important phenomenon in U.S. cor-
porate law over the last two decades.231  The basic concept gives rise to
many strands of debate and scholarship, largely depending on the type of
activist (or not-activist-enough),232 or a certain outcome of its operations,
such as index funds,233 the “problem of twelve,”234 “wolf pack” hedge
funds,235 and “common ownership.”236  This Section places shareholder
activism within the structure of corporate law, outlined in this Article.  It
then considers a common scenario—an institutional shareholder owing
fiduciary duties to both its own investors and a corporation toward which it
is active—to show how this Article’s theory can aid in resolving an oft-
encountered, high-stakes situation.
In the structure of corporate law, shareholders and fiduciaries are two
distinct actors.  Each occupies a separate, almost polar, role in respect to
the corporation: shareholders are residual claimants, equitably entitled to a
residual value that fluctuates with the corporation’s fortunes (that is, the
degree to which it attains its purpose).237  The corporation’s fiduciaries,
on the other hand, mainly have obligations—specifically, a fiduciary duty to
loyally and devotedly cause the corporation to achieve its purpose.238  Un-
less fiduciaries also own shares (which they often do), nothing entitles
them to enjoy the corporation’s residual value.  Equally, as a rule, share-
holders are not fiduciaries for the corporation.239
231. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 13, at 156 (“Hedge fund activism is to corpo-
rate law’s early twenty-first century what the hostile takeover was to its late twenti-
eth century.”).
232. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corpo-
rate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019) (argu-
ing that index fund managers should play a greater role in corporate governance).
233. See, e.g., id.
234. See John C. Coates, IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The
Problem of Twelve 2 (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 19-07, 2019), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247337 [https://perma.cc/4YEB-
FABV] (discussing the possibility that “control of most public companies . . . will
soon be concentrated in the hands of a dozen or fewer people”).
235. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 172 (discussing the detrimental effects of
some hedge fund activists on the long-term performance of some public
corporations).
236. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Common Ownership and
Coordinated Effects (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-40, 2018), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3296488 [https://perma.cc/Y8LV-
HVQN] (discussing the intersection of corporate law and competition law, as re-
sulting from large institutional shareholders owning shares of multiple corpora-
tions operating in the same industry).
237. See supra Section I.D.
238. See supra Section I.E.
239. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded
Retail Investor, 102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 47–48 (2017) (“Shareholders do not act as
fiduciaries when they exercise their voting rights, and they are under no obligation
to vote their shares in the best interests of the corporation.” (footnote omitted)).
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The rule has an exception.  Some shareholders are also fiduciaries.
That duty can be imposed on a variety of shareholders—such as a control-
ling shareholder, or a plaintiff in a derivative action—but the principle is
this: “[W]hen a shareholder, who achieves power through the ownership
of stock, exercises that power by directing the actions of the corporation,
he assumes the duties of care and loyalty of a director of the corpora-
tion.”240  The principle coheres with the overall structure of corporate
law: the corporation is an artificial person, wholly dependent on others,
through whom it acts in the world.  Normally, those others are called “di-
rectors” or “managers,” but nothing precludes additional people—such as
a shareholder with a large enough voting stake—from directing the corpo-
ration’s actions, at least in part (or in concert with others, as in the “wolf
pack” scenario).
Here lies the key to understanding and handling the shareholder ac-
tivism phenomenon: activism is not about shareholders as such.  The struc-
ture of corporate law gives individual shareholders no right to direct the
corporation’s actions, but only to (ultimately) reap their fruits.  An activist
is a shareholder who willfully became a fiduciary for the corporation.  The
quantitative inquiry policymakers and scholars should make is not whether
share prices rose as a result of an activist campaign, but whether the corpo-
ration now better achieves its purpose—the lawful pursuit of its profit.
The two metrics very often align.  A fiduciary-shareholder can see a rise in
share value (within the time horizon favored by the shareholder), and
meet all duties toward the corporation.  When they do not,241 corporate
law mandates that the latter override the former.
Reality presents further complications.  In the common scenario, the
activist is not an individual acting in one’s own benefit,242 but is itself a
fiduciary for other people down the line, such as pension savers or private
equity investors.  There might be a very definite time horizon over which
240. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 8358, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105,
at *63 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1991).  For an article applying a similar principle specifi-
cally to activist shareholders, see Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for
Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008).
241. For discussion of such situations, see Raz, supra note 1, at 272, 276–78,
282–85, 291 n.145, 293–95, 304–05, 311–19 (discussing various conflicts or dispari-
ties between the corporation and all or part of its shareholders); Strine, supra note
172. At the macroeconomic level, it is possible that shareholder activism, includ-
ing by hedge fund managers, has a neutral or positive effect. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe,
Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 71 (2018).  This Article fo-
cuses on the firm level, where specific instances of activism can have varying
effects.
242. There are exceptions. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy & Steven Davidoff Solo-
mon, Frank and Steven’s Excellent Corporate-Raiding Adventure, ATLANTIC (May 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/05/frank-and-stevens-
excellent-corporate-raiding-adventure/521436 [https://perma.cc/TD2P-PW3W].
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the fiduciary has to maximize its investors’ stake, such as ten years for
some hedge funds.243
Assume the following hypothetical: a hedge fund has been set up for a
ten-year period, after which it has to liquidate, distributing all assets to its
investors.  Nine years have elapsed; the hedge fund manager has one more
year to maximize returns.  It now contemplates initiating an activist cam-
paign at the largest corporation in its portfolio, which would lead the tar-
get to sell its central asset (say, a research and development division).
According to ample information, that move is likely to result in a 10%
increase in share price over the next year.  If, however, the asset is not sold,
equally robust predictions indicate that the target corporation would see a
6% annual increase in profits, and a similar (anyway, less than 10%) an-
nual increase in share price, over a twenty-year period.  At the end of that
period, the corporation’s residual value would be higher, in net present
value terms, than if the main asset is now sold.  How can the two fiduciary
duties owed by the activist—one to its own investors; the other to the cor-
poration whose actions it partly “direct[s]”244—be settled?
This requires addressing an “egg and chicken” problem.  What came
first: the corporation itself, its shares, and the rights and duties they con-
fer, or the hedge fund manager’s ownership of those shares?  The answer
is easy: at any moment of its existence as the target corporation’s share-
holder, the hedge fund manager held something that existed beforehand
(the share, or its corporate law-derived nature).  When share ownership,
or certain activities it enables, also make someone a fiduciary for the target
corporation, that duty precedes other fiduciary duties, which the activist
could never have had if corporations and shares did not exist in the first
place.245
The analysis so far does not conclusively entail that the hedge fund
manager should forego the activist campaign.  Corporate law does not ex-
plicitly set the corporation’s time horizon at twenty years, rather than one
year, or any other number.  Yet, corporate law does provide certain de-
faults, or presumptions, in this regard.  For example, in its 2013 Trados
decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery states that “[a] Delaware corpo-
ration, by default, has a perpetual existence. . . .  [T]he duty of loyalty . . .
243. See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 764, 811 (2012).
244. Cinerama, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *63.
245. Put differently, any person, including hedge fund managers, is required
to act lawfully.  This Article expands on that requirement as it applies to all corpo-
rations. See supra Section I.C.  In regard to hedge fund managers, the lawfulness
requirement includes meeting all fiduciary obligations toward the corporations in
which they invest.  A hedge fund manager and its investors know what they are
getting into when the manager adopts an active investment strategy; they must
accept corporate law, and the rights and duties it imposes, as a given.  Corporate
law, on the other hand, is not required (and is informationally unable) to change
itself according to one fiduciary or another’s obligations to third parties.
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mandates that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the
long-term.”246
On a deeper level, the very concept of the corporation—indeed hav-
ing perpetual existence, as well as its own identity and traits—suggests that
a corporation’s time horizon should tend to the longer term.  Professor
Lynn Stout’s 2015 article247 compares the corporation to a “time ma-
chine,” suggesting that “corporate entities can be understood as institu-
tions designed to transfer wealth forward from earlier time periods to later
time periods,”248 and concluding, “if we do not continue to have thriving
corporations . . . future generations will be left worse off than they could,
or should, be.”249
This accords with the theory presented here: nothing makes the cor-
poration’s present state more important than its future state; just as a natu-
ral person may expend less today to live better tomorrow, so can a
corporation.  If it can be shown that a given action would improve the
corporation’s prospects, that action ought to be taken, even if present-day
shareholders (or stakeholders) do not instantly receive what they might
wish for.  From this perspective, many activist campaigns are beneficial,
and should be encouraged.  Others are less so.  In any case, shareholders
who materially influence the affairs of a corporation may not operate for
their own benefit (although it may well accrue to them, as derived from
the corporation’s).  Activists, like directors, CEOs, and anyone else in cor-
porate law, operate within the bounds of a structure.
B. Corporations’ Constitutional Rights
The two most famous corporate law cases of this century, Citizens
United250 and Hobby Lobby,251 are not, in fact, cases about corporate law.
More precisely, it plays a part in both cases, but their disposition mainly
lies in other fields: constitutional law, along with election, health, and em-
ployment law.  This Section proceeds in three steps: first, it criticizes the
misapplication of corporate law by the Court in both cases (namely, the
erroneous utilization of a nineteenth-century-like “aggregate” model); it
then shows how, even when we apply correct corporate theory, the out-
comes in both cases could have been reached; finally, it explains, in simi-
lar fashion to Section I.C above, that these cases—and their possible
future undoing—do not (and should not) have much to do with corpo-
rate law.
246. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013).
247. Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation As a Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity,
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685 (2015).
248. Id. at 686.
249. Id. at 722.
250. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
251. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
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In both Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court effectively
ignores one of corporate law’s building blocks: the fact that the corpora-
tion is a person, with rights and duties separate from, and possibly conflict-
ing with, those of any other person, including its shareholders.252  Instead,
the Court relies on a theory “which was prevalent in the 19th cen-
tury”253—the “aggregate” model of the corporation, according to which a
corporation is merely a grouping of other individuals.  In Citizens United,
Justice Kennedy describes the corporation as “an association that has
taken on the corporate form.”254  Similarly, in Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito
calls corporate personhood a “fiction”255 and surmises that “[w]hen rights
. . . are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of
[the] people [associated with the corporation].”256  Adding insult to mis-
understanding, he implies that corporations are “own[ed]”257 by their
shareholders.
Indeed, “[c]orporate personhood . . . is entirely missing from the [Cit-
izens United] opinion. . . . [T]he Citizens United decision obscured the cor-
porate entity and emphasized the rights of others, like shareholders and
listeners.”258  The same holds true for Hobby Lobby.  As this Article demon-
strates extensively, the Court’s assertions have little to do with actual cor-
porate law.  In fact, they even clash with case law from the Supreme Court
itself.259  What might have led the Court to embark on this deconstructive
enterprise?  Very plausibly, the Court simply tried to find an explanation
for how for-profit corporations, supposedly meant to pursue “business-re-
lated” activities, can also engage in political activity and have religious be-
liefs.  Such explanation, however, does not require an “aggregate” model
of the corporation.
The outcomes in both cases could be achieved with correct corporate
law.  As a rule, corporations have the same legal capacity as natural per-
sons.260  Accordingly, a corporation should enjoy the same rights—and
bear the same duties—as a natural person with similar traits, in constitu-
tional law as in any other field.  Within corporate law, the corporation’s ac-
252. See supra Section I.B.
253. Hill, supra note 79, at 42.
254. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349.
255. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 706.
256. Id. at 706–07.
257. Id. at 707.
258. WINKLER, supra note 54, at 364.
259. See Macey & Strine, supra note 49, at 485–95 (surveying “The Supreme
Court’s Treatment of the Corporate Entity in Other Areas of Law”).
260. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.  The Pennsylvania statute—
under which Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation, one of the plaintiffs in
Hobby Lobby, is incorporated—says so explicitly. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501
(2020) (“[A] business corporation shall have the legal capacity of natural persons
to act.”); see also Macey & Strine, supra note 49, at 530 (“[C]orporations are crea-
tures of state law, and therefore state law rules should guide our understanding
about the essential nature of these entities.”).
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tions are subject to an ever-looming restriction: the law of corporate
purpose.261 If having political or religious beliefs, either at all or specific
ones, steers a certain corporation away from its purpose, then holding and
exercising such beliefs violates corporate law.  The corporation (and possi-
bly its fiduciaries, who breached their duty to further the corporation’s
purpose)262 should then face appropriate sanction.263  Yet, neither Citi-
zens United nor Hobby Lobby suggest that these were the facts of the case.
For some corporations, exercising such beliefs might advance the corpora-
tion’s purpose—for example, if the corporation operates in a community
of like-minded people, who are therefore more likely to purchase its prod-
ucts and services.
Does the above necessarily mean that Citizens United and Hobby Lobby,
if only we corrected their corporate law mistakes, are good decisions that
should be reaffirmed in the future?  Of course not.  Consistent with this
Article’s distinction between corporate law and general, non-corporate law
(the latter governing the corporation’s relationships with its various stake-
holders),264 Citizens United and Hobby Lobby are not primarily corporate law
cases.  They are cases in constitutional law—specifically, the First Amend-
ment.265  The real question behind these cases is not whether corporations
should be able to exercise their First Amendment rights in a certain way,
but whether rich, influential people (human or corporate) should be able
to do so.266  If a natural person was engaged in political financing to the
same extent as Citizens United, or had the same number of employees as
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., that would give rise to precisely the same ques-
tions: how should the law balance the constitutional and human interest
in a functional, representative democracy with political freedom of
speech?  How should the law balance employment and reproductive rights
with religious ones?  A small-scale corporation is less likely to provoke
these questions, although it is fully a corporation, presenting all the issues
(or building blocks) inherent to corporate law.
Constitutional law is largely about determining when the state may
treat different people in different ways, including on account of their
wealth, or their ability to affect others’ lives (say, through political influ-
ence).  Quite possibly, the Court got the answers wrong.  Yet, as Justice
Stevens notes in his Citizens United dissent, “[n]othing in this analysis turns
261. See supra Section I.A.
262. See supra Section I.E.
263. It is at this point that much of the corporate law scholarship about Citi-
zens United and Hobby Lobby comes into the picture. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83
(2010) (suggesting a framework for corporate decision-making on whether and how
to engage in political speech, while presupposing that corporations can engage in
such speech).
264. See supra Section I.C.
265. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
266. This is supported by case law from the Supreme Court, particularly the
Munn v. Illinois decision. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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on whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state con-
cession, a nexus of . . . contracts, a mediated hierarchy . . . , or any other
recognized model.”267  Justice Stevens does not mention the one correct
answer—“a legal person”—but his main point is clear: Citizens United is a
case about influence on the political process, and the constitutional limita-
tions it should face.  That issue is separate from the corporate law ques-
tion.268  If the cases are overturned by a future Court, this would detract
nothing from the structure of corporate law (if anything, it would be an
opportunity to reinforce the correct roles of corporate purpose, per-
sonhood, and shareholders within that structure).269  Save for the useful
mistake they make, as described in this Section, Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby do not—and are not supposed to—tell us much about corporate
law.
C. Alternative Corporations
In the United States, specifically Delaware, a person wishing to start a
corporation270 can choose among a wide variety of forms: besides the en-
tity type which the statute calls a “corporation,”271 it is possible to establish
a partnership,272 statutory trust,273 or limited liability company.274
267. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 465 n.72 (2010) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (citations omitted).
268. See, e.g., Macey & Strine, supra note 49, at 530 (“[W]hatever one might
say about Citizens United from a constitutional law perspective, the case is bad cor-
porate law.”).
269. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COM-
MENT. 309, 326 (2015) (“One can support campaign finance regulation . . . and
still acknowledge corporate personhood and corporate constitutional rights as
well.”).
270. On the broad meaning of “corporation” as used in this Article, see supra
note 1.  The distinction made there is particularly important in the context of this
Section.
271. See Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1
(2020).
272. See Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, ch.
15 (2020); Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, tit. 6, ch. 17.  It is
possible for a general (non-limited) partnership not to be a corporation, if the
partners specifically agree so. See § 15-201(a) (“A partnership is a separate legal
entity which is an entity distinct from its partners unless otherwise provided in a
statement of partnership existence or a statement of qualification and in a partner-
ship agreement.”).  Yet, by default, a partnership is a corporation, presenting all of
corporate law’s building blocks, see supra Part I: purpose (see, e.g., § 15-202(a)
(“[An association to carry on] a business for profit forms a partnership . . . and [an
association] to carry on any purpose or activity not for profit [may form] a partner-
ship . . . .”)); personhood (see §§ 15-201(a), 17-201(b) (“A limited partnership
formed under this chapter shall be a separate legal entity . . . .”)); stakeholders (see,
e.g., § 15-305 (stating that a partnership may be “liable for loss or injury caused to a
person”)); residual claimants (see §§ 15-101(6), 17-101(13) (defining a partner’s
economic interest as “partner’s share of the profits and losses” of a partnership));
and fiduciaries (see §§ 15-401(f) (“Each partner has equal rights [(i.e., powers)] in
the management and conduct of the partnership business and affairs.”), 17-101(9)
(stating that every limited partnership must have “1 or more general partners”),
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The latter form—the limited liability company (LLC)—is today the
most prevalent type of corporation in Delaware and across the U.S., vastly
outnumbering narrow-sense “corporations.”275  In daily life, it becomes in-
creasingly common to see the letters “LLC”—not “Inc.”—appended to the
name of the corporation one works for, supplies goods to, or gets products
and services from.  LLCs permeate all levels of economic, financial, and
personal life: in fact, the New York Stock Exchange, which runs the
world’s largest and most important securities marketplace, is itself an
LLC.276  So is Google.277  Many LLCs have their shares (or “limited liabil-
17-403(c) (discussing “the general partner’s . . . powers and duties to manage and
control the business and affairs of the limited partnership”)).  In the case of gen-
eral partnerships, residual claimants and fiduciaries are the same people.
273. See Delaware Statutory Trust Act, tit. 12, ch. 38.  It is possible for a statu-
tory trust not to be a corporation, if the parties to its governing instrument specifi-
cally agree so. See § 3801(g) (“Any . . . statutory trust . . . , unless otherwise
provided in its certificate of trust and in its governing instrument, [shall be] a
separate legal entity.”).  Yet, by default, a statutory trust is a corporation, present-
ing all of corporate law’s building blocks, see supra Part I: purpose (see
§ 3801(g)(1)); personhood (see §§ 3801(g), 3810(a)(2), 3812(f)); stakeholders
(see, e.g., § 3804(a) (discussing “debts and other obligations or liabilities” for which
the trust may be sued)); residual claimants (see §§ 3801(a), 3801(g), 3805 (discuss-
ing the trust’s beneficial owners and the nature of their rights, known as “benefi-
cial interests”); see also Raz, supra note 1, at 272–75 (explaining that every legal
person always has residual claimants)); and fiduciaries, see § 3807(a).  Apparently,
unless the creation of a separate entity has been avoided according to § 3801(g),
the trust itself is the person serving as trustee for the beneficial owners (which also
accords with the common law of trusts, since the trust—not the “trustee”—legally
owns the trust property), while the “trustees” are fiduciaries for the trust (with few
channeling principle exceptions, see supra text accompanying notes 192–95).  To
illustrate this distinction, consider a situation where a beneficial owner would ben-
efit from a distribution of the trust’s assets, while the trust itself would be harmed:
to whom do the trustees owe their duties?  Clearly, to the trust, considering first
principles. See supra Sections I.B, I.E; see also, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. JWH Special Cir-
cumstance LLC, 959 A.2d 1096 passim (Del. Ch. 2008) (discussing fiduciary duties
owed “to the trust” and finding possible breaches of those duties).  Note that, as
with other corporations (such as mutual insurance companies, see Raz, supra note
1, at 275 & n.79), the beneficial owners of a statutory trust have a dual relationship
with the corporation: by default, along with their equitable rights under share law,
they have rights as trust law beneficiaries. See § 3809 (“Except to the extent other-
wise provided in the governing instrument of a statutory trust or in this sub-
chapter, the laws of this State pertaining to trusts are hereby made applicable to
statutory trusts . . . .”).
274. See Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, tit. 6, ch. 18.
275. See, e.g., Mohsen Manesh, Creatures of Contract: A Half-Truth About LLCs,
42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 391, 393 n.5 (2018) (citing data showing that as of Dec. 31,
2016, there were 827,611 Delaware LLCs and 298,025 “Delaware corporations” in
existence).
276. See EDGAR Search Results for New York Stock Exchange LLC, EDGAR,
https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?CIK=0000876661 [https://perma.cc/
T7TB-8B8X] (last visited June 30, 2020).
277. See Certificate of Conversion of Google Inc. (a Delaware corpora-
tion) to Google LLC (a Delaware limited liability company) (Sept. 29,
2017), http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/assignment-tm-6178-0319.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G2ZY-7ZS4].
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ity company interests”278) publicly traded.279  In short, LLCs operate in
the world, get their incentives, and affect the lives of others, in precisely the
same way as any other corporation.280  Given the small, bordering on non-
existent, practical difference between a narrow-sense “corporation” and an
LLC, we might wake up in the not-too-distant future in an LLC-dominated
world.  To sustain meaningful discourse in this area, it is time to clarify the
actual legal difference between LLCs and other corporations.
An oft-repeated statement is that LLCs are “unincorporated” entities,
or “uncorporations.”281  That is an incident of historical terminology: the
constitutional documents of narrow-sense “corporations” are known as
“charters” or “certificates of incorporation,” and the act of “granting” a
charter is known as “chartering” or “incorporation.”  This evokes an aroma
of government involvement, of the kind prevalent before the rise of gen-
eral incorporation.282
Today, however, the process of establishing both types of corpora-
tions—a narrow-sense “corporation” and an LLC—requires the same,
minimal level of government action: in both cases, certain documents
have to be filed with the Secretary of State, often through the internet; if
those documents are properly formatted and a fee is paid, a new corpora-
tion is created.283  No substantive government act—that is, no choice be-
278. See tit. 6, §§ 18-101(10) (defining “[l]imited liability company interest” as
“a member’s share of the profits and losses of a limited liability company and a
member’s right to receive distributions of the limited liability company’s assets”),
18-701 (“A limited liability company interest is personal property.  A member has
no interest in specific limited liability company property.”). Cf. Raz, supra note 1,
at 272–76, 285–87 (discussing characteristics of corporate shares, identical to those
of LLC interests).  Thus, we may speak of “LLC share law” (as with other corpora-
tions, discussed id.).  It is possible to be an LLC member without acquiring an LLC
interest (also often known as “LLC unit”). See § 18-301(d).  Yet, assuming that every
member has some claim toward the LLC (otherwise, what is the meaning of “mem-
bership?”), those legal claims (even if not “packaged” as LLC interests, or shares)
have to be governed by some legal framework, that is, LLC share law.  More gener-
ally, “share law” and “residual claimancy law” can be regarded as synonymous.
279. See, e.g., New Fortress Energy LLC Class A Shares Representing Limited Liability
Company Interests (NFE), NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/
stocks/nfe [https://perma.cc/WEU5-VHCR] (last visited June 30, 2020) (provid-
ing information on a public LLC with market capitalization of approximately $2.2
billion).
280. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Trust v. Law (in a Box): Do Organizational
Forms Really Make a Difference?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1795, 1798 (“Virtues like trust
and their counterpart vices—greed, fear, panic—seem to me as likely to kick in
after the fact whether we are talking about partnerships, limited partnerships,
LLCs, [or] corporations . . . .”).
281. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010) (discuss-
ing the increased popularity and legal theories relating to LLCs and other alterna-
tive entities).
282. For a discussion of chartering by special legislation in the nineteenth
century, and the transition to general incorporation, see, for example,
Hovenkamp, supra note 142, at 1634–40.
283. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 3, at 831 n.164 (“Most state statutes impose
only pro forma requirements for incorporation, which typically include the filing
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tween competing alternatives, made by a public official—is involved in the
creation of either a narrow-sense “corporation” or an LLC.  The state is
not party to the “corporate contract” in any meaningful way.  The state
does legislate and adjudicate corporate law, which—although highly struc-
tured and partly unwaivable, as this Article explains—is simply a legal field
governing relations between private actors.  These actors, not the state,
create the corporation.284  In this regard, contract law is the same: the
existence of a contract statute285 does not mean that the state is party to
every contract.  Therefore, the “unincorporated” terminology is as non-
dispositive as the use of the word “charter,” rather than “operating agree-
ment,” or any other moniker, for the corporation’s constitutional docu-
ments.  Even on these linguistic grounds, there is no actual difference
between an LLC and any other corporation.
More importantly, LLCs are corporations, just like narrow-sense, “Del-
aware corporations,” because they have precisely the same anatomy, and
give rise to the same set of problems.  Going back to the distinction be-
tween “structural” and “dynamic” meanings,286 there certainly are dynamic
of a certificate of incorporation, signed by an ‘incorporator,’ who may be almost
anyone, and a payment of a fee.  The most regulated part of this process is the
choosing of the corporate name.”).  The creation of an LLC identically requires
only the filing of a certificate of formation and payment of filing fees. See tit. 6,
§§ 18-201(a), 18-206(a).
284. For recent sources expressing a view that “the state” has a significant
relationship with every corporation, including as the corporation’s creator, see, for
example, Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 578 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 19, 2018), rev’d, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020); Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note
112; Macey & Strine, supra note 49.  However, none of these sources cite a con-
crete example of any substantive role the state plays within corporate law, in terms
of bearing rights and duties.  In context, it seems each of these sources simply aim
to argue, correctly, that corporate law differs from a pure “private ordering” re-
gime.  It is true that law is required for any corporation to exist; yet, the same is
also true of any contract and any property.  Corporate law is part of private law,
which is established (at least partly) by the state, but generally does not give the
state itself a role within the various relationships it enables. See John C.P.
Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640
(2012) (“Private law is law, so government is involved, albeit in a particular way.
Typically, it makes available institutions and procedures that enable individuals
and entities to define their relationships and to assert and demand the resolution
of claims against others.” (emphasis added)).
285. See U.C.C. (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012) (Uniform Com-
mercial Code, adopted in whole or part by all U.S. states, and providing legal
norms governing various types of contracts).  Contract law, just like corporate law,
has unwaivable structure—for example, the rule that a contract legally binds the
parties to it.  Otherwise, it is not a contract at all. See infra note 306.  This point
also bears on the mistaken view that fiduciary law, or anything other than “private
ordering,” is a form of “regulation,” see, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U.
L. REV. 553, 562 (2001) (implying that fiduciary law is “[m]andatory regulation
that forces people to attend to others’ interests”).  However, precisely as in a con-
tract case, a court adjudicating a breach of fiduciary duty does not engage in gov-
ernmental “regulation,” but merely resolves a dispute between private parties,
arising within a private (albeit asymmetric) relationship.
286. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
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differences between LLCs and narrow-sense “corporations”—for example,
in regard to members’ or shareholders’ rights to receive a distribution of
the corporation’s assets,287 the transferability of shares,288 or issues
outside corporate law, such as tax treatment (itself related to the corpo-
rate dynamic choices; the greater ease of withdrawing assets from an LLC,
compared to a narrow-sense “corporation,” might motivate different tax
rules).
Yet, on the more fundamental, structural level,289 LLCs and other
corporations are exactly the same.  Does an LLC have a purpose?  Yes.290
Is it a person, with general capacity to act and bear rights and duties?
Yes.291  Does it have stakeholders?  Yes.292  Does it have residual claimants?
Yes; they are called “members.”293  Does it have fiduciaries?  Yes; they
might be the members, or “managers.”294  We can modify the rules of
capital lock-in, transferability of shares, ability to contract around certain
legislative or common law provisions, and many other dynamic topics, but
we are still dealing with a corporation.  This Article’s discussion of corpo-
rate law’s structure, and the issues it inherently gives rise to, equally applies
to LLCs.  The insistence on making some deep-seated distinction between
287. See, e.g., Robert L. Symonds, Jr. & Matthew J. O’Toole, SYMONDS &
O’TOOLE ON DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 7.02[B] (2d ed. 2018)
(“[T]he statute provides significant latitude to fashion . . . distribution rights . . . .
Limited liability company interests may carry distinctly tailored rights pertaining to
. . . distributions.”).  Such pre-agreed distribution (dividend or buyback, including
share redemption) can also be made by a narrow-sense “corporation,” if it does not
breach the mandatory rules governing distributions. See Raz, supra note 1, at 274
n.77.  Yet, pre-agreed distributions are more prevalent in alternative corporations.
288. See, e.g., tit. 6, § 18-702(b)(1) (“An assignment of a limited liability com-
pany interest does not entitle the assignee to become or to exercise any rights or
powers of a member[.]”).
289. See supra Part I (discussing the building blocks of corporate law).
290. See tit. 6, § 18-106(a) (“A limited liability company may carry on any law-
ful business, purpose or activity, whether or not for profit . . . .”).
291. See § 18-201(b) (“A limited liability company formed under this chapter
shall be a separate legal entity . . . .”); see also Manesh, supra note 275, at 415–16
(discussing “separate legal existence” as a defining, unwaivable, and practically im-
portant characteristic of every LLC).
292. See §§ 18-303 (“[T]he debts, obligations and liabilities of a limited liabil-
ity company, whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise, shall be solely the
debts, obligations and liabilities of the limited liability company . . . .”), 18-607
(discussing the “liabilities of the limited liability company”).
293. See § 18-101(8) (“‘Limited liability company’ . . . means a limited liability
company formed under the laws of the State of Delaware and having 1 or more
members.”); supra note 278 (discussing the nature of LLC members’ rights, the
same as those of other corporations’ residual claimants).
294. See §§ 18-402 (“Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company
agreement, the management of a limited liability company shall be vested in its
members . . . ; provided however, that if a limited liability company agreement
provides for the management . . . of a limited liability company by a manager, the
management . . . shall be vested in the manager . . . .”), 18-1104 (“In any case not
provided for in this chapter, the rules of law and equity, including the rules of law
and equity relating to fiduciary duties . . . , shall govern.”).
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LLCs and other corporations is all language and no substance.295  This
rather obvious fact has been recognized by scholars296 and leaders of Dela-
ware law.297
In one important area, however, LLC law purports to break with corpo-
rate law.  That area is the fifth building block discussed above: corporate
fiduciary law.298  LLC statutes in many places,299 including Delaware, pre-
sumably give parties to the LLC agreement the option to eliminate all fi-
duciary duties owed by the corporation’s managers or other fiduciaries.300
The only correct answer to this trend is: “not so fast.”
As explained above, every corporation must be the beneficiary of fidu-
ciary duties, at any given moment.301  The corporation cannot “waive” all
of its fiduciary law protections, because even in purely contractual terms,
such offer and acceptance cannot occur.  Given the open-ended, ex-
tremely asymmetric nature of these relationships, the beneficiary is enti-
tled to a protective mechanism that transcends purported “consent” to
entirely unknowable future scenarios.302
Indeed, the belief that fiduciary duties can be “eliminated” counters
the most fundamental notion of what a director or manager is meant to
295. See, e.g., Joshua Fershee, Posts in the Category “LLCs”, BUS. L. PROF
BLOG, https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/llcs [https://perma.cc/
F8J2-N9HT] (last visited June 30, 2020) (criticizing, in dozens of blog posts since
2013, courts and others who use phrases such as “limited liability corporation”).
Professor Fershee is entirely correct that an LLC is not a narrow-sense “corpora-
tion,” as the term is used in most U.S. law.  Yet, the substantive question is whether
LLCs omit any of the legal and economic issues inherent to all corporations
(broadly defined, see supra note 1), which they do not.
296. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 247, at 689 n.7 (“[S]ome LLCs are the func-
tional equivalents of close corporations . . . .  [A]n LLC whose shares are listed for
trading on a recognized exchange . . . becom[es] a public corporation in all but
name.”).  For another criticism of alternative corporation exceptionalism (in the
very similar context of statutory trusts, see supra note 273), see Anne Tucker, Justice
Scalia’s Final Mark on Corporate Law May Be One of Form over Substance, BUS. L. PROF
BLOG (Feb. 17, 2016), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/02/
justice-scalias-final-mark-on-corporate-law-form-over-substance.html [https://
perma.cc/5ZVK-7C3N].
297. See Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contrac-
tual Freedom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE
FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11, 14–17 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loew-
enstein eds., 2015) (noting that LLCs and narrow-sense “corporations” have the
same characteristics, except for tax treatment, which is not part of corporate law).
298. See supra Section I.E.
299. See Manesh, supra note 275, at 394 n.6 (listing state LLC statutes that
presumably allow for waiver of fiduciary duties).
300. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1101(c), 18-1101(e) (2020).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 212–17.
302. See, e.g., Amir N. Licht, Motivation, Information, Negotiation: Why Fiduciary
Accountability Cannot Be Negotiable, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 159,
179 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018) (“These asymmetries [due to
unobservable and unverifiable information] provide a compelling justification for
a strict, full-disclosure-based accountability regime. . . .  Fiduciary law thus pre-
serves an irreducible core of accountability to ensure fiduciary loyalty.”).
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do: act for the benefit of the corporation, because no one else is there to
do so.303 Truly eliminating fiduciary duties means abolishing the concept
of directors and managers, period.  That, in turn, entails disposing of cor-
porations altogether, since they could do nothing: there would be no one
to operate on their behalf.  The act of “eliminating” all fiduciary duties “by
contract” is impossible, as it negates the entity itself.  Contract is not a
license to make stuff up.304
Thus, when courts fail to enforce one party’s fiduciary obligation to
another, they are not “giv[ing] the maximum effect to the principle of
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company
agreements.”305  They are doing the exact opposite: by overlooking the
norms and enforcement mechanisms that make this unique type of docu-
ment operative, they essentially turn these instruments into something
akin to an illusory contract.306
As importantly, LLC statutes never had the power to allow for the elimi-
nation of fiduciary duties.  Those duties arise in equity, not “created” by
any legislative act.307  Equity cannot be contracted around or legislated
away.  It is precisely the concept of equity to protect rights even when, for
some reason, contractual and legislative “law” purports to negate them.  In
Delaware, as anywhere else, directors and managers of all corporations (in-
cluding alternative ones) are fiduciaries, and never stopped being.
When a legislature creates “law” that simply makes no sense, on the
most definitional level—for example, saying “any contract may be breached
without remedy” or “a corporation can exist without fiduciaries”—this is
not the final word.  Equity is always part of the law.308  Courts are always
303. See, e.g., de Fontenay, supra note 1, at 219 (“If managers are not acting
with the corporation’s interests in mind, what is their conceivable purpose or
role?”).
304. Cf. Ravenswood Inv. Co., L.P. v. Estate of Winmill, Nos. 3730-VCS, 7048-
VCS (Consol.), 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 96, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 2018) (“Equity is
not a license to make stuff up.”).
305. § 18-1101(b).
306. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 125 (“A contract which is not mutually
enforceable is illusory.  An ‘illusory promise’ is one which . . . by its terms makes
performance optional or entirely discretionary on the part of the promisor.  In
other words, a promise is illusory when it fails to bind the promisor, who retains
the option of discontinuing performance.” (footnotes omitted)). Cf. McNeil v. Mc-
Neil, 798 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 2002) (“Courts . . . flatly refuse to enforce provisions
relieving a trustee of all liability.  A trust in which there is no legally binding obliga-
tion on a trustee is a trust in name only . . . .” (citation omitted)).
307. See, e.g., J D Heydon, Are the Duties of Company Directors to Exercise Care and
Skill Fiduciary?, in EQUITY IN COMMERCIAL LAW 185, 234 (Simone Degeling & James
Edelman eds., 2005) (“It cannot be said that equity does not lay down prescriptive
rules and leaves it to ‘company law’ to do so: the prescriptive duty to act in the best
interests of the company is imposed on directors because of equity, not because of
some aspect of ‘company law’ which is outside equity.”).
308. In this Article, “equity” is used not in a historical sense, of a normative
system distinct from “law,” but in a broader substantive sense, see, e.g., Manesh,
supra note 275, at 425 (“[E]quity [is also referred to here] in the broader sense,
meaning the power vested in all courts ‘to do right and justice’ by exercising judi-
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vested with equitable power, which includes the duty to apply the law cor-
rectly, even if contrary to a simplistic reading of statutory text.  At the fed-
eral level, the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity.”309  At the state level, particularly
in Delaware, equitable jurisdiction enjoys similar constitutional protec-
tions.310  Even if no text said that every court is required to do justice—and
that every person is entitled to justice—this fact is self-evident.  It is there-
fore an invalid, empty defense to simply mention that LLC statutes allow
for the waiver of fiduciary duties.  Reading the whole statute, and under-
standing what an LLC—or any other corporation—actually is, clarifies
that at least a “core”311 of fiduciary obligation always persists.
So, what is the practical meaning of the “elimination” of fiduciary du-
ties owed to Delaware alternative corporations, or anyone else in like posi-
tion?  It means that certain actors, bound by certain duties, are better
positioned to breach those duties with impunity.  Most fiduciaries do not
act unlawfully.  Yet, certain legislative acts and court decisions afford them
the “opportunity” to do so, if only they wanted, far more conveniently.  To
a large extent, some LLC managers can harm the corporation in multiple
ways, and simply not be held accountable.  For some fiduciaries, there is
free lunch—which is not free at all, but comes at the expense of those in
the position of most abject vulnerability.312  This deviation of enforceable
cial discretion in how the law is interpreted and applied.”); Smith, supra note 215
(analyzing equity from a modern law and economics perspective).
309. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  Federal case law also supports an expan-
sive view of equity. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 119, at 709 n.41 (citing Supreme
Court cases to that effect).
310. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (“This court shall have all the jurisdiction
and powers vested by the laws of this State in the Court of Chancery.”); Du Pont v.
Du Pont, 85 A.2d 724, 727–29 (Del. 1951) (“[T]he general equity jurisdiction of
the Court of Chancery . . . is defined as all the general equity jurisdiction of the
High Court of Chancery of Great Britain as it existed prior to the separation of the
colonies . . . .  [The Delaware Constitution] intended to establish . . . a tribunal to
administer the remedies and principles of equity. . . .   Its result is to establish by
the Judiciary Article of the Constitution the irreducible minimum of the judiciary.
It secures for the protection of the people an adequate judicial system and
removes it from the vagaries of legislative whim.”); Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (stating, four years after the passage of Dela-
ware’s new General Corporation Law, that “inequitable action does not become
permissible simply because it is legally possible”); In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114
A.3d 592, 603–05 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“I cannot accept the contention that . . . LLCs
. . . fall outside the domain of equity. . . .  [W]hen . . . an entity [has] attributes that
contracting parties cannot grant themselves by agreement, the entity is not purely
contractual.”); Johnson, supra note 119, at 702 (“The argument made here . . .
contends that the Delaware General Assembly is constitutionally prohibited from
preventing the judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery from applying fiduciary
duties as those judges think best—whether or not a private agreement purports to
eliminate such duties.”).
311. Licht, supra note 302, at 179.
312. See, e.g., de Fontenay, supra note 1, at 223 (“What precisely does it mean
for a director to have no duty of loyalty whatsoever to shareholders or to the corpo-
ration?  Taken literally, it would suggest that directors could simply gamble away
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law from actual law (including equity) is not even economically
efficient.313
In summary, certain areas of U.S. corporate law—which, in the sub-
stantive sense of the word, includes alternative corporations, such as
LLCs—are now in a state similar to the late Middle Ages in England, as we
find in Maitland’s vivid tale of the development of equity.314  It is unlikely
that human nature is about to change;315 corporate fiduciary law is an
inherent, unwaivable part of the structure governing all corporations,
however flexible they might otherwise be.
CONCLUSION
Participants in the corporate law community—judges, lawyers, busi-
nesspeople, scholars, and many others—grapple with a set of recurring
questions.  The ones about which corporate jurists think most often are
those pertaining to modifiable, dynamic choices: “should multiple-class
shares be permitted?” and “does a staggered board promote or weaken
managers’ compliance with their duties?” are common examples.  At a
more fundamental, structural level, the questions are “what is a corpora-
tion?” and “what is the corporation’s purpose?”  As this Article suggests,
the most overarching question might be: “what is corporate law?”
As to the latter, modern scholars mainly attempt to frame corporate
law in terms of other concepts or legal fields.  The best example, of course,
is the proclamation that corporate law is contract law, hallmark of the law
and economics movement and its “nexus of contracts” theory.  Others
have countered by stating that corporate law “is property law, not contract
law.”316  What all of these scholars have failed to consider is one possibil-
ity: corporate law is corporate law.  Its unique structure, presenting its own
set of practical issues, doctrines, and actors (“corporation,” “shareholder,”
the corporation’s money, or use corporate property to advance the director’s pri-
vate business interests.  Absent a duty of loyalty, charlatans could abuse the corpo-
rate form . . . .”).
313. See id. (“[W]hile the law may nominally permit waivers of the duty of
loyalty . . . , the courts are likely to intervene through other doctrines . . . .  [T]his
. . . would create substantial legal uncertainty in the interim, which, as we are so
often told, is bad for business.”).
314. F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW
4–6 (1909) (“Very often the petitioner . . . complains that for some reason or
another he can not get a remedy in the ordinary course of justice and yet he is
entitled to a remedy.  He is poor, . . . his adversary is rich and powerful, . . . or has
by some trick or some accident acquired an advantage of which the ordinary courts
with their formal procedure will not deprive him. . . . [O]wing to one thing and
another such wrongs are not always redressed by courts of law.”).
315. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“A public policy,
existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human
characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate
officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance
of his duty . . . .”).
316. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 110, at 440.
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“director”), is capable of generating highly beneficial economic and social
outcomes, not achievable through any other framework.
This Article provides a first-of-its-kind, nuanced, and fully self-explan-
atory account of corporate law’s structure and normative underpinnings.
Corporate law brings to the table at least two concepts we find in no other
field: the first, discussed in Section I.A above, is corporate purpose.  Every
corporation exists in order to achieve a certain purpose, which might be
the lawful pursuit of profit, or any other, such as those of nonprofit corpo-
rations.  The second concept, discussed in Section I.B above, is corporate
personhood.  Every corporation is a legal person, bearing its own rights, du-
ties, identity, and characteristics, separate from any other entity, and (with
few exceptions) possessing the same legal capacity as a natural person.
These two concepts, in turn, necessarily give rise to three additional
groups of actors: stakeholders, residual claimants, and fiduciaries.  As Sec-
tion I.C above describes, stakeholders, or non-residual claimants, enjoy a
superior normative framework upon which their claims rest: general, non-
corporate law.  Thanks to its inherently higher information content, general
law provides far more specific and easily enforceable imperatives than cor-
porate law, with its wide-open command to the corporation: “do whatever
(to achieve your purpose).”  Therefore, “corporate social responsibility”
advocates should seek reform in general, not corporate, law.  The corpora-
tion, like any other person, is required to meet all obligations under posi-
tive law.  It cannot be subject to legal sanction for lawful behavior, even
when some might view that behavior as subjectively undesirable.
Residual claimants (often known as “shareholders”), discussed in Sec-
tion I.D above, in fact have the opposite of “primacy”: their legal claim is
fully a product of corporate law, and is completely subordinated to all
stakeholders’ claims.  While residual claimants do not “own” the corpora-
tion or its assets, and are not directly owed duties by its fiduciaries, their
unique situation makes their claims more than contractual.  Share law is
grounded in equity—no more, no less.
Those usually occupying the center stage of corporate law adjudica-
tion and scholarship—the corporation’s fiduciaries, discussed in Section
I.E above—do not owe direct duties either to shareholders or to stake-
holders.  Their duties run to the corporate person.  By necessity, due to
the extreme and unavoidable power and information asymmetries be-
tween the artificial person and its human representatives, the latter owe
fiduciary duties to the corporation—nothing short of that.  Fiduciaries are
duty-bound to act in order to make the corporation achieve its purpose.
Finally, Part II above discusses three high-currency topics pervading
today’s corporate law: shareholder activism, corporations’ constitutional
rights in light of the Citizens United and Hobby Lobby decisions, and the rise
of LLCs and other alternative corporations.  In each case, the fundamen-
tal, unwaivable structure of corporate law provides a new, more well-
grounded viewpoint from which to examine these issues.
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As this Article proves, the present-day dichotomy of corporate law—
the great debate between shareholderists and stakeholderists, each seek-
ing to promote external values (economic and communitarian, respec-
tively) within corporate law itself—does not, in fact, cohere with either
positive law or normative analysis.  It is possible for a corporation to act for
profit without offending anyone else in any legally proscribed way.  If the
corporation does breach its obligations, positive law provides ample re-
sponses.  At the same time, the corporation—an entirely separate person,
with its own rights, duties, and traits—is not meant to operate “for” share-
holders, and is not obliged to follow their desires.  The rights shareholders
and stakeholders possess are gained through (corporate or non-corpo-
rate) law.
One early case, touching upon four of the five building blocks dis-
cussed in this Article, paints a remarkably precise diagram of corporate
law’s structure:
There is no legal privity, relation, or immediate connexion, be-
tween the holders of shares . . . and the directors . . . .  The bank
is a corporation and body politic, having a separate existence as a
distinct person in law . . . .  The very purpose of incorporation is,
to create such legal and ideal person in law, distinct from all the
persons composing it, in order to avoid the extreme difficulty,
and perhaps . . . the utter impracticability, of such a number of
persons acting together in their individual capacities. . . . [T]he
directors are the appointees of the corporation, not of the indi-
viduals. . . . [Stockholders] are not the legal owners of the prop-
erty . . . .  Their rights and their powers are limited . . . .  They are
members of an organized body, and exercise such powers as the
organization of the institution gives them. . . . [O]nly after [the
corporation’s] debts were paid . . . the stockholders would be
entitled to receive any thing. . . . [S]hares . . . [are] a qualified
and equitable interest . . . .317
The one building block not discussed in Smith v. Hurd318 is that
around which all the others may be arranged: the corporation’s purpose.
Yet, there is no reason to suggest that the court saw the for-profit corpora-
tion’s purpose as altruistic; its remark on the corporation’s “debts” implies
that those obligations can be ascertained through positive law, and are not
an open-ended guess.  Furthermore, the court’s mention of shareholders’
“equitable” rights, in a decision which might otherwise seem critical of
them, points to the nuanced structure of corporate law, and the impor-
tance of being attentive to each of its elements.
More than 170 years have passed since Smith v. Hurd was decided, but
many members of the corporate law community still perpetuate the same
317. Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371, 384–86 (1847).
318. Id.
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misconceptions that opinion had elaborately rejected.  The structure of
corporate law allows us to achieve what would otherwise be “utterly im-
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A storm is brewing on the corporate law horizon. Several recent 
judicial developments, which this Article ties together for the first time, present 
the most refined opportunity yet for mandatory arbitration—today prevalent 
in consumer and employment contracts—to enter the corporate law sphere, 
shutting the courthouse doors before corporate entities and shareholders 
precisely where legal remedy is most needed. Yet, for this scenario to unfold, 
the Supreme Court would have to declare that corporate charters and bylaws 
are “contracts.” Otherwise, restrictions on arbitration (including those recently 
enacted by Delaware) cannot be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. 
As this Article innovatively explains, scholars have long resorted to 
inaccurate metaphors, such as “nexus of contracts,” in the corporate context. If, 
however, we move away from legal realist conventions, embrace the idea that 
corporate law is a self-standing category within private law, and examine its 
distinctive properties—most importantly, its principled reliance on ex post 
judicial supervision over open-ended factual scenarios—we find that corporate 
law is nearly the structural opposite of contract law. This legal distinction also 
generates a set of powerful economic benefits. Existing scholarship has focused 
on procedural and doctrinal aspects, such as directors’ power to amend 
corporate documents without shareholders’ consent. This Article ties the 
arguments into an overarching theoretical framework, originally bringing 
together the literature on private law theory, law and economics, and corporate 
litigation. 
Similar to the 1980s takeover wave, and recent debates surrounding 
corporations’ constitutional rights and corporate purpose, the specter of 
mandatory arbitration offers an opportunity to take a fresh look at corporate 
law’s theoretical foundations. The economic benefits and non-contractual, 
equity-based structure of corporate law are two sides of the same coin. To avoid 
both inefficiency and injustice, courts and scholars must recognize the 
implications of corporate law’s distinct nature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate law is not contract law, and corporate charters and bylaws 
are not contracts. Influenced by American Legal Realism,1 with its skepticism 
of legal concepts and categories,2 scholars over the last several decades have 
been loosely employing a contract-centric terminology when discussing issues 
in corporate law.3 As this Article demonstrates, those references have been, at 
most, a metaphor. In practice, both law and economics scholars,4 and the 
Delaware courts, are taking corporate law for what it actually is: a distinct legal 
framework, having its own defining structure, and residing on the same level 
as contract, property, or tort in the hierarchy of private law.5 Corporate law’s 
unique characteristics, in turn, allow our economy, society, and technology to 
flourish, in a way no other legal framework can (or is meant to) achieve.6 
As this Article explains for the first time, the “contract” metaphor—
so far tamed by this more nuanced understanding—is now set on a course that 
                                                                                                                                   
1 See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Doctrine and the Legacy of American Legal Realism, 
163 U. PA. L. REV. 2019 (2015). 
2 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 820 (1935) (“[A legal] proposition . . . would be scientifically 
useful if [the legal concepts it uses] were defined in non-legal terms.”). 
3 Prominent examples include Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and 
Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 555-60 (1990) (discussing much of corporate 
law as consisting of “avoidable rules” and “changeable rules”); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993); Eugene F. 
Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302 
(1983) (“An organization is the nexus of contracts, written and unwritten, among owners of 
factors of production and customers.”). 
4 For a detailed analysis of the link between legal realism and modern law and economics, 
along with a suggestion as to how to better construe both, see Henry E. Smith, Complexity 
and the Cathedral: Making Law and Economics More Calabresian, 48 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 43 
(2019). 
5 Importantly, these other frameworks (contract, property, and tort law) have already moved 
away from the more extreme form of legal realism. Today, much of the scholarship is 
devoted to the legal concepts that govern these fields (in a manner that also responds to 
economic and other extra-legal concerns). This change is largely taking place as part of the 
New Private Law movement. See infra notes 261-66 and accompanying text. This Article 
introduces the New Private Law approach into corporate law, where it has not been widely 
applied before. 
6 See infra Section II.B (explaining how corporate law facilitates innovation and 
entrepreneurship, by creating legal entities with human-like freedom of action, subject to 
very few contractual or legal constraints ex ante, and subject to broad judicial supervision ex 
post). 
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might lead it to fundamentally reshape American corporate law as we know it. 
Two recent developments—one, a judicial decision from the Supreme Court 
of Delaware;7 the other, a case currently pending in federal court8—might 
operate in conjunction to bring about a dramatic development: sending 
corporate law into the “black hole”9 of mandatory arbitration. 
Provisions of this kind, today commonly found in consumer and 
employment contracts, shut the courthouse doors precisely in those situations 
where civil justice is most needed, and impose severe human and economic 
costs on our society and rule of law.10 Corporate law, which relies on litigation 
even more heavily than other legal frameworks,11 would functionally become a 
dead letter under a mandatory arbitration regime.12 Yet, according to both the 
Federal Arbitration Act13 (FAA) itself, and the United States Supreme Court, 
this scenario can only transpire if the federal courts find corporate charters and 
bylaws to be “contracts.”14 Ironically, the Realist-inspired imprecision that has 
given rise to such phrases as “nexus of contracts”15 might put the brakes on the 
highly influential “corporate governance movement,”16 advocated by the very 
same law and economics scholars who are using these phrases. 
This Article makes two original contributions to the literature: first, 
                                                                                                                                   
7 Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020). 
8 Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 3:19-cv-8828 (D.N.J. filed 
Mar. 21, 2019). 
9 Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679 (2018). 
10 See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING 
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013). 
11 See infra Sections II.B, II.C. 
12 See, e.g., Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in 
Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 626-40 (2016).  
13 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2020)). 
14 See infra note 21 and accompanying text. 
15 E.g. Fama & Jensen, supra note 3, at 302. The phrase “nexus of contracts” appears in over 
1,600 works of corporate law literature. See LEXIS+, https://plus.lexis.com (last visited Apr. 
2, 2021) (search for the term “nexus of contracts” within the category “Secondary Materials”; 
the search generates 1,670 results). As this Article explains, that usage does not support a 
judicial or other legal finding that corporate charters and bylaws are contracts. See infra 
Section II.C. 
16 E.g. Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L. 359 passim 
(2016). 
2021] Mandatory Arbitration and the Boundaries of Corporate Law 5 
 
in Part I, it describes the current doctrinal situation—what Salzberg and 
Johnson & Johnson say, how they relate to one another, and how arbitration 
proponents might, in the near future, utilize these cases to try and introduce 
mandatory arbitration, first into federal securities law, then state corporate law. 
No previous academic work has analyzed Johnson & Johnson in depth; and, 
while Salzberg did attract much scholarly fanfare,17 these works have focused 
on a different dimension—the boundary between corporate and securities law, 
and the practice of forum selection provisions (which send cases to one court, 
rather than another)—as opposed to this Article’s emphasis on the more 
troubling prospect of mandatory arbitration, which aims to stifle all litigation 
on behalf of the affected corporations.18 
This Article’s second contribution is even more distinctive: so far, 
scholarship about corporate litigation has been carried out mostly apart from 
the literature on corporate theory (or “corporate anatomy”19). The former 
mainly discusses doctrinal and practical developments in the way corporate law 
is enforced, while the latter seeks to discern the legal and economic principles 
that make corporate law what it is. This Article, in Part II, ties the two areas 
                                                                                                                                   
17 See Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi & Ofer Eldar, Federal Forum Provisions and the 
Internal Affairs Doctrine, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 383 (2020) (empirically reviewing the 
effect of the Chancery Court’s Salzberg decision on the share prices of corporations that have 
adopted federal forum provisions, and calling for the decision’s reversal on these grounds 
and others); Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limits of Delaware Corporate Law: Internal Affairs, 
Federal Forum Provisions, and Sciabacucchi, 75 BUS. LAW. 1319 (2019) (criticizing the 
Chancery Court’s Salzberg decision and calling for its reversal, based primarily on arguments 
in the state-vs.-federal law, or internal affairs, dimension); Michael Klausner, Jason 
Hegland, Carin LeVine & Jessica Shin, State Section 11 Litigation in the Post-Cyan 
Environment (Despite Sciabacucchi), 75 BUS. LAW. 1769 (2020) (positively reviewing the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s Salzberg decision, while arguing that litigation under the 
Securities Act of 1933 might continue in state courts despite the decision); Daniel B. Listwa 
& Bradley J. Polivka, First Principles for Forum Provisions, 
2019 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 106 (arguing that the Chancery Court’s Salzberg 
decision erred in its construction of the internal affairs doctrine, due to applying a principle 
of territoriality rather than comity); Mohsen Manesh, The Contested Edges of Internal Affairs, 
87 TENN. L. REV. 251 (2020) (discussing the Salzberg case and other recent developments 
with the potential of fundamentally expanding or restricting the influence of state corporate 
law, particularly that of Delaware). 
18 See, e.g., Aggarwal, Choi & Eldar, supra note 17, at 414-16; Grundfest, supra note 17, at 
1341 (“Standard objections to arbitration, which include a lack of transparency and the loss 
of rights that are common in federal or state court, are meaningless when assessing [a federal 
forum provision] that directs federal claims to an open federal court where the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence apply.” (footnote omitted)). 
19 See, e.g., REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (3d ed. 2017). 
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together. 
Achieving this synthesis is crucial, because the highly practical, 
litigation-vs.-arbitration controversy actually hinges on a theoretical question: 
is corporate law a branch of contract law, and by extension,20 are corporate 
charters and bylaws contracts? According to both the FAA itself, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the FAA strictly applies to contractual, consent-based 
relationships, as opposed to those grounded in other legal frameworks.21 If 
corporate law lies outside of contract law, then arbitration proponents’ efforts 
should fail,22 and corporate law may remain vital and enforceable. 
                                                                                                                                   
20 This is a critical point: if corporate law is not contract law, then by definition, it is 
impossible for corporate charters and bylaws to be contracts. The reason is that “contract,” 
just like “corporate charter,” is a legal concept. Neither instrument can “pull itself by the 
bootstraps” and modify its own pre-existing nature. That nature is initially defined by law. 
See, e.g., James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 257, 279 n.91 (2015); Felipe Jiménez, The Grounds of Arbitral 
Authority 10-13 (July 22, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3657506. To determine if something 
is a contract or not, we must turn to the organic legal framework that gives rise to that 
instrument (which, in U.S. private law, is mostly state common law; this is also what the 
federal courts will have to rely on when considering the questions covered in this Article. 
See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text). For charters and bylaws, that framework is 
corporate law, which—due to the reasons described in this Article—gives rise to something 
very different than “contracts,” as they are defined by contract law. Since corporate law 
mandates that every corporation must have at least a charter, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 101(a) (2020), it is logically impossible for these documents to be “contracts,” seemingly 
placing all corporations under the rule of contract law, which is precisely what corporate law 
differs from. People can still make contracts in regard to corporations (such as a share transfer 
agreement), just as they can make contracts for the sale of property, for the waiver of a right 
arising in tort, or for giving up their share under a will. This fact does not turn the original 
device—the corporate charter, deed of property, act of tort, or will—into a contract. If no 
contract was made, which is the default case, we are left with the non-contractual rights and 
duties, governed by corporate, property, tort, and inheritance law, respectively. 
21 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2020) (“A written provision in any . . . contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”). 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked “the fundamental principle that 
arbitration is a matter of contract,” Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 
(2010), quoted in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
22 See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton & Verity Winship, A Cooperative Federalism Approach to 
Shareholder Arbitration, 128 YALE L.J.F. 169, 177 (2018) (“Under the FAA, arbitration 
agreements are presumptively valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. This presumption is 
triggered, however, only if corporate governing documents count as ‘contracts’ under the 
FAA.”). 
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If, however, we take the “contract” metaphor at face value, presumably 
not much would be left23 to stop the Supreme Court from giving fiduciaries 
the green light to self-exculpate through mandatory arbitration clauses—which 
is likely to occur in precisely those corporations that would most need the 
assistance of courts.24 Considering that the total value of publicly-listed shares 
at U.S. stock exchanges, in 2020, was over $50 trillion,25 it is hard to overstate 
what is hanging in the balance. 
As this Article originally explains, the confusion between corporate 
and contract law—now on the verge of causing its greatest harm ever—is the 
result of a broader “low-visibility problem” that has been plaguing corporate 
law discourse for many decades. That problem exists on at least three levels. 
First, scholars often fail to treat corporate law as law,26 that is, a jural discipline 
                                                                                                                                   
23 This Article takes seriously the Supreme Court’s distinction between contracts and non-
contracts for purposes of the FAA. Of course, one might again suggest a more “realist” 
theory: the conservative members of the Court believe civil litigation should be 
marginalized, and have found mandatory arbitration to be a convenient way to dispose of it. 
For a similar argument, see Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 
72 VAND. L. REV. 1119 (2019). Presumably, judges in FAA cases might define as “contract” 
anything they do not want people to be able to vindicate in court. To the extent it occurs, 
this problem can be separately addressed: primarily, we must do away with the idea that 
supporting private litigation, or opposing it, is a “liberal” or “conservative” matter. The 
enforcement of private law, through litigation, is (and can become more of) a bipartisan 
cause. See, e.g., BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CLASS ACTIONS 
(2019). Moreover, a functioning, enforceable private law is a condition for the existence of 
free markets and, indeed, free society. See infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text. 
Putting the political dimension aside for the moment, this Article provides an equally 
important part of the argument that should be made to the Court, when the issue of 
mandatory arbitration in corporate law comes before it. 
24 See infra note 204 and accompanying text. 
25 See Total Market Value of U.S. Stock Market, SIBLIUS RES., 
https://siblisresearch.com/data/us-stock-market-value (last visited Apr. 2, 2021) (stating 
that “[t]he total market capitalization of [the] U.S. stock market is [$50.8 trillion] [as of 
Dec. 31, 2020]”). This amount should be considered in addition to the value of shares issued 
by private, or not-publicly-listed, corporations. The latter are an increasingly important 
phenomenon. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 
157 (2019) (“Over three hundred ‘unicorn’ startups have reached private valuations 
described as one billion dollars or more. . . . Our economy and society are increasingly 
dominated by companies that start in the proverbial garage or dorm room and, for a critical 
period, operate [as private companies].”). Both private and public corporations feature the 
same basic structure discussed in this Article, see infra Part II. That structure requires, 
among other things, ex post supervision by courts, and is incompatible with mandatory 
arbitration. 
26 See, e.g., Bill Bratton, Corporate Law as Law, JOTWELL (Nov. 15, 2019) (reviewing DAVID 
KERSHAW, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATE FIDUCIARY LAW 
(2018)), https://corp.jotwell.com/corporate-law-as-law (treating the possibility of 
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having its own internal structure, rules, and principles;27 instead, corporate law 
is often studied as a predominantly economic28 or political29 matter.30  
Second, even when scholars do think in legal terms, corporate law is 
often assumed to be merely part of some other discipline—mainly contract (this 
Article’s focus), but also agency31 or property law,32 among others.33 
                                                                                                                                   
“corporate law as law” with an air of surprise; also stating that, while “Kershaw is 
affirmatively . . . anti-realist,” “I cannot join him in that”). 
27 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the Common 
Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241 (2015). 
28 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Robert Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s q, 
73 VAND. L. REV. 353 (2020) (surveying a wide range of recent works in that vein). 
29 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate 
Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205 (2001) (suggesting that the prevalence of corporate 
litigation is a matter of political economy, through which Delaware preserves its status as 
the premier venue for incorporation). In contrast, this Article embraces a position much 
closer to KERSHAW, supra note 26: corporate law has its own substance, and practices such 
as corporate litigation are meant to protect the independent rights and expectations of real 
people, predating concepts such as “race to the bottom” or “race to the top.” Corporate law’s 
reliance on litigation is not a bug, but a feature. 
30 Corporate law is the only framework experiencing this problem at such magnitude. Other 
disciplines in private law, including property, tort, and contract itself, have long moved 
toward greater emphasis on legal concepts and unifying principles. See, e.g., infra notes 261-
66 and accompanying text. In fact, this move is also occurring in other areas of business law 
itself. See, e.g., John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment 
Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1231-32 (2014) (“I offer a broad 
perspective by suggesting . . . that the essence of investment funds and their regulation lies 
. . . in the nature of their organization. An investment fund . . . is an enterprise that holds 
investments in a particular way. . . . This pattern . . . has never been [previously] identified 
as a common feature of the various types of investment funds.”). This Article brings a 
similarly broad perspective to corporate law. 
31 See, e.g., J.B. Heaton, Corporate Governance and the Cult of Agency, 64 VILL. L. REV. 201, 
207-14 & passim (2019) (surveying in detail the development of “agency” as a central term 
of art in corporate academic literature; also strongly criticizing that usage). 
32 See, e.g., Robert Anderson IV, A Property Theory of Corporate Law, 
2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role 
of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 440 (2000) (“At its essential core, organizational 
law is property law, not contract law.”). 
33 Some scholars, mainly on the stakeholderist (or “corporate social responsibility”) side, 
often overlook the line separating corporate law from public law, or general regulation. See, 
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Third, although they sometimes accept that corporate law is a self-
standing legal category, most scholars tend to overlook at least one of the 
defining building blocks that, together, make corporate law what it is: the 
corporation’s purpose, separate personhood, duty to obey positive law, 
equitable obligations to residual claimants, and fiduciary duties owed to the 
entity.34 These foundational elements are supplied by law, not contract;35 and, 
as this Article describes, they give rise to unique economic and social benefits, 
not achievable through any other legal framework.36 On the flipside, these 
properties of corporate law also require constant, ex post monitoring by courts 
of equity, through litigation—precisely what mandatory arbitration makes 
impossible. 
To be certain, although the link between corporate litigation and 
corporate theory scholarship can be made much stronger, this Article joins a 
body of literature that has started making it. In a groundbreaking 2016 article,37 
Professor Ann Lipton dissects the problem of mandatory arbitration in 
corporate law, criticizing it from both descriptive (corporations are not 
contracts, so the FAA cannot apply to them)38 and normative (mandatory 
arbitration would make corporate law largely unenforceable, leading to an 
unjustified impairment of shareholders’ rights)39 aspects. Professors James Cox 
and Jill Fisch have recently made similar arguments,40 in the somewhat more 
benign41 context of forum selection provisions. As the citations throughout this 
Article demonstrate, a number of other authors have turned their attention to 
this scholarly space. 
While this Article builds upon these essential works, it also 
importantly adds to them. First, in the doctrinal dimension, this Article is the 
                                                                                                                                   
e.g., Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 
71 STAN. L. REV. 137 (2019). 
34 See Asaf Raz, A Purpose-Based Theory of Corporate Law, 65 VILL. L. REV. 523 (2020). 
35 For example, regarding separate personhood, see KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 31 
(“[L]egal personality [] clearly requires special rules of law.”). 
36 See infra Section II.B. 
37 Lipton, supra note 12. 
38 See id. at 600-26. 
39 See id. at 626-40. 
40 Cox, supra note 20; Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate 
Bylaws, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 373 (2018).  
41 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
10 George Mason Law Review [Vol. 29:__ 
 
first to discuss and analyze several very recent developments—namely, the 
Salzberg and Johnson & Johnson cases42—which, if left unchecked, might soon 
turn mandatory arbitration in corporate law to a reality. Second, in the 
theoretical dimension, it offers an innovative account of corporate law’s 
distinctive, and non-contractual, nature. Existing works43 mainly discuss the 
topic through various examples, correctly illustrating how consent is lacking 
from the day-to-day workings of corporate law. These examples, however, are 
not tied into an overarching theory; they demonstrate that corporate law is not 
contract law, but they do not explain why that is so—what advantages we derive 
from corporate law’s unique structure. They also do not fully discuss why 
corporate law cannot become more cognate with contract law, if courts or other 
lawmakers considered making it so. This Article provides that explanation in 
detail.44 
Moreover, previous works have concentrated on various power and 
information asymmetries between shareholders and managers, which make 
“shareholder consent” to such litigation-limiting provisions an empty 
construct.45 This Article expands the argument much further: the problem of 
mandatory arbitration in corporate law is not merely one of consent;46 rather, 
it is a problem of enforcement and power to act. Even the most well-informed 
group of shareholders cannot absolve all present and future fiduciaries of a 
                                                                                                                                   
42 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
43 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 12, 40. 
44 Relatedly, this Article fills another important gap in existing literature: even when writing 
about the mandatory structure of corporate law, scholars often invoke the language of 
contract. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: 
The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1822 (1989) 
(“[Even] the contractual view of the corporation offers strong reasons for placing significant 
limits on the freedom to opt out.”). This usage can become highly problematic, because in 
the arbitration context, the Supreme Court makes an almost binary distinction between 
contracts and non-contracts: under the textualist approach, anything that is a “contract” 
might, presumably, fall within the scope of the FAA. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 12, at 636 
n.301. This Article takes a step back, proving that corporate law is not contract law, and 
charters and bylaws are not contracts, full stop. 
45 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 20, at 258-59, 262-72, 283-90; Fisch, supra note 40, at 382-99; 
Lipton, supra note 12, at 600-26. 
46 This point is becoming increasingly important, due to the rise of highly powerful 
institutional investors. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate 
Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 263 (2019) (arguing that the empowerment of institutional 
investors can make corporate law unnecessary). In fact, corporate law is very much alive. See 
Raz, supra note 34, at 528, 531. Even to the extent private actors have greater power vis-à-
vis directors and officers, and so might presumably “consent” to mandatory arbitration, that 
“consent” should not, as a rule, be enforced, for the reasons explained here. See infra Sections 
II.B, II.C. 
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corporation from legal liability to the entity, over inherently unpredictable, 
long-term, open-ended scenarios (precisely what corporate law is designed to 
facilitate). The ideas of equity and ex post supervision are woven into the fabric 
of corporate law, just as much as the business judgment rule or asset 
partitioning. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a doctrinal and 
practical overview of the current and near-future state of affairs in corporate 
mandatory arbitration. Section I.A offers an introduction to both mandatory 
arbitration and corporate litigation, as they currently stand. Section I.B 
discusses the Johnson & Johnson case in detail, also explaining how it relates to 
the recent Salzberg decision. Section I.C describes the route through which 
Johnson & Johnson, combined with Salzberg, might turn mandatory arbitration 
into a reality, first in the securities arena, then in state corporate law. 
Part II turns to the theoretical argument. Because any inquiry into 
mandatory arbitration hinges on the question of whether corporate law is 
“contractual” in nature, that Part provides the answer: an unambiguous “no.” 
Section II.A discusses the root problem—many scholars’ and policymakers’ 
ongoing refusal to recognize corporate law as a self-standing legal framework, 
and to study its unique nature. Section II.B goes to the heart of the argument: 
if not contract, what is corporate law, and what economic and other benefits 
do we derive from its distinctive legal structure? Section II.C addresses the way 
in which the phrase “contract” is used in both Delaware case law and corporate 
academic literature; it explains why looking at that word in isolation ignores a 
broader, more nuanced idea of corporate law, which both of these bodies of 
text are conveying. 
Similar to the 1980s takeover wave,47 the discussion surrounding 
corporations’ constitutional rights over the last decade,48 and the recent 
reinvigoration of the corporate purpose debate49—each bringing corporate 
                                                                                                                                   
47 See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 263 (1992) (“The 1980s were turbulent years for corporation 
law. . . . [In 1977,] [n]o one realized . . . that . . . the secure ground upon which the accepted 
suppositions of corporation law had been premised would [soon] break apart . . . .”). 
48 See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Wrong Turns with Corporate Rights, 
98 B.U. L. REV. ONLINE 44, 44 n.1 (2018) (citing a wide range of recent scholarly works 
on the topic). 
49 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, 
100 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3561164; Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The 
False Dichotomy of Corporate Governance Platitudes, 46 J. CORP. L. 345 (2021) (surveying 
and responding to the recent flux of literature on the topic); Raz, supra note 34. 
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theory and corporate practice together in unforeseen ways—this Article turns 
the specter of mandatory arbitration from a threat to a scholarly opportunity. 
It is time to consider what corporate law does, and how it does it.50 Pulling 
corporate law away from the more extreme form of legal realism would preserve 
its very existence, preventing it from being overrun by mandatory arbitration. 
As importantly, it would bring corporate literature in line with broader private 
law scholarship, and provide an answer to what is perhaps the most 
fundamental question in the field: why do we have corporate law in the first 
place—and why should we defend its continued presence, separate from any 
other framework, most pressingly, contract. 
 
I.      THE NEW ROAD TO MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN CORPORATE 
LAW 
 
A.      The Present Landscape of Mandatory Arbitration and Corporate Litigation 
[T]here can be no injury, but there must be a remedy in all or 
some of them; and therefore I will never determine that frauds 
of this kind are out of the reach of courts of law or equity, for 
an intolerable grievance would follow from such a 
determination.51 
 
Before this Article delves into the issue of mandatory arbitration in 
corporate law, the current Section asks more generally: what are the pathologies 
of mandatory arbitration in the United States, and what is corporate 
litigation—which has so far remained outside of the mandatory arbitration 
sphere—doing in the meantime for our economy and civil justice system? 
To start with, there is not much wrong with arbitration per se.52 In 
                                                                                                                                   
50 Cf. Henry E. Smith, The Persistence of System in Property Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 
2065 (2015) (“It is time to consider what property does, and how it does it.”). 
51 Charitable Corp. v. Sutton (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 645; 2 Atk. 400, 406 (Eng.). 
52 As the discussion in this Section shows, the U.S. mandatory arbitration system bears little 
relation to other forms of arbitration, geared toward good faith dispute resolution and the 
provision of justice to deserving parties. That is generally the case, for example, in the field 
of international investment arbitration, as well as arbitration between power-symmetrical 
parties (the FAA’s original subject matter), both of which are outside the scope of this 
Article. For a nuanced discussion of ways in which the U.S. mandatory arbitration system 
crosses the line from a dispute resolution device to a justice-impeding one, see Stephen J. 
Ware, The Centrist Case Against Current (Conservative) Arbitration Law, 
68 FLA. L. REV. 1227 (2016). 
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current U.S. practice, however, “arbitration clauses” cover a wide range of 
provisions, often having nothing to do with arbitration as a method of dispute 
resolution, and everything to do with dispute elimination and obfuscation. These 
clauses are usually formulated by the party enjoying superior power and 
information, and are inserted, on a “take it or leave it” basis, into contracts of 
adhesion—mainly consumer and employment agreements, from mobile phone 
contracts53 to those governing the hiring of law firm associates and partners.54 
The problem with the American version of mandatory arbitration, then, is 
rooted not in the concept of arbitration, but in the extremely simplistic way the 
Supreme Court requires that arbitration agreements be enforced “according to 
their terms.”55 
Although a plain reading of the FAA56 instructs us that arbitration 
provisions “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,”57 in practice, the 
Court has repeatedly failed to acknowledge almost any “such grounds.” Instead, 
it has aggressively expanded the FAA’s reach, even in cases where contract law 
or equity do require the non-enforcement of an arbitration provision,58 and 
even where the contents of the arbitration clause negate any possibility of an 
“effective vindication”59 of the legal rights at issue. 
Such clauses might state, for example, that the weaker party “waives” 
all rights to bring any class action—although arbitration is fully compatible 
with class proceedings,60 and despite the fact that it is entirely impossible to 
“arbitrate” certain claims on a non-class basis.61 An arbitration clause can 
                                                                                                                                   
53 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011). 
54 See, e.g., infra note 63. 
55 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012). 
56 Federal Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2020)). 
57 Id. § 2 (emphasis added). 
58 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352 (nullifying state contract law rule 
against certain unconscionable arbitration provisions). 
59 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 passim (2013). 




61 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“[A]greements that forbid the consolidation of claims can lead small-dollar claimants to 
abandon their claims rather than to litigate. . . . What rational lawyer would have signed on 
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purport to cover an unlimited range of future disputes in which the stronger 
party might be involved, even if they have nothing to do with, and could not 
be contemplated at the time of, the original contract where the arbitration 
mandate appears.62 Even more extremely, an arbitration provision might 
declare that the arbitrator must defer to the very action being challenged in 
arbitration—thus creating what is known as “the firm always wins” clause.63 
Some of the most basic tenets of law—namely, the principle that no 
one may be a judge in one’s own case64—are thus being subverted by the U.S. 
system of mandatory arbitration. Unsurprisingly, this results in less people 
seeking to enforce their rights in the first place,65 and deformation of justice in 
many of the cases that are filed.66 In economic terms, the more justice-
impeding the arbitration clause it can draft, the more wealth a party can 
unilaterally shift to itself. The gross inequities generated by mandatory 
arbitration’s overreach have been studied extensively by scholars of civil 
procedure, constitutional law, and contract law.67 This is far from purely a 
                                                                                                                                   
to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 
claim?”). 
62 See David Horton, Infinite Arbitration Clauses, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2020). 
63 See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 7, Winston & Strawn LLP v. Ramos, 
No. 18-1437 (July 31, 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-
1437/109930/20190731162449651_18-1437_BIO.pdf (quoting the contents of a “firm 
always wins” arbitration clause from a law firm partnership agreement; the clause stated that 
“[t]he panel of arbitrators shall have no . . . authority to substitute its judgment for, or 
otherwise override the determinations of, the Partnership, or the Executive Committee or 
officers authorized to act in its behalf, with respect to any determination made or action 
committed to by such parties”). The law firm’s petition for certiorari has been denied, after 
the parties’ briefs and many amicus briefs were filed. See Docket for 18-1437, U.S. SUP. CT., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/18-1437.html (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2021). Yet, the very existence of such provisions (which remain, at least plausibly, 
valid in states where no judicial precedent has been reached to the contrary) highlights the 
pathologies of the U.S. mandatory arbitration system. 
64 See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 15-32 (2003). 
65 See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 9; Samuel Issacharoff & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The 
Hollowed Out Common Law, 67 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 600, 632-35 (2020); Judith Resnik, 
Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the 
Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2812 (2015) (“Despite the heralding of arbitration 
as a speedy and effective alternative to courts, the mass production of arbitration clauses has 
not resulted in ‘mass arbitrations.’ Instead, the number of documented consumer arbitrations 
is startlingly small.” (footnote omitted)). 
66 See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 10. 
67 See, e.g., Michelle L. Caton, Form over Fairness: How the Supreme Court’s Misreading of the 
Federal Arbitration Act Has Left Consumers in a Lurch, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 497 (2014); 
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matter of legal doctrine: in a well-regarded 2013 book, Professor Margaret Jane 
Radin documents the human costs of mandatory arbitration clauses in the U.S., 
along with other, similarly self-exculpatory terms in standard-form contracts.68 
To make things even worse, courts and legislatures (particularly at the 
state level) cannot do much about this. Once an arbitration provision has been 
placed in a contract, extremely little room is left for equitable, ex post review—
possibly reshaping, limiting, or revoking arbitration in a specific case—to 
preserve any degree of justice-making. That is because, in a line of cases, 
epitomized by such decisions as AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,69 the 
Supreme Court has held that almost no state law may interfere with any 
arbitration clause; state laws that do so are preempted by the FAA.70 
As a result, if corporate charters and bylaws, at some point in the 
future, are found to come under the FAA’s ambit, then presumably neither 
Delaware,71 nor any other state of incorporation, may regulate what corporate 
directors and officers put into those documents, as long as they frame these 
provisions as “arbitration clauses.” Contrary to the (justified) wishes of some 
scholars, the structure of U.S. arbitration law currently makes it impossible to 
ensure that cases will be heard by a “credible arbitral institution,”72 or that a 
process of “interpretation”73 by courts, limiting arbitration to “reasonable and 
                                                                                                                                   
Estlund, supra note 9; Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and 
Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 322-31 (2013); Resnik, supra note 65. 
68 RADIN, supra note 10. 
69 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
70 See, e.g., id. at 352 (“Because it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,’ . . . California’s Discover Bank rule 
[(prohibiting class action waivers in certain contracts)] is pre-empted by the FAA.”) 
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
71 Delaware law does prohibit the inclusion of mandatory arbitration clauses in corporate 
charters and bylaws. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2020). As the Delaware legislature 
explained, “Section 115 . . . invalidates . . . a provision selecting the courts in a different 
State, or an arbitral forum, if it would preclude litigating [internal corporate] claims in the 
Delaware courts.” S.B. 75, 148th Gen. Assemb., synopsis § 5 (Del. 2015) (enacted), 
https://legis.delaware.gov/json/BillDetail/GetPdfDocument?fileAttachmentId=51221. 
72 Andrew K. Jennings, Firm Value and Intracorporate Arbitration, 38 REV. LITIG. 1 passim 
(2018). 
73 Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Interpreting Organizational Contracts and the Private Ordering 
of Public Company Governance, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985 passim (2019). 
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equitable”74 provisions, will take place. 
Despite all this, two borders have not been crossed. First, even while 
expanding the reach of anything bearing the title “arbitration clause,” the 
Supreme Court continues to impose one overarching limitation: that clause 
must be part of a contract, not some other legal document.75 Second (and closely 
related), mandatory arbitration has not become part of the corporate law 
landscape. In fact, no Supreme Court case has held corporate charters and 
bylaws to be “contracts” under the FAA. As this Article proves, these 
documents truly are not, cannot, and have never been contracts, under any form 
of doctrinal, historical, linguistic, or economic analysis.76 
Accordingly, corporate law remains one of the more well-functioning 
areas of American law.77 Directors, officers, and other actors bound by the 
norms of corporate law continue to be subject to the jurisdiction of regular 
courts, most importantly, those in Delaware.78 “[T]he Delaware courts 
determine questions of liability in the most significant corporate law cases, 
[and] provide instruction on best practices for the directors of publicly held 
corporations.”79 This dual function—the corporate law court as a provider of 
both remedy and guidance—is recognized even by those scholars who most 
strongly advocate a wide breadth for the business judgment rule, and who stress 
the significance of “norms,” as opposed to “law,” in shaping the day-to-day 
                                                                                                                                   
74 Id. at 996. The exceptionally broad reach of federal arbitration law, and its interference 
with state law, present a uniquely problematic form of “ex ante corporate governance,” not 
encountered in previous corporate governance debates (such as those over poison pills, 
staggered boards, forum selection clauses, and so on). The Supreme Court’s arbitration 
jurisprudence makes it much more difficult to remedy wrongs through ex post, equitable 
intervention. That form of remedy is the traditional province of the courts—and a solution 
often invoked by scholars to address the various problems of private ordering in the corporate 
context. See, e.g., George S. Geis, Ex-Ante Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 609, 643-
44 (2016); infra note 177. 
75 See supra note 21. 
76 See infra Part II. 
77 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate 
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731 (2013). 
78 For a detailed discussion of recent cases where corporate law actors were held accountable 
in the Delaware courts, see Joel Edan Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using 
Data Points of Successful Stockholder Litigation as a Tool for Reform, 72 BUS. LAW. 623 (2017). 
79 David Skeel, The Bylaw Puzzle in Delaware Corporate Law, 72 BUS. LAW. 1, 23-24 
(2016). 
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behavior of corporate actors.80 The rise of powerful activist shareholders—
pulling us away from the “Berle and Means” era,81 characterized by strong 
separation of ownership and control—does not detract from the need for 
effective corporate litigation; instead, it relies on it.82 
In one derivative action case, 2012’s Americas Mining Corporation v. 
Theriault,83 the Delaware courts have successfully remedied a fiduciary breach 
by a controlling shareholder, in the amount of $2.031 billion.84 Americas 
Mining was a particularly fruitful exercise in corporate law enforcement, but 
the Delaware courts routinely grant remedies, and approve settlements, in the 
tens or hundreds of millions of dollars;85 they do not shy away from denying 
motions to dismiss, even in cases that involve well-known, well-connected 
entities and businesspeople.86 
As Section II.B below explains, the open-endedness of corporate 
                                                                                                                                   
80 See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, 
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1661-63, 1686-89 (2001) 
(discussing situations where, despite the article’s general thesis, corporate litigation remains 
necessary and beneficial); see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, A Babe in the Woods: An Essay 
on Kirby Lumber and the Evolution of Corporate Law, 45 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 138 (2020) 
(“Skepticism about the limits of shareholder litigation . . . is not the same as implacable 
opposition to such litigation. In Delaware’s system of corporate law, representative 
stockholder plaintiffs, and their lawyers, are a bulwark against misappropriation and 
electoral manipulation by self-interested directors, officers, and controlling stockholders, 
and are therefore a critical promoter of efficient, wealth-creating corporate governance.”). 
81 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
82 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 77, at 780 (“Today’s corporation bears little resemblance to [the 
Berle and Means] model. . . . [I]nstitutional intermediaries own an ever-increasing majority 
of publicly traded equities and exercise the traditional shareholder powers such as the right 
to vote and the right to sue.” (emphasis added)). This point is further illustrated infra note 
87: if shareholders could not sue to repeal the inequitable poison pill, it is not clear how they 
could meaningfully exercise their voting rights. Without well-functioning courts of equity, 
there could be no effective shareholder activism to begin with. 
83 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012). 
84 See id. at 1218. 
85 See, e.g., Friedlander, supra note 78. 
86 See, e.g., In re Dell Techs. Inc. Class V Stockholders Litig., Consol. C.A. 
No. 2018-0816-JTL, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211 (Del. Ch. June 11, 2020) (denying motion 
to dismiss a complaint against Michael Dell and other defendants, following alleged non-
compliance with the requirements set forth in Delaware law, in the course of a $40.5 billion 
share conversion transaction). 
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existence, where almost no legal constraints are imposed on the corporation ex 
ante, inevitably leads to a wide range of ever-changing factual scenarios. The 
Delaware courts—as opposed to “private ordering,” or any other mechanism—
are the ones who approve or reject, on an equitable, case-by-case basis, the 
numerous legal devices that corporations, their fiduciaries, and their legal 
counsel come up with.87 
While corporate litigation is not perfect, of course, it is better than no 
litigation (that is, making corporate law unenforceable). Occasionally, non-
meritorious litigation practices emerge from the plaintiff side, but the Delaware 
courts are well-versed in weeding them out.88 Accordingly, leading corporate 
litigation scholars agree that litigation is an important, beneficial mechanism 
to enforce the substantive norms of corporate law;89 while both meritorious and 
non-meritorious claims exist, as in any other field of law, no scholar seriously 
suggests eliminating all corporate litigation90—the equivalent of a 100% 
dismissal rate, whether the lawsuit is justified or not. 
                                                                                                                                   
87 A perfect example is the poison pill. In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court has accepted 
the original form of the poison pill as an anti-hostile-takeover device. See Moran v. 
Household Int’l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). Yet, this ex ante grant of power does not mean 
that any use of a poison pill, even inequitably or contrary to the principles of corporate law, 
is permissible ex post. In 1998, the same court struck down a recent innovation—the “no-
hand” poison pill, designed to be so irredeemable that not even a whole new board of 
directors could repeal it. See Quickturn Design Sys. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). 
88 See, e.g., In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016) (responding 
to the practice of “disclosure settlements”—ones leading to the payment of attorneys’ fees 
while providing little additional value to the represented class of shareholders—by 
establishing a rule that requires the court not to approve a settlement, unless it clearly 
provides such value). 
89 See, e.g., David H. Webber, Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, 
57 ARIZ. L. REV. 201, 266-67 (2015) (stating that “there is substantial evidence that at least 
a subset of existing class actions are meritorious and value enhancing, [and] that top firms 
and institutional lead plaintiffs, particularly public-pension funds, correlate with better 
outcomes for shareholders”; citing multiple sources to that effect). 
90 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the 
Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 
93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015) (characterizing a specific troubling practice—settlements for 
supplemental disclosure and attorneys’ fees, see supra note 88—while not implicating other, 
more meritorious litigation practices); Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, A Mission 
Statement for Mutual Funds in Shareholder Litigation, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1149 (2020) 
(discussing many benefits generated by shareholder litigation, and the manner in which 
mutual fund managers can be encouraged to bring more meritorious cases); Webber, supra 
note 89, at 267 (“An optimal reform to shareholder litigation would offer flexibility and 
nuance, allowing preservation of meritorious, value-enhancing actions . . . .”). 
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Recently, however, even this final fortress—corporate law, enforceable 
in court—has come under clear and present danger, as Sections I.B and I.C 
below explain in detail. 
 
B.      The Johnson & Johnson and Salzberg Cases: A New Roadmap for 
Mandatory Arbitration in Corporate Law 
On March 21, 2019, a relatively little-noticed case91 was filed in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. That case, Doris 
Behr 2012 Irrevocable Trust v. Johnson & Johnson,92 involves a unique procedural 
situation: a shareholder proposing the adoption of a mandatory arbitration 
clause in a corporation’s bylaws. This fact makes the success of the arbitration 
proposal less likely in this specific case,93 but that is not the most pertinent 
issue. More importantly, the arguments raised in Johnson & Johnson illustrate 
how, in the near future, when corporate directors start making such proposals, 
they will enjoy the most potent chance yet for mandatory arbitration to expand 
into the corporate law realm. 
The Johnson & Johnson case has two features that are likely to be 
replicated in the near future, by directors aiming to impose mandatory 
arbitration on their corporations (and to secure the judicial precedents that will 
enable them to do so). First, the case directly deals with limits on the litigation 
of federal securities claims, rather than internal affairs, state law corporate 
claims. Arbitration proponents are likely to try ushering mandatory arbitration 
through the securities law door first, relying on the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                                   
91 This Article is the first scholarly work to analyze the Johnson & Johnson case. The case 
received some coverage in other circles. See, e.g., Cydney Posner, Mandatory Arbitration 
Shareholder Proposal Goes to Court—As Chair Clayton Suggested, COOLEY PUBCO (Mar. 25, 
2019), https://cooleypubco.com/2019/03/25/mandatory-arbitration-shareholder-proposal-
complaint. In early 2019, a group of 26 law professors have signed a white paper discussing 
the Johnson & Johnson shareholder proposal, predating the court case (and focusing on the 
internal affairs, corporate-vs.-securities dimension, which became less salient following the 
2020 Salzberg decision). See Jacob Hale Russell, Mandatory Securities Arbitration’s 
Impermissibility Under State Corporate Law: An Analysis of the Johnson & Johnson Shareholder 
Proposal (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance Working Paper Series No. 237, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3332853. 
92 No. 3:19-cv-8828 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 21, 2019). The complaint in this case was amended 
twice, following the Delaware Supreme Court’s Salzberg decision and other developments, 
discussed below. Second Amended Complaint, Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr. v. Johnson 
& Johnson, No. 3:19-cv-8828 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/7PYK-7WQD 
[hereinafter Johnson & Johnson Complaint]. 
93 See infra text accompanying notes 157-62. 
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recent Salzberg decision,94 discussed shortly below. While mandatory 
arbitration in securities law is bad enough, it might easily spread from there to 
state corporate law, as well.95 
Second, the arbitration proponent in Johnson & Johnson has adopted a 
tactic, also likely to be followed by pro-arbitration directors, which ignores or 
attempts to sneak through the backdoor96 the more important question in this 
debate: are corporate charters and bylaws “contracts,” at least for purposes of 
the FAA?97 If the federal courts correctly find (as they have before)98 that these 
documents are not contracts, federal arbitration law cannot apply to them. If 
the courts fail to do so, however, the floodgates are likely to open for mandatory 
arbitration in both securities and corporate law.99 
Under the combined effect of legal realism’s disdain for categories,100 
and a misreading of some cases and scholarly works,101 arbitration proponents 
would like this issue to either “slip under the radar,” or be incorrectly answered. 
This Article puts the question squarely on the table, and cogently answers it. 
While Johnson & Johnson and Salzberg provide a boilerplate for arbitration 
proponents’ arguments in the near future, they also provide the roadmap for 
rejecting them. 
Johnson & Johnson was filed by Hal Scott, professor emeritus at 
Harvard Law School,102 who is engaged in an academic and public campaign 
                                                                                                                                   
94 Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020). 
95 See infra Section I.C. 
96 See Johnson & Johnson Complaint, supra note 92, at 5, 7, 12 (referring five times to 
corporate bylaws using the word “agreement,” or its inflections, without any substantive 
discussion or attempt to support that claim). 
97 See supra note 21 (discussing the requirement that a “contract” be present for the FAA to 
apply). 
98 See Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (denying 
a corporate defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, on the grounds that the plaintiff-
shareholder never consented, in the contract law sense, to an arbitration clause in the 
corporation’s bylaws). 
99 See infra Section I.C. 
100 See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
101 See infra Section II.C. 
102 See Hal S. Scott, HARVARD LAW SCH., 
https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10781/Scott (last visited Apr. 2, 2021). The 
Johnson & Johnson complaint was filed by Scott both in his personal name, and as trustee of 
the Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Trust, a Massachusetts common law trust, in which 
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against the practice of securities litigation.103 In November 2018, somewhat 
ironically, Scott adopted a strategy most often employed by shareholder rights 
activists:104 he made a shareholder proposal, and sought to have it voted on at 
the 2019 annual shareholder meeting of Johnson & Johnson, a New Jersey 
corporation.105 Shareholders are entitled to do so under the SEC’s Rule 
14a-8,106 but a corporation may refuse to include a proposal in its proxy 
materials, if any one of “few specific circumstances”107 are met. Among those 
circumstances, the proposal might, “if implemented, cause the company to 
violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject.”108 
Scott’s proxy submission was framed as a precatory proposal,109 stating, 
“[t]he shareholders of Johnson & Johnson request the Board of Directors take 
all practicable steps to adopt a mandatory arbitration bylaw [providing as 
follows].”110 In Scott’s proposal, the bylaw would require “disputes between a 
stockholder and the Corporation and/or its directors, officers or controlling 
persons relating to claims under federal securities laws in connection with the 
                                                                                                                                   
capacity he owns 1,050 shares of Johnson & Johnson. See Johnson & Johnson Complaint, 
supra note 92, at 2, 6. 
103 See, e.g., Hal S. Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual 
Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1188 (2013); Hal S. Scott, 
The SEC’s Misguided Attack on Shareholder Arbitration, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-secs-misguided-attack-on-shareholder-arbitration-
11550794645. 
104 Scott is operating as what Professors Yaron Nili and Kobi Kastiel have termed a 
“corporate gadfly”—an individual shareholder, owning a relatively small number of shares, 
but potentially wielding large influence on corporate affairs by making various shareholder 
proposals. See Yaron Nili & Kobi Kastiel, The Giant Shadow of Corporate Gadflies, 
94 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3520214. 
105 See Johnson & Johnson Complaint, supra note 92, at 2, 4. 
106 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(2). 
109 A precatory shareholder proposal is an “advice” to the corporation or its directors, rather 
than a binding requirement. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 846 (2005) (“[Precatory resolutions] are not 
binding: under state corporate law, directors have discretion whether to follow precatory 
proposals . . . , and directors’ freedom to disregard such resolutions is protected under the 
business judgment rule.”). 
110 Johnson & Johnson Complaint, supra note 92, at 4. 
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purchase or sale of any securities issued by the Corporation to be exclusively 
and finally settled by arbitration.”111 If adopted, Scott’s proposed bylaw would 
mandate “that any disputes subject to arbitration may not be brought as a class 
and may not be consolidated or joined.”112 
Scott’s proposal also included a “supporting statement,” where things 
get even more intriguing. Among other contentions, that statement raises a 
patently false assertion: that “[t]he United States is the only developed country 
in which stockholders of public companies can form a class and sue their own 
company for violations of securities laws.”113 In reality, many developed 
countries have securities class actions; over the last few years, numerous 
European countries even saw an increase in certain kinds of collective 
shareholder litigation.114 Recoveries for the class in such actions went as high 
as US$1.5 billion.115 
Shortly thereafter, Johnson & Johnson rejected Scott’s demand to 
include his proposal in the corporation’s 2019 proxy materials, and sought a 
no-action letter from the SEC, affirming the legality of this decision.116 In the 
back-and-forth of letters between the corporation, the SEC, and Scott, leading 
to the issuance of the no-action letter, Johnson & Johnson reasoned that a 
mandatory arbitration clause would, among other things, “violate New Jersey 
state [corporate] law.”117 The corporation based this argument on the Delaware 
Chancery Court’s Salzberg decision,118 but also on other, directly arbitration-
                                                                                                                                   
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 5. 
113 Id. 
114 See Laying Down the Law: Europe Is Seeing More Collective Lawsuits from Shareholders, 
ECONOMIST (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-
economics/2017/12/07/europe-is-seeing-more-collective-lawsuits-from-shareholders. 
115 See The Top 25 Non-North American Settlements, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. 2, 4 
(2020), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/ISS-SCAS-The-Top-25-Non-
North-America-Settlements.pdf (providing information on the 2018 Netherlands case of 
Ageas SA/NV (f/k/a Fortis S.A./N.V. & Fortis N.V.), which settled for said amount; also 
providing information on high-recovery cases from several other countries). 
116 See Johnson & Johnson Complaint, supra note 92, at 6. 
117 Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted). 
118 Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 578 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 19, 2018). For discussion of the case, see infra text accompanying notes 135-46. Note 
that “Delaware law is significant here because . . . New Jersey courts frequently look for 
guidance [from Delaware] on corporate law issues absent controlling New Jersey authority.” 
Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae Attorney General of the State of New Jersey at 7, 
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related authorities, such as Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C.119 In his 
responsive correspondence (and later, in the complaint countering the 
corporation’s and SEC’s positions), Scott raised several arguments centered on 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA.120 
On February 11, 2019, the SEC issued the no-action letter requested 
by Johnson & Johnson,121 thus blocking the arbitration proposal’s way to the 
2019 annual meeting. In response, Scott filed his action in the federal New 
Jersey District Court.122 The complaint consists of a single count of action, for 
“violation of federal securities law,”123 arguing that the proposed bylaw is not 
illegal under New Jersey corporate law, and even if it were, the state law is 
preempted by the FAA. Thus, Johnson & Johnson presumably acted 
unlawfully when it excluded Scott’s proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(2), since 
implementing the proposal would not cause the corporation “to violate any 
state, federal, or foreign law.”124 
The questions directly facing the court, therefore, are whether 
inserting a securities law mandatory arbitration clause into a corporation’s 
bylaws conforms with New Jersey corporate law, and by extension,125 Delaware 
corporate law; and, if such a clause is enacted, are the bylaws a “contract” to 
which the FAA, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s arbitration precedents, apply. 
                                                                                                                                   
Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 3:19-cv-8828 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 
2019), https://perma.cc/W6DA-8EQC. 
119 560 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (denying a corporate defendant’s motion to compel 
arbitration, on the grounds that the plaintiff-shareholder never consented, in the contract 
law sense, to an arbitration clause in the corporation’s bylaws). 
120 See Johnson & Johnson Complaint, supra note 92, at 7. The main FAA cases relied upon 
by Scott, in response to Johnson & Johnson’s and the SEC’s letters, are Shearson/American 
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), and Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
121 Letter from Jacqueline Kaufman, Att’y-Adviser, SEC, to Johnson & Johnson (Feb. 11, 
2019), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-
8/2019/dorisbehrjohnson021119-14a8.pdf. 
122 See supra note 92. The complaint cited id. is the second amended complaint filed by Scott, 
but his substantive arguments have remained nearly identical throughout his various 
complaints, except to the extent discussed in this Section, following the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s Salzberg decision. 
123 Johnson & Johnson Complaint, supra note 92, at 12. 
124 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(2) (2020). 
125 See supra note 118. 
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These are questions of state law: under the Erie doctrine,126 federal courts 
adjudicating this issue—in Johnson & Johnson, or future cases about mandatory 
arbitration in securities and corporate law—are required to apply Delaware law 
to resolve it.127 
Recognizing what might be at stake in Johnson & Johnson, institutional 
investors and members of the bar were quick to respond. In addition to the 
original defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint,128 a similar motion was 
filed by two large institutional shareholders, the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS) and the Colorado Public Employees’ 
Retirement Association, who joined the case as intervenors,129 represented by 
renowned plaintiffs’ attorney Deepak Gupta.130 Curiously, Johnson & Johnson 
presents the rare case where if the motions to dismiss are granted, that would 
be a plaintiff-friendly move. 
In their original motions to dismiss, both Johnson & Johnson and the 
institutional intervenors relied on two lines of argument. The first runs along 
the internal affairs, corporate law-vs.-securities law axis,131 primarily based on 
                                                                                                                                   
126 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
127 The federal courts are facing this issue under their “federal question” jurisdiction, since 
both the Securities Acts and the Federal Arbitration Act are federal statutes. Yet, even 
within its federal question jurisdiction, the Erie doctrine requires a federal court to apply 
state law when faced with a state law question (such as the question “are corporate charters 
and bylaws ‘contracts?’”). See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1926 (2011) (“[T]he Erie 
doctrine applies in federal-question and federal constitutional cases, just as it does in 
diversity cases, provided that an analytically separate question of state law is presented.”). 
128 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Johnson & Johnson’s Motion to Dismiss, 
Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 3:19-cv-8828 (D.N.J. May 31, 
2019), https://perma.cc/9EDP-A9QZ [hereinafter Johnson & Johnson Defendant’s Original 
Motion to Dismiss]. 
129 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss of Proposed Intervenors California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System & Colorado Public Employees’ Retirement Ass’n, 
Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 3:19-cv-8828 (D.N.J. May 31, 
2019), https://perma.cc/JR77-F34X [hereinafter Johnson & Johnson Intervenors’ Motion to 
Dismiss]. 
130 See id. at 30. Among other arbitration-related cases, Gupta represented the appellees 
before the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). See 
id. at 335. 
131 See Johnson & Johnson Defendant’s Original Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 14-
28; Johnson & Johnson Intervenors’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 129, at 9-14. 
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the Delaware Chancery Court’s Salzberg decision.132 The second argument 
concerns the distinction between corporate law and contract law.133 At this 
point, it is worthwhile to pause and discuss Salzberg, a case which has received 
extensive scholarly attention.134 Existing literature, however, does not primarily 
focus on the case’s possible influence in the more critical arbitration context, 
which this Article now covers. 
At issue in Salzberg was one primary question: can the charters and 
bylaws of a Delaware corporation regulate the rights and duties arising outside 
of state corporate law (that is, beyond the realm of “internal affairs”135)? This 
question arose after three Delaware corporations, prior to the initial public 
offering (IPO) of their shares, adopted so-called “federal forum provisions,” 
mandating that plaintiffs must litigate their federal securities law claims against 
the corporation (as opposed to state corporate law claims) only in federal court, 
despite the 1933 Securities Act’s allowance for filing securities claims in state 
court.136 While forum selection provisions in regard to state corporate law 
claims have been allowed since the 2013 Boilermakers decision137 and the 2015 
amendment to the Delaware General Corporation Law,138 Salzberg added the 
                                                                                                                                   
132 Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 578 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 19, 2018). 
133 See infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
134 See supra note 17. 
135 “The internal affairs doctrine . . . holds that the chartering state alone should govern a 
corporation’s ‘internal affairs’—what the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws defines 
as ‘the relations inter se of the corporation, its shareholders, directors, officers or agents.’ In 
contrast, the rights and obligations of ‘third persons,’ namely those other than ‘the directors, 
officers or stockholders of the corporation,’ are subject to ordinary conflicts analysis.” 
Vincent S.J. Buccola, Opportunism and Internal Affairs, 93 TUL. L. REV. 339, 340 (2018) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1971)). 
136 See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2020) (stating that, in respect to “class actions, [and] all suits in 
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title,” the 
federal courts’ jurisdiction is “concurrent with State and Territorial courts”); Cyan, Inc. v. 
Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1078 (2018) (“[The Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA)] did nothing to strip state courts of their 
longstanding jurisdiction to adjudicate class actions alleging only 1933 Act violations. 
Neither did SLUSA authorize removing such suits from state to federal court.”). 
137 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
138 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2020) (“The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws 
may require . . . that any or all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and 
exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State . . . .”). 
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internal affairs question into the mix. 
In December 2018, the trial court—Delaware’s Chancery Court—
decided the precedential Salzberg case in favor of the plaintiff, who had 
challenged the federal forum provisions by arguing they violate the “internal 
affairs” boundary. The court said that “a 1933 Act claim resembles a tort or 
contract claim brought by a plaintiff who happens also to be a stockholder, but 
under circumstances where stockholder status is incidental to the claim,”139 and 
defined “purchasers of securities” as “parties external to the corporation.”140 
Therefore, the federal forum provisions were found to be “ineffective and 
invalid.”141 
On these grounds, one might also not impose other limits on securities 
litigation (including mandatory arbitration) by placing that limit in a 
corporation’s charter or bylaws. Since the Johnson & Johnson original complaint 
was filed shortly after this decision (and prior to its reversal), the defendant and 
intervenors broadly relied on it in their original motions to dismiss.142 
On March 18, 2020, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed.143 In its 
Salzberg decision, the state’s high court devised an entirely new doctrine: the 
“outer band”144 theory, according to which certain matters—such as the 
securities laws—lie outside the “internal affairs” sphere, but still within the 
scope of the Delaware General Corporation Law.145 The court reasoned that 
“[a federal forum provision is] also . . . a provision ‘defining, limiting and 
regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors and the stockholders,’ 
since FFPs prescribe where current and former stockholders can bring [1933 
Act] claims against the corporation and its directors and officers.”146 In other 
words, the fact that the same people are involved in both securities and corporate 
relationships, at least in most cases, was dispositive in the eyes of the court. 
                                                                                                                                   
139 Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 578, at *40 (Del. 
Ch. Dec. 19, 2018). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at *8, *49. 
142 See supra note 131. 
143 Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020). 
144 Id. at 131. 
145 See, e.g., id. (“‘[I]ntra-corporate’ matters . . . are not necessarily limited to ‘internal 
affairs[]’ . . . .”). 
146 Id. at 115. 
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The Delaware Supreme Court’s Salzberg decision thus eliminates one 
ground for opposing Hal Scott’s proposal in the Johnson & Johnson case: it is 
now possible to use a corporation’s charter or bylaws to control some aspects of 
federal securities litigation. The former case, however, deals with a far less 
troubling practice (forum selection, directing plaintiffs to one court, rather than 
another) compared to the latter (mandatory arbitration, entirely shutting the 
courthouse doors before any and all plaintiffs).147 Salzberg also does not 
implicate the FAA, and does not hinge on the question of whether or not 
corporate charters and bylaws are “contracts,”148 which is the more fundamental 
inquiry with regard to arbitration. 
Moreover, the Salzberg court explicitly rejects the application of 
Salzberg in the mandatory arbitration context, saying that “[s]uch provisions, 
at least from our state law perspective, would violate [Delaware General 
Corporation Law] Section 115.”149 Similarly, Professor Joseph Grundfest 
argues that the outcome in Salzberg serves to preclude, not promote, mandatory 
arbitration.150 In an amicus brief recently filed in California state court, a group 
of high-ranking Delaware jurists, among them two former Chief Justices of 
Delaware, also note the difference between forum selection and mandatory 
arbitration.151 
These facts did not prevent Hal Scott from stating, in his amended 
complaint filed after the Delaware Supreme Court’s Salzberg decision, that 
“[the decision] eliminates any possible basis for Johnson & Johnson’s argument 
that [Scott’s] shareholder-arbitration proposal violates Delaware law.”152 This 
claim is incorrect. The Johnson & Johnson defendants—just like corporations, 
                                                                                                                                   
147 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
148 In several parts of its opinion, the Salzberg court discusses the issue, in a manner 
consistent with this Article’s thesis: charters and bylaws are unique creatures of corporate 
law, governed by equity principles, rather than contract law. See infra notes 329-31 and 
accompanying text. 
149 Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 137 n.169. 
150 See Grundfest, supra note 17, at 1384-86. 
151 See Amicus Brief of Former Delaware Justices, Chancellors, and Vice Chancellors and 
Professor Joseph A. Grundfest in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non 
Conveniens at 5-6, In re Dropbox, Inc. Secs. Litig., No. 19-CIV-05089 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
July 10, 2020), https://static.reuters.com/resources/media/editorial/20200714/dropbox--
amicus.pdf (implying that, “[i]n contrast” to federal forum provisions, mandatory arbitration 
clauses are “objectionable”). 
152 Johnson & Johnson Complaint, supra note 92, at 12. Relatedly, see supra note 96 (citing 
places where the plaintiff refers to corporate bylaws using the word “agreement,” or its 
inflections, without any substantive discussion or attempt to support that claim). 
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shareholders, and directors who will oppose mandatory arbitration in future 
cases—still have their second line of argument (also the focus of this Article): 
the fact that corporate law is distinct from contract law, and therefore,153 
corporate charters and bylaws are not contracts, and are not subject to the FAA 
or the U.S. Supreme Court’s arbitration precedents.154 
Indeed, both of the original motions to dismiss in Johnson & Johnson 
correctly address this fundamental issue.155 Salzberg detracts nothing from this 
argument, and even supports it.156 Part II below develops this reasoning in 
depth. Prior to that, however, Section I.C explains how ignoring this 
distinction (perhaps due to the same excessive focus on Salzberg’s internal 
affairs angle, as advanced by Hal Scott) can dramatically alter the landscape of 
both securities and corporate law enforcement. 
As it turns out, by the time Johnson & Johnson filed its new motion 
to dismiss157 (responding to Scott’s post-Salzberg amended complaint), in 
which the institutional intervenors joined,158 a few facts had shifted in the case. 
Most importantly, Johnson & Johnson had agreed to let Scott include his 
arbitration proposal in the 2021 annual meeting159—likely, in large part, 
because it had recognized there is little chance Scott’s proposal would win a 
shareholder majority.160 Accordingly, the new motion to dismiss mainly 
                                                                                                                                   
153 See supra note 20. 
154 See supra note 21. 
155 See Johnson & Johnson Defendant’s Original Motion to Dismiss, supra note 128, at 30; 
Johnson & Johnson Intervenors’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 129, at 19-26. 
156 See infra notes 329-31 and accompanying text. 
157 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Johnson & Johnson’s Motion to Dismiss, 
Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 3:19-cv-8828 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 
2020), https://perma.cc/T46N-ZYMV [hereinafter Johnson & Johnson Motion to Dismiss]. 
This is the third motion to dismiss filed by Johnson & Johnson in the case; in addition to 
the original motion to dismiss, supra note 128, there was a second motion to dismiss, filed 
in response to Scott’s first amended complaint (his second complaint out of three overall). 
There is no substantial difference between the first and second amended complaints, or the 
second and third motions to dismiss, for purposes of the discussion here. 
158 Notice of Joinder of Intervenor-Defendants California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System & Colorado Public Employees’ Retirement Ass’n, Doris Behr 2012 Irrevocable Tr. 
v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 3:19-cv-8828 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/FXJ4-EEDR. 
159 See Johnson & Johnson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 157, at 3, 12, 21-22. 
160 Approximately eight months after Johnson & Johnson filed its original motion to dismiss, 
another arbitration proposal made by Hal Scott, similar to the one in Johnson & Johnson, has 
been rejected by 97.6% of Intuit Inc.’s voting shareholders. See Intuit Inc., Form 8-K, 
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revolves around procedural arguments such as mootness and unripeness,161 
stating that the court cannot issue an “advisory opinion.”162 At the time this 
Article is being written, the motion is pending. 
Whether or not the Johnson & Johnson case is dismissed (and whether 
or not that decision goes on appeal), it has provided the template for how 
mandatory arbitration proponents are likely to try introducing it into this new 
field of law. The unique circumstances that have impeded Hal Scott’s 
arbitration proposal are not expected to repeat in the next round, when 
corporate directors will be the ones making the proposal (or simply inserting an 
arbitration clause into their corporation’s bylaws, without any proposal to 
shareholders, or anyone else).163 The same types of substantive arguments 
raised by both sides in Johnson & Johnson will be litigated again—except this 
time, shareholders (perhaps also derivatively, on behalf of the corporation) will 
be the plaintiffs, opposing the mandatory arbitration provision. Their success, 
or lack thereof, will shape a large swath of American law for a long time to 
come. Section I.C below describes how this scenario might unfold in detail. 
 
C.      The Next Round: Toward Federal Imposition of Mandatory Arbitration in 
Corporate Law? 
As Section I.A above explains, litigation in courts (particularly the 
Delaware courts) remains an important, beneficial mechanism for the 
enforcement of corporate law in the United States. Section I.B has described 
how proponents of mandatory arbitration have initiated a campaign—now 
taking its first steps through the federal courts, in the Johnson & Johnson 
                                                                                                                                   
EDGAR (Jan. 27, 2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/896878/000089687820000020/a8-
kshellshmtg01232020.htm. In this case, the corporation’s directors recommended to 
shareholders that the proposal be rejected. See Notice of 2020 Annual Meeting of Stockholders 
and Proxy Statement, INTUIT INC. 78 (Nov. 27, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/896878/000110465919068149/tv531778-
def14acourtesy.pdf. This extremely strong opposition to mandatory arbitration only 
highlights the danger of such provisions being adopted via the bylaw route, where 
shareholders will not even have a say on the matter, or in other circumstances where directors 
have the decisive power, see infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text. This is especially 
true for corporations where—unlike Intuit and Johnson & Johnson—directors are less 
attuned to the corporation’s or shareholders’ interests (to put it mildly). 
161 See Johnson & Johnson Motion to Dismiss, supra note 157, at 17-26. 
162 Id. at 4. 
163 See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text. 
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litigation—aimed at (ultimately) making private enforcement of the securities 
laws substantially more difficult, if not impossible. 
This Section merges these two lanes: it explains how the current legal 
situation might evolve in the long run—specifically, how mandatory arbitration 
might inject itself first into federal securities law, and from there, expand to 
state corporate law. This Section also shows that the strongest barrier against 
this troubling development lies in recognizing that corporate law is separate 
from contract law, and therefore, the federal courts cannot apply the FAA to 
corporate charters and bylaws. This, in turn, leads to Part II below, where the 
distinction between corporate and contract law is developed in depth. 
Start where we left off the Johnson & Johnson case, in Section I.B. As 
discussed there, Johnson & Johnson revolves around the following question: can 
a Delaware corporation lawfully channel securities law claims into mandatory 
arbitration, by adding to its bylaws an arbitration clause that would be covered 
by the FAA?164 This question, in turn, splits into two branches, each being 
dispositive if answered “no”: first, can corporate charters and bylaws regulate 
the rights and duties arising under an external field of law (in this case, 
securities law)? Second, are corporate charters and bylaws “contracts” subject 
to the FAA? 
The first branch has been affirmatively answered by the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s Salzberg decision.165 Yet, this does not affect the second, 
corporate-vs.-contract distinction. If the courts adjudicating that question 
correctly find that charters and bylaws are not contracts,166 this should end the 
case, just as much as if Salzberg was differently decided.167 Since the FAA does 
not apply to corporate charters and bylaws, attempts to enact mandatory 
arbitration provisions may be subject to review or revocation, either ex ante, 
through statute (such as Delaware’s Section 115),168 or ex post, through 
equitable adjudication in state or federal court.169 
                                                                                                                                   
164 See supra text accompanying notes 116-27. 
165 See supra text accompanying notes 143-46. 
166 See infra Part II. 
167 See, e.g., Clopton & Winship, supra note 22, at 177 (“Under the FAA, arbitration 
agreements are presumptively valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. This presumption is 
triggered, however, only if corporate governing documents count as ‘contracts’ under the 
FAA.”); supra note 21. 
168 See sources cited supra note 71. 
169 If the arbitration clause deals with the litigation of securities claims, then it might not be 
covered by Delaware’s Section 115, which pertains to “internal corporate claims.” DEL. 
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Yet, a certain risk arises in the current circumstances of the Johnson & 
Johnson litigation, and future cases in its vein: given all the “brouhaha”170 over 
the first dimension—the internal affairs, corporate-vs.-securities issue decided 
in Salzberg, and covered at length by scholars171—the federal courts might be 
led to treat it as dispositive. As discussed above, Scott argues that the Salzberg 
decision “eliminates any possible basis”172 for finding his proposal contrary to 
law. In fact, the corporate-vs.-contract distinction—which Scott ignores or 
minimizes173 (and future arbitration proponents are likely to, as well)—is 
equally dispositive in this case, and more important as a general matter. It must 
not slip under the federal courts’ radar. Part II below explains in detail how the 
courts should resolve this question. 
Assume, however, that—even if the issue is fully addressed by the 
federal courts, including the Supreme Court—corporate charters and bylaws 
are found to be “contracts” under the FAA, so that the FAA, and the Supreme 
Court’s expansive arbitration jurisprudence,174 apply to them. What would 
come next? The first and most obvious effect would be the adoption of 
arbitration provisions in regard to securities law claims. Corporations’ directors, 
in their sole discretion, could simply amend the corporation’s bylaws to include 
an arbitration clause,175 perhaps with a similar language as Scott’s proposal to 
                                                                                                                                   
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2020). Even so, the arbitration clause would also not be covered 
by the FAA (and the Supreme Court’s arbitration precedents), because it is not part of a 
“contract.” See supra note 21. Arbitration can exist outside the scope of the FAA, governed 
only by state law and non-FAA federal law. As a result, securities plaintiffs will have a space 
to challenge arbitration clauses ex post, relying on equitable grounds, or the securities laws’ 
anti-waiver provision, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 78cc (2020), or ex ante, through SEC 
rulemaking. If the arbitration clause deals with the litigation of internal affairs claims, it is 
subject to both Section 115 and the full plethora of state law equitable powers, see infra 
Section II.B. 
170 Cf. Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha Over Intra-Corporate Forum 
Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325 (2013). 
171 See supra note 17. 
172 Johnson & Johnson Complaint, supra note 92, at 12. 
173 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra Section I.A. 
175 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2020) (“[A]ny corporation may, in its 
certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the 
directors . . . .”). The vast majority of U.S. public corporations indeed have such a director-
empowering clause in their certificate of incorporation. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 40, at 379-
80. 
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Johnson & Johnson.176 Again, so much for the “contract” metaphor.177 
Alternatively, directors could use their exclusive power to propose 
charter amendments,178 and submit such an arbitration provision to 
shareholders’ vote in the next annual meeting. In fact, this is the only route 
where shareholders would be asked, in any form, whether they wish to 
“arbitrate”179 their claims. Even for those corporations that proceed through 
the charter (rather than bylaws) avenue, acceptance rates for directors’ 
arbitration proposal might be considerable, resulting from shareholders’ 
entrenched collective action problems and directors’ vast informational and 
procedural advantage.180 Still, to the extent shareholders (specifically, large 
institutional shareholders such as Vanguard and BlackRock) have the 
opportunity to prevent the adoption of an arbitration clause in a certain 
corporation,181 they ought to do so (and are, in fact, obliged to, as fiduciaries 
for their investors, and in some cases, for the corporations in which they 
invest).182 
So far, this Section has discussed the course of mandatory arbitration 
in the securities law realm. Indeed, that is the issue directly being addressed in 
the Johnson & Johnson case.183 If mandatory arbitration sweeps across the U.S. 
securities law landscape, we might see a large swath of the securities acts 
                                                                                                                                   
176 See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. 
177 The unilateral amendment of corporate constitutional documents, by the corporation’s 
fiduciaries, is different than the (seemingly) unilateral modification of an agreement under 
contract law. See Albert H. Choi & Geeyoung Min, Contractarian Theory and Unilateral 
Bylaw Amendments, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2018). The best solution Professors Choi and 
Min find, for the various problems that arise in the corporate context, is the granting of 
“equitable relief” through “stronger judicial oversight,” which is characterized by “speed and 
low cost,” id. at 41. This is precisely the solution that mandatory arbitration makes 
impossible. 
178 See, e.g., tit. 8, § 242(b)(1). 
179 The quote marks are necessary. See supra note 65. 
180 See, e.g., Geeyoung Min, Shareholder Voice in Corporate Charter Amendments, 
43 J. CORP. L. 289, 296-99 (2018) (discussing the “Failure of [the] Shareholder Right to 
Veto Charter Amendments” and noting that “[g]iven these structural impediments, it is 
uncertain whether a shareholder approval requirement in the charter amendment process 
could effectively prevent directors’ opportunistic amendment attempts”). 
181 See, e.g., supra note 160. 
182 On activist shareholders as fiduciaries for the target corporation, see, for example, Raz, 
supra note 34, at 567-70. 
183 See supra Section I.B. 
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become practically unenforceable, specifically through class actions—a 
mechanism which the Supreme Court has called “essential.”184 Yet, the U.S. 
securities arena would not experience a complete return to the Hobbesian state 
of nature, since there is some alternative—albeit far less efficient185—
enforcement mechanism: civil and criminal actions, brought against securities 
law violators by the SEC and the Department of Justice.186 Even this final 
outlet, however, would not be available when mandatory arbitration spreads to 
its next target: internal affairs, state corporate law claims.187 
At this point, we should return to Delaware’s Section 115.188 One 
might correctly observe that mandatory arbitration of corporate law matters is 
legally impossible, given the Delaware legislature’s express prohibition of that 
practice.189 Indeed, this appears to be the argument made by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in the final part of the Salzberg decision.190 The Delaware 
court, however, neglected to mention one obvious risk: that a federal court, to 
whose precedents Delaware is subject, would find corporate charters and 
                                                                                                                                   
184 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007). 
185 See, e.g., Roy Shapira, Mandatory Arbitration and the Market for Reputation, 
99 B.U. L. REV. 873, 901-04 (2019) (discussing ways in which SEC enforcement falls short 
of private litigation, in terms of information production and in other respects). 
186 See, e.g., Tellabs v. Makor, 551 U.S. at 313 (discussing the “criminal prosecutions and civil 
enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the [SEC]”). 
187 There is no state corporate law equivalent to the SEC, and the enforcement of internal 
affairs law is dependent on private actors. One seeming exception is actions brought by the 
state Attorney General, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 124(3), 284, 323, 384 (2020), 
but these only relate to few, delineated subject matters, and play a small role in the landscape 
of corporate law enforcement. It is possible to try expanding the enforcement of private law 
by state actors, and some scholars have suggested doing so in the face of the spread of 
mandatory arbitration. See, e.g., Sarath Sanga, A New Strategy for Regulating Arbitration, 
113 NW. U. L. REV. 1121 (2019). While state enforcement of private law is better than no 
enforcement at all, it is still inferior to enforcement by private actors, for the reasons 
discussed, for example, by Shapira, supra note 185. Since Delaware, like all other states, has 
practically no mechanisms in place for the public enforcement of corporate law, the costs of 
creating this institutional framework are also likely to be exceptional. 
188 Tit. 8, § 115. 
189 See sources cited supra note 71. 
190 See Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 137 n.169 (Del. 2020) (“Much of the 
opposition to FFPs seems to be based upon a concern that if upheld, the ‘next move’ might 
be forum provisions that require arbitration of internal corporate claims. Such provisions, at 
least from our state law perspective, would violate Section 115 . . . .”). In addition, even if 
Section 115 did not exist, mandatory arbitration would still be contrary to corporate law 
principles, see infra Sections II.B, II.C, and should be equitably regulated ex post. 
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bylaws to be “contracts” under the FAA. In such a case, that court would be set 
on a road culminating in a declaration that Section 115 is preempted by the 
FAA, and is therefore invalid for arbitration-related purposes. 
How would that road unfold? Again, remember that we are 
(hypothetically) past the point in which a Johnson & Johnson-like case has led 
the U.S. Supreme Court to find that corporate charters and bylaws are 
“contracts” subject to the FAA. Assume the directors of some Delaware 
corporation—possibly one whose fiduciaries are especially eager, for whatever 
reason, to shield themselves from the reach of law191—now insert an arbitration 
clause into their corporation’s bylaws. Instead of dealing only with the “federal 
securities laws,” as in Hal Scott’s Johnson & Johnson proposal,192 the internal 
affairs arbitration clause might mirror the language of Section 115, covering 
“any or all internal corporate claims,”193 or claims “based upon a violation of a 
duty by a current or former director or officer or stockholder in such 
capacity.”194 
The linguistic possibilities are endless, as are the various ways to defeat 
any chance for the meaningful enforcement of corporate law: for example, 
through a “waiver” of the right to file any derivative action (rather than only 
                                                                                                                                   
191 See infra note 204 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
193 Tit. 8, § 115. 
194 Id. 
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class actions),195 or through “the firm always wins” clause196—which, in the 
corporate context, would translate to “the firm always loses,” as the corporate 
entity would be deprived of its ability to hold its fiduciaries accountable for any 
violation. 
Next, one or more shareholders of the Delaware corporation at issue 
would likely file an action in the Delaware Chancery Court, seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the arbitration provision is ineffective and invalid, 
given the clear language of Section 115.197 The Chancery Court would have a 
much easier job compared to Salzberg,198 since the arbitration clause squarely 
comes within the scope of the corporation’s internal affairs. After the unlawful 
provision has been struck down, the director-defendants would likely appeal to 
the Delaware Supreme Court. If that court takes its own language in the final 
part of Salzberg199 seriously, it would affirm the Chancery Court’s ruling. 
The stage would then be set for what might become “Delaware’s 
fall”200—and that of American corporations’ and shareholders’ rights more 
                                                                                                                                   
195 This would eliminate any practical way for the corporate entity to sue its directors and 
officers for any breach whatsoever, since they will not sue themselves (on behalf of the 
corporation). Therefore, a waiver of the right to file a derivative action (or derivative 
arbitration) is precisely equivalent to waiving the right to sue (or arbitrate), full stop. 
Derivative and class actions are fundamentally different, as the former is filed on behalf of a 
single person (the corporation), while the latter is filed on behalf of a non-precisely-
delineated group of people. See, e.g., Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1265 
(Del. 2012) (“[T]he corporation was harmed and the total recovery is awarded to the 
corporation . . .—not ‘nominally’ but actually. . . . Delaware law does not analyze the ‘benefit 
achieved’ for the corporation in a derivative action . . . as if it were a class action 
recovery . . . .”). However, in the U.S., a serious error has occurred with respect to Rule 23.1 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: the rule requires that derivative plaintiffs “fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of shareholders or members who are similarly situated in 
enforcing the right of the corporation or association,” FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a) (emphasis 
added). In fact, shareholders are simply not party to a derivative action, which is between 
the corporate entity (through a representative) and the fiduciary-defendant. The improper 
phrasing of Rule 23.1 might encourage courts to erroneously view derivative actions as akin 
to class actions, and to similarly uphold “derivative action waivers” in arbitration clauses. 
196 See supra note 63. 
197 See sources cited supra note 71. 
198 See supra text accompanying notes 139-41. 
199 See Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 137 n.169 (Del. 2020). 
200 Lynn M. LoPucki, Delaware’s Fall: The Arbitration Bylaws Scenario, in CAN DELAWARE 
BE DETHRONED?: EVALUATING DELAWARE’S DOMINANCE OF CORPORATE LAW 35 
(Stephen M. Bainbridge, Iman Anabtawi, Sung Hui Kim & James Park eds., 2018). For 
more on this point, see Skeel, supra note 79, at 19-20 (“Delaware needs cases; corporate law 
litigation is the fuel that powers the mighty Delaware corporate law engine. . . . What sets 
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generally. The director-defendants could seek certiorari from the U.S. 
Supreme Court. If that writ is granted, and as the Court had already found 
(within the hypothetical scenario here) corporate charters and bylaws to be 
“contracts” under the FAA, it might proceed to declare that Delaware’s Section 
115 is preempted by the FAA, in similar fashion to the Concepcion decision201 
and others in its vein. The U.S. Supreme Court would overturn the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s ruling, reinstating the internal affairs arbitration clause in the 
corporation’s bylaws, and opening the floodgates for widespread adoption of 
such clauses among corporations chartered in Delaware and elsewhere in the 
U.S. 
Clearly, not all American corporations will get mandatory arbitration 
clauses inserted into their charters or bylaws, in regard to either securities or 
internal affairs claims. The rise of institutional investor stewardship and proxy 
advisor oversight,202 combined with the simple fact that many fiduciaries seek 
to lawfully meet their duties, while guarding the corporation’s and investors’ 
long-term interests—as demonstrated by Johnson & Johnson and Intuit 
directors’ refusal to cooperate with Hal Scott’s arbitration proposals203—make 
it plausible that in those corporations where the level of corporate governance 
is higher to begin with, mandatory arbitration is less likely to materialize. 
The problem is more nuanced, however. As can be analogized from 
Professor Michal Barzuza’s research on fiduciary duty waivers,204 the 
corporations most likely to get arbitration provisions, in their charters or 
bylaws, are those that are more likely to violate the law in the first place (or see 
                                                                                                                                   
Delaware apart is its sophisticated corporate law judiciary and its rich supply of 
precedents . . . .”). 
201 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (“Because it ‘stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress,’ . . . California’s Discover Bank rule [(prohibiting class action waivers in certain 
contracts)] is pre-empted by the FAA.”) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 
(1941)). To be certain, Delaware’s Section 115 does not counter any Congressional 
objective; in fact, Congress hardly ever says anything about the internal affairs of corporate 
law, which is the province of the states. In the scenario described here, the federal courts 
might miss this point. 
202 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 77, at 780. 
203 See supra note 160. 
204 Michal Barzuza, Inefficient Tailoring: The Private Ordering Paradox in Corporate Law, 
8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 131 (2018); Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, What Happens in 
Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax Law, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 3593 (2014); Michal Barzuza, 
Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935 
(2012). 
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their fiduciaries commit such violations). Whether or not mandatory 
arbitration clauses become quantitatively as prevalent as, say, 102(b)(7) 
provisions,205 as a qualitative matter, the effect of mandatory arbitration will be 
significant. Those fiduciaries and entities who most require “law,” as opposed 
to “norms” (to invoke Professors Rock and Wachter’s terminology)206 to be 
disciplined, are the ones who will be able, and incentivized, to place themselves 
beyond enforceable law. Lawsuits will become impossible precisely where 
lawsuits are needed. 
Moreover, the concept of litigation plays a primordial role in corporate 
law; without courts of equity, fiduciaries can easily undermine the non-judicial 
mechanisms meant to supervise them, such as shareholder voting, upon which 
most of activism and stewardship are built.207 Mandatory arbitration in 
corporate law is thus likely to generate an unpredictable, systemically complex, 
and unprecedentedly troubling set of effects. 
This Article mainly aims to explain where the hands have come to on 
the clock, and to demonstrate why corporate law and mandatory arbitration are 
structurally incompatible; it does not seek to describe all the practical 
consequences of mandatory arbitration in corporate law—many of which have 
been analyzed in excellent detail by Professor Ann Lipton.208 The remainder 
of this Section, however, discusses a few of those implications, both to stress 
the magnitude of the issue, and to keep the literature on this point updated in 
light of recent scholarship. 
Just as in consumer and employment law, the root problem with 
mandatory arbitration in corporate law is that it does not channel cases to 
alternative dispute resolution, but the opposite: it practically eliminates them, 
leading to impairment of justice, accompanied by a unilateral shift of wealth to 
the party managing to shut the courthouse doors before the other.209 Yet, 
                                                                                                                                   
205 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2020) (allowing for waiver of monetary remedies 
for duty of care breaches by directors of a Delaware corporation, if a provision to that effect 
is placed in the corporation’s charter). On the prevalence of 102(b)(7) provisions, see Matteo 
Gatti, Did Delaware Really Kill Corporate Law? Shareholder Protection in a Post-Corwin 
World, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 345, 366 (2020) (“[V]irtually all firms incorporated (or 
reincorporated) in Delaware after July 1, 1986 (when Section 102(b)(7) became effective), 
and more than 90% of the pre-existing corporations, . . . have managed to pass the charter 
amendment.” (footnote omitted)). 
206 See Rock & Wachter, supra note 80. 
207 See, e.g., supra notes 82, 87 and accompanying text. 
208 See Lipton, supra note 12, at 626-40. 
209 See supra Section I.A. 
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mandatory arbitration in corporate law also presents its own, distinctive set of 
issues. Two examples were mentioned shortly above: the derivative action 
waiver and “the firm always loses” clause.210 More generally, if arbitration 
clauses truly are to be enforced “according to their terms,”211 what would 
prevent the corporation’s fiduciaries—who will almost always be the ones 
drafting the arbitration provision212—from requiring, say, the posting of a $10 
million bond as a prerequisite for filing any arbitration claim, or having the 
directors’ own legal counsel sit as arbitrators, or any similar justice-obstructing 
device? 
Furthermore, as Professor Lipton notes, corporate law relies on a set 
of representative enforcement mechanisms, which individualized “arbitration” 
makes entirely meaningless.213 By definition, there is no such thing as an 
“individual” derivative action,214 nor a “particularized” harm to shareholders, 
who (by default) all hold units of identical economic magnitude,215 and 
respectively share in the effects of corporate and managerial decisions (such as 
merging the corporation for too low a price,216 or infringing upon shareholders’ 
voting rights217). Arbitration clause drafters might also attempt to waive 
corporate law’s important set of information-revealing tools, without which 
many lawsuits cannot be initiated or pursued.218 
Even if every public corporation had just a handful of large 
                                                                                                                                   
210 See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text. 
211 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012). 
212 See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text. 
213 See Lipton, supra note 12, at 632-36. 
214 See supra note 195. 
215 See Asaf Raz, Share Law: Toward a New Understanding of Corporate Law, 
40 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 255 (2018). 
216 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986). 
217 See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
218 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c) (2020) (providing for a judicial procedure to compel 
inspection of corporate books and records by shareholders). On the recent rise in the 
importance of such procedures, see, for example, George S. Geis, Information Litigation in 
Corporate Law, 71 ALA. L. REV. 407 (2019); Roy Shapira, Corporate Law, Retooled: How 
Books and Records Revamped Judicial Oversight, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3600935. 
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institutional investors (which is hardly the case),219 there would still be no 
economic justification, nor any practical way, to run an identical arbitration five 
or ten times, for each shareholder anew. As Professor David Webber had 
found, even in a litigation environment dominated by institutional investors, 
“loss of the class action would eliminate . . . any remedy for substantial investor 
losses. . . . [C]ertain types of remedies would cease to be pursued without class 
action litigation. Specifically even positive-value claimants would no longer 
pursue remedies such as corporate governance reform.”220 Nor would it be even 
remotely feasible to submit the exact same breach of law to millions of 
individual arbitrations, considering retail shareholder ownership.221 Yet, unless 
all of these proceedings are pursued, the same, single violation can never be 
fully remedied (or deterred). How does this square with the Supreme Court’s 
praise for “reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution?”222 
These facts hint at an important observation, closely related to this 
Article’s broader thesis. In the corporate context, the Supreme Court cannot 
repeat the claim that “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate . . . , a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights . . . ; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather 
than a judicial, forum.”223 Instead, the party—a shareholder, or the corporation 
itself—is deprived of substantive rights when corporate law’s special 
enforcement mechanisms disappear. Those substantive rights are the product 
of a distinct legal framework, relying on its own methods of enforcement to 
address unique, corporate-specific situations.224 Elimination of corporate 
litigation means elimination of corporate law as an enforceable legal field, 
period. Even the most meritorious cases could never be brought,225 and those 
                                                                                                                                   
219 See Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor, 
102 MINN. L. REV. 11 (2017) (discussing the important role of individual, non-institutional 
shareholders in the U.S., and the need for a better policy response to their interests). 
220 Webber, supra note 89, at 265. 
221 See Fisch, supra note 219. 
222 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011). 
223 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
224 See infra Section II.B. 
225 For detailed discussion of such recent cases, see Friedlander, supra note 78. Consider, for 
example, the highest-recovery shareholder litigation case in Delaware history, Americas 
Mining Corporation v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012). In that case, the corporation’s 
fiduciaries were penalized in the amount of $2.031 billion for engaging in a self-interested 
transaction. See id. at 1218. Under a mandatory arbitration regime, the fiduciaries could have 
simply amended the corporation’s bylaws prior to the transaction, adding an arbitration 
clause with various justice-impairing devices. The case could then have not been brought, 
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who choose to violate the norms of corporate law would get “free lunch,” every 
day, and in respect to any decision, however harmful or irrational. 
Accordingly, the insertion of a mandatory arbitration clause, including 
standard justice-impairing provisions, into a corporation’s charter or bylaws, is 
precisely equivalent to a waiver of equitable and fiduciary duties, which 
Delaware law has long prohibited, even outside of the arbitration context.226 
Importantly, the FAA and the Supreme Court do allow courts to override 
arbitration clauses, as long as this is done “upon such grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract,”227 or if “arbitration agreements 
[are placed] on equal footing with all other contracts.”228 Delaware’s Section 
115, prohibiting mandatory arbitration of corporate law disputes,229 does 
indeed place arbitration on equal footing with other “contracts” (or, more 
correctly, corporate and directorial actions): in every case, a waiver of equitable 
and fiduciary obligations is legally impossible. This fact, too, must guide the 
federal courts adjudicating the issue. 
Finally, it is unlikely that, over the long term, corporations and 
shareholders will submit to a regime where their rights are unenforceable. 
Large institutional investors—from the U.S., and just as importantly, from 
overseas—can simply shift more money into securities issued by non-American 
corporations. Similarly, more new incorporations of international businesses 
might take place in jurisdictions where the nation’s highest court did not decide 
to make corporate law mostly unenforceable. Although fewer cases of 
misconduct will become publicly known, when future Enron-style scandals (or 
more recent ones—pick your favorite) do get uncovered, outsiders to the U.S. 
corporate governance system will have a hard time understanding why no civil 
recourse exists. Just like incorporation, litigation would also shift abroad, 
                                                                                                                                   
or, if brought, not be decided correctly. The fiduciaries would have gone away with a multi-
billion-dollar free lunch. 
226 See, e.g., Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 664 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“An essential aspect of 
our form of corporate law is the balance between law . . . and equity (in the form of concepts 
of fiduciary duty). Stockholders can entrust directors with broad legal authority precisely 
because they know that that authority must be exercised consistently with equitable 
principles of fiduciary duty.” (emphasis added)). 
227 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2020) (emphasis added). 
228 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). In another case, 
the Supreme Court has warned that the FAA is intended “to make arbitration agreements 
as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.” Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967). 
229 See sources cited supra note 71. 
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whenever possible.230 These developments would harm both the U.S.’s image 
and its economy. 
Is the scenario described in this Section actually going to unfold? As 
discussed above, the federal courts’ approval of mandatory arbitration clauses 
in corporate charters and bylaws is contingent upon one preliminary finding: 
that these documents are “contracts.”231 Part II explains why such a finding 
cannot be made consistent with law. 
 
II.      WHAT DEFINES CORPORATE LAW—AND MAKES IT NON-
CONTRACTUAL 
 
A.      Corporate Law’s Boundary Question: So Far, Unresolved 
Hohfeld’s project . . . seems to promise . . . [that] [t]axonomic 
activity will be happening. There will be classification. And 
jurisprudence by subdivision. Oh, joy.232 
 
Part I above has discussed the new doctrinal landscape, arising from a 
pair of recent cases (Johnson & Johnson and Salzberg), which might lead the 
federal courts, in the near future, to introduce the practice of mandatory 
arbitration into the corporate law sphere. This troubling economic and social 
development hinges on a question of legal classification: under state law,233 is 
corporate law part of contract law—and by extension,234 are corporate charters 
and bylaws “contracts?” Only if they are,235 can the Federal Arbitration Act, 
and the Supreme Court’s expansive arbitration precedents,236 enter the 
corporate law playing field. 
                                                                                                                                   
230 For discussion of corporate and securities litigation outside of the U.S., see, for example, 
sources cited supra notes 114-15. 
231 See supra note 21. 
232 Pierre Schlag, How to Do Things with Hohfeld, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 186 
(2015) (formatting altered) (discussing Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913)). 
233 See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra note 20. 
235 See supra note 21. 
236 See supra Section I.A. 
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This Part turns to a more theoretical approach, connecting with 
broader scholarship in corporate theory, contract theory, and law and 
economics, to prove that the answer to that question is squarely “no.” 
To start with, why do we even have to ask this question now? After 
all, no one thinks to conflate most other areas of private law with contract. No 
judge, practitioner, or scholar would seriously believe that an act of tort is an 
act of contract-making. Nor do we consider property law to be a branch of 
contract law. As this Section illustrates, today’s cutting-edge scholarship 
devotes itself to discerning the unifying principles and legal structures that 
delineate each of these fields, and many others. 
Corporate law, however, has remained different. Despite the huge 
amount of high-quality corporate scholarship, these taxonomic questions have 
yet to be clearly answered. At its root, this state of affairs might be grounded 
in the American tradition of legal realism,237 which distances itself from legal 
concepts, classifications, and doctrines. As Professor Felix Cohen famously 
wrote in 1935, “[a legal] proposition . . . would be scientifically useful if [the 
legal concepts it uses] were defined in non-legal terms.”238 
Over the last several decades (and in corporate law more than any 
other area), legal realism has largely morphed into the law and economics 
movement.239 Similar to Professor Cohen, many law-and-economists more 
readily discuss non-legal concepts—say, “externalities” or “Tobin’s q”240—than 
they do “corporate charters,” “equity” or “corporate purpose.” When reviewing 
the work of non-realist scholars, some authors seem to regard the possibility of 
“corporate law as law”241 with an air of surprise. 
As a result, we see a comparatively little amount of scholarship devoted 
to theoretical, structural questions—what defines corporate law, and why do 
we have it in the first place?—and a much broader literature dedicated to 
                                                                                                                                   
237 For a discussion of legal realism’s influence on U.S. corporate law, see Rock, supra note 
1. 
238 Cohen, supra note 2, at 820. 
239 On the link between these two movements, see Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Introduction: The Distinction Between Private Law and Public Law, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 1, 7-9 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky 
eds., 2020); Smith, supra note 4, at 46-48. 
240 See, e.g., Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 28. 
241 Bratton, supra note 26 (emphasis added). 
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important, yet more dynamic issues, such as dual-class shares,242 staggered 
boards,243 executive compensation,244 and so on.245 Corporate-specific legal 
concepts, such as corporate personhood, which in fact play a significant role in 
the daily operation and economics of business organizations,246 are often left 
by the scholarly wayside.247 
Among other effects, this has resulted in the rise of the “contract” and 
“private ordering” metaphors in corporate legal academia.248 After all, if we do 
not have to deal with definitions and categories, why not assume that corporate 
law has very little structure of its own, and is just part of something else, more 
intuitive to understand (that is, contract law)? When corporate law scholars 
depart from the “contract” metaphor, they tend to replace it with another, such 
as “property”249 or “agency.”250 Quite simply, “[w]hat all of these scholars have 
                                                                                                                                   
242 Compare, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-
Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585 (2017) (advocating the adoption of “sunsets,” terms in 
corporate constitutional documents that mandate the cancellation of the more senior class 
of shares a certain period of time after its issuance), with, e.g., Jill Fisch & Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, The Problem of Sunsets, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1057 (2019) (criticizing such terms). 
243 See, e.g., Yakov Amihud, Markus Schmid & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Settling the 
Staggered Board Debate, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1475 (2018). 
244 See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
245 Regarding the distinction between structural and dynamic legal concepts, see Balganesh 
& Parchomovsky, supra note 27; Raz, supra note 34, at 525-26, 531-32. 
246 On the economic and practical importance of corporate personhood (which is often not 
called that, but instead referred to using terms such as “entity” or “firm”), see, for example, 
Raz, supra note 34, at 539-48. 
247 See, e.g., Ann M. Lipton, Beyond Internal and External: A Taxonomy of Mechanisms for 
Regulating Corporate Conduct, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 657, 661 (“Companies do not act; 
individuals within them do.”). If we choose, from the outset, to treat one of corporate law’s 
building blocks—personhood—as transparent, all corporate affairs would pass off merely as 
direct relationships between stakeholders, fiduciaries, and shareholders. In practice, 
however, most of the frameworks discussed in Professor Lipton’s article as constraining 
“directors”—for example, employment and environmental law—actually bind the 
corporation itself. As a rule, neither directors, nor shareholders, can be sued for breach of 
these non-corporate legal norms. For further discussion of the significance of the 
corporation’s entity status, see infra Section II.B. 
248 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3. 
249 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 32. 
250 See, e.g., Heaton, supra note 31, at 207-14 (surveying in detail the development of “agency 
costs” as a central concept in corporate academic literature). 
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failed to consider is one possibility: corporate law is corporate law.”251 Even 
when, finally, discussing corporate law as such, authors often overlook at least 
one of its defining properties, leading to highly fragmented discourse.252 
At the bottom line, corporate law suffers from a multi-faceted “low-
visibility problem.”253 With the specter of mandatory arbitration (leaning on 
the confusion between corporate and contract law), this problem now threatens 
the very existence of corporate law as an enforceable framework.254 
This predicament is not shared by other areas of private law, which 
have largely re-embraced legal inquiry. In 2000, renowned legal philosopher 
Jeremy Waldron wrote that “any steps we have taken down th[e] road [offered 
in Cohen’s 1935 article255] have been taken without giving up the conceptual 
terminology of traditional legal analysis.”256 As Professor Ronald Coase, one of 
the greatest law and economics scholars in history, said in his 1991 Nobel Prize 
lecture, “the legal system [has] a profound effect on the working of the 
                                                                                                                                   
251 Raz, supra note 34, at 581. To be certain, several works do discuss corporate law’s 
boundary question—what distinguishes corporate law from other legal frameworks, and why 
do we need it at all?—in various contexts. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. 
Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1819 (2013) (“The 
theoretical interest concerns the problem of defining the corporation’s boundaries, asking 
the ‘who’s in and who’s out’ question regarding the line dividing fiduciary beneficiaries from 
contract counterparties.”); Ofer Eldar & Andrew Verstein, The Enduring Distinction 
Between Business Entities and Security Interests, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 213 (2019) (comparing 
corporate law and the law of security interests in property); John Morley, The Common Law 
Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American Business History, 
116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145 (2016) (arguing that trust law is capable of producing many of 
corporate law’s benefits); Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate 
Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 652 (2002) 
(arguing that, from a Coasean viewpoint, corporate law and trust law are fundamentally 
different, since the former lies in the “firm context” and the latter in the “market context”); 
Andrew Verstein, Enterprise Without Entities, 116 MICH. L. REV. 247 (2017) (arguing that 
contract law, particularly as applied in reciprocal insurance exchanges, is capable of 
producing many of corporate law’s benefits). Yet, some of these works reject the view that 
corporate law is substantively distinct from other areas; and none of them are aimed at 
systematically addressing corporate law’s underlying principles. 
252 See, e.g., Raz, supra note 34, at 525-26, 533. 
253 See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text. 
254 See supra Part I. 
255 Cohen, supra note 2. 
256 Jeremy Waldron, “Transcendental Nonsense” and System in the Law, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 17 (2000). 
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economic system and may in certain respects be said to control it.”257 
Recently, Professor Hanoch Dagan and co-authors have argued that 
“markets arise out of and operate through law—not just through public 
regulation but also through private law regimes . . . that create entitlements, 
enforce market exchanges, and limit expropriation.”258 Even in the context of 
blockchain—which has been initially perceived as an almost polar alternative 
to legal ordering, where “anything goes” if only you can code it—legal norms 
and concepts, including contract principles and litigation in courts, strongly 
persist.259 Put simply, law came before the market, and it is a predicate for 
private ordering, not the other way around.260 
Accordingly, structural theory enjoys a respectable role in the fields of 
property, tort, and of course, contract. In each of these areas, scholars make a 
nuanced effort to locate the underlying, unifying principles of the particular 
legal framework: for example, Professor Randy Barnett concludes that the 
foundation of contract law is “consent”;261 Professors Thomas Merrill and 
Henry Smith discuss the reduction of information costs through the numerus 
clausus principle in property law;262 and Professors John Goldberg and 
Benjamin Zipursky have recently formulated a new theoretical justification for 
tort law.263 These works, which today are increasingly associated with the New 
                                                                                                                                   
257 Ronald H. Coase, Lecture to the Memory of Alfred Nobel, NOBEL PRIZE (Dec. 9, 1991), 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1991/coase/lecture. 
258 Hanoch Dagan, Avihay Dorfman, Roy Kreitner & Daniel Markovits, The Law of the 
Market, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, i (2020). 
259 See Shaanan Cohney & David A. Hoffman, Transactional Scripts in Contract Stacks, 
105 MINN. L. REV. 319 (2020). 
260 This statement has no collectivist overtones, but the opposite of that. To have free 
markets, it is imperative to have a functioning, credible legal system, where rights are actually 
enforced (as opposed to, say, the current U.S. system of consumer and employment law, 
dominated by mandatory arbitration). Legal frameworks such as corporate law distinctively 
contribute to entrepreneurship and economic productivity, thanks to their legally-generated 
structure. See infra Section II.B. 
261 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986). 
262 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000). 
263 JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS (2020). 
Indeed, high-level theory remains especially prevalent in the field of tort law, as it has been 
for many decades. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) 
(discussing the fundamental nature of private law, mainly using tort law examples and 
doctrines). 
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Private Law movement,264 sharply contrast with legal realism’s neglect of legal 
concepts and categories. At the same time, they respond to Professor Cohen’s 
criticism265 in that they are neither formalistic, nor divorced from economic 
and social realities.266 
Why should corporate law be any different?267 After all, even under its 
expansive arbitration jurisprudence,268 the Supreme Court would not apply the 
FAA to an arbitration clause in a deed of property, because it is not a 
contract,269 and there was no “consent” by external parties to be bound by it. 
Similarly, if a heavy object fell on a person from the third floor of a nearby 
building, the Court would place the case in the correct category—tort law—
and would rightly ignore a presumed “arbitration clause” that was, say, affixed 
to the side of the building, in such a manner that the victim could neither read 
it prior to being hit, nor agree to it. Similarly, it is time to take corporate law 
at face value: a distinct legal field, having its own structure and practices, meant 
to deal with a unique set of real-world situations, and separate from contract 
law (or any other framework). 
The following Section does precisely that. Specifically, it demonstrates 
that, like other branches of private law, corporate law has a unifying principle: 
the open-endedness of the corporation’s activities and relationships. This legally-
generated principle, and its economic and social implications, have no 
equivalent in other fields of law; and, as the discussion below indicates, they 
make corporate law not merely different, but in some respects the opposite of 
                                                                                                                                   
264 See, e.g., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW (Andrew S. Gold, John 
C.P. Goldberg, Daniel B. Kelly, Emily L. Sherwin & Henry E. Smith eds., 2020); NEW 
PRIV. L., http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog (last visited Apr. 2, 2021). 
265 Cohen, supra note 2. 
266 A clear example is Professors Merrill and Smith’s justification of a legal concept (the 
numerus clausus principle of property law) in both doctrinal and economic terms (the 
reduction of information costs). See Merrill & Smith, supra note 262. 
267 Professor Paul Miller has recently written about corporate law within the framework of 
New Private Law. See Paul B. Miller, Corporations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
NEW PRIVATE LAW 341 (Andrew S. Gold, John C.P. Goldberg, Daniel B. Kelly, Emily L. 
Sherwin & Henry E. Smith eds., 2020). This Article continues and deepens these efforts. 
268 See supra Section I.A. 
269 In some cases, a document that serves as a deed of property might also be a contract, if 
the requirements for contract formation have been met. By itself, a deed of property is not 
a contract, and has no “parties” in the contractual sense, as it is binding on all the people in 
the world (in rem). It derives its normative power not from the consent of each of these 
people, but from property law as law. See supra note 20. 




B.      Corporate Law’s Defining Property: The Open-Endedness Principle 
In a recent article, Professors Zohar Goshen and Doron Levit point 
to an intriguing fact: 
Almost every aspect of corporate governance that was studied 
in the last forty years yielded conflicting empirical findings, 
for instance: dual-class shares; anti-takeover defenses, such as 
poison pills, staggered boards, and protective state 
legislations; hedge-fund activism; and the strength of 
corporate governance as measured by several indices.270 
How can this be? As this Section explains—for the first time in 
corporate law scholarship—the lack of persistent findings is due to no fault of 
empirical researchers. Rather, it is one effect of corporate law’s legal structure 
(as opposed to economic or political structure),271 which involves the concepts 
of purpose, personhood, equity, and fiduciary duty.272 These concepts are found 
together only in corporate law, and they manifest through a number of well-
studied phenomena, discussed below, including the business judgment rule,273 
capital lock-in,274 asset partitioning,275 and perpetual existence.276 
This legal structure, in turn, is tied to a unifying principle: open-
                                                                                                                                   
270 Zohar Goshen & Doron Levit, Irrelevance of Governance Structure 2-3 (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 606, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3340912 (citation and footnotes 
omitted). 
271 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
272 See Raz, supra note 34, at 533-66. 
273 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 20, at 264 (“Flexibility within the corporation occurs through a 
centralized board that operates under an unconstrained corporate charter whose decisions 
are insulated by overwhelming deference provided by the business judgment rule.”). 
274 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003). 
275 See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 32, at 390 (“[O]rganizational law . . . 
provide[s] for the creation of . . . ‘asset partitioning’ that could not practicably be established 
[without organizational law].”). 
276 See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764 
(2012). 
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endedness. Corporate law is meant to facilitate a wide range of eventualities 
that neither involved parties, nor legislators, nor judges, nor scholars can 
predict, plan, or regulate before-the-fact (ex ante). Corporate law is an ex post 
framework. It is about making very little information available to anyone in 
advance; instead, it lets the corporate entity pursue open-ended adventures, and 
disciplines it (or its human representatives) after-the-fact, in courts of equity, 
through inquiry into what is right and just at the present moment. What 
corporate law does mandate ex ante is this regime of ex post supervision. That 
is the “bargain” entities and shareholders “agree” to when they step into the 
domain of corporate law. As this Section originally explains, this structure also 
generates a powerful set of economic and social benefits, only achievable 
through corporate law. 
Importantly, this open-endedness principle also makes corporate law 
very different—in fact, almost the opposite—from another legal framework: 
contract law. In a way that is more familiar to economic scholars,277 contract 
law is built around a principle of ex ante consent.278 It is about making promises 
before-the-fact, and enforcing them in the manner they were made. Although 
“parties to a contract are free to be as whimsical or fanciful as they like in 
describing the promise to be performed,”279 from the moment the contract 
comes into being, it limits the parties’ autonomy and freedom of action, under 
pain of legal sanction. As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts says, “[a] 
contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives 
a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a 
duty.”280 Contract law hinges on consent,281 and that consent, in turn, has to 
be to something.282 
Contract law permits for some ex post wiggle room, partly stemming 
                                                                                                                                   
277 See Saul Levmore, The Ex-Middle Problem for Law-and-Economics, 
22 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2020) (“Law-and-economics is driven by an ex ante 
perspective.”). 
278 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 261. 
279 Merrill & Smith, supra note 262, at 3. 
280 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
281 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 261. 
282 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 20, at 279 n.91 (“[T]he requirement of definiteness is not a 
matter that the parties can waive if they are to have a contract. Indeed, it is tautological to 
argue that the parties can agree to an indefinite level of performance, since there cannot be 
an agreement if parties do not know to what they have agreed.”). 
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from the fact that contracts are inherently incomplete.283 Yet, even such 
intervention is shaped by whatever subject matter the parties have agreed to 
before-the-fact. The Delaware Chancery Court has expanded on this point: 
The temporal focus is critical. Under a fiduciary duty . . . 
analysis, a court examines the parties as situated at the time of 
the wrong. . . . [L]iability depends on the parties’ relationship 
when the alleged breach occurred, not on the relationship as 
it existed in the past. [A contract law] claim, by contrast, 
looks to the past. . . . [It asks] what the parties would have 
agreed to . . . at the time of contracting.284 
Corporate law stands firmly on the ex post side. To begin with, every 
corporation is a legal person.285 Two well-known concepts—asset partitioning 
and capital lock-in—can be viewed as different aspects of corporate 
personhood. Because the corporate person owns its own assets (and owes its 
own obligations), entirely separate from its shareholders (who, in turn, have 
their own assets and obligations), corporate law generates a distinct economic 
pool that cannot be touched by shareholders’ creditors.286 Nor, just as 
importantly, can it be touched by shareholders themselves: capital lock-in 
mandates that “individual shareholders [cannot] remov[e] productive business 
assets at will.”287 These achievements can only be unlocked by corporate law, 
                                                                                                                                   
283 See, e.g., Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in a Complete Contract 
World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 725 (2006) (“Contracts are never fully complete, because 
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284 ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC, 
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Post: The Non-Contractual Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
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IV, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 
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286 See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 32. 
287 Elisabeth de Fontenay, Individual Autonomy in Corporate Law, 
8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 183, 201 (2018). 
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as law;288 no other private law framework enables us to create a new, non-
human legal person, with its own set of rights and duties. 
Next, the corporation is endowed with extremely broad capacity to 
operate in the world. Some corporate statutes declare that “a business 
corporation shall have the legal capacity of natural persons to act,”289 while 
others provide it with a very extensive list of “[s]pecific powers,”290 practically 
equaling those of a human being. The corporation can use these human-like 
powers “to engage in any lawful act or activity.”291 Both the “any” and the 
“lawful” are highly consequential. Like any other person, the corporation is 
required to obey the law.292 For example, when a corporation makes a contract, 
it has to be fulfilled—but that is because the corporation is a person, subject to 
general law, not because of any ex ante command within corporate law itself. 
To the contrary, corporate law nowhere tells corporations which acts 
or activities to engage in. Just as a human’s life is open-ended, in the sense that 
no law tells the person which contracts or voluntary relationships to participate 
                                                                                                                                   
288 See, e.g., KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 31; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 
32, at 390. 
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(often extremely positive ones) that is, by default, the hallmark of corporations. 
292 See, e.g., Raz, supra note 34, at 549 n.135. 
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in, so is a corporation’s. Many adventures,293 or misadventures,294 can transpire. 
When we add the corporation’s perpetual existence into the mix,295 the range 
of potential endeavors grows even further, well beyond that of a human. The 
open-endedness principle is perhaps most famously facilitated by the business 
judgment rule (again, a concept limited to corporate law),296 mandating that 
“in the absence of facts showing self-dealing or improper motive, a corporate 
officer or director is not legally responsible to the corporation for losses that 
may be suffered as a result of a decision that an officer made or that directors 
authorized in good faith”297—no matter what the decision actually is. Contract 
law, with its ex ante nature, cannot (and is not meant to) achieve anything 
similar. 
Consider, for example, a corporation like Google. Would it be 
possible for anyone to write an ex ante contract that dictates—even in broad 
strokes—the details of all the corporation’s future activities? Such a task is 
impossible, at any point in time (both at the corporation’s founding, and any 
“midstream” moment of its existence). The reason is that people can predict or 
                                                                                                                                   
293 See, e.g., Jatan Mehta, How SpaceX’s Falcon Heavy Could Enable Fantastic Science in the 
Outer Solar System, MEDIUM (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://medium.com/teamindus/a051d65a2b0a. 
294 See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN 
CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM (2005) (discussing many 
corporate misdeeds, including the Enron scandal, as related to corporations’ partly legitimate 
risk-taking behavior). 
295 See tit. 8, § 102(b)(5) (stating that, unless the certificate of incorporation specifies 
otherwise, “the corporation shall have perpetual existence”); Schwartz, supra note 276. 
296 See, e.g., In re Viacom Inc. Stockholders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 2019-0948-JRS, 
2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 373, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2020) (noting, while discussing the 
business judgment rule, that “the conduct of corporate fiduciaries is given less judicial 
scrutiny than the conduct of trust fiduciaries”); Rock & Wachter, supra note 251 (discussing 
the lack of a business judgment rule in trust law); Robert H. Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles in 
Trust Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 41, 41 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul 
B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019) (“[T]he trust law duty of care . . . is not softened 
by a business judgment rule.”). Contract law, as well, does not have any concept that is 
analogous to the business judgment rule. 
297 Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch. 1996). For more on this point 
(and its relation to the open-endedness principle), see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s 
Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the 
Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar’s Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate 
Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1275 (2001) (“The Delaware Model . . . provides 
corporate managers with the flexibility to do practically any lawful act, subject to judicial 
review focused on whether the managers were properly motivated and not irrational.”). 
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plan the future only to a limited extent.298 Naturally, and at however high 
investment of money and effort, no one could (or can today) even imagine most 
of the activities Google would engage in within a long-enough period of 
time.299 What began as purely a search engine developer turned into a 
corporation dealing with such projects as YouTube and autonomous cars. If 
Google’s existence was based on “contract,” as opposed to corporate law, none 
of these feats could be achieved, or they would require an infinite cost at the 
contract drafting stage; they would require omniscience. Corporate entities 
both change the world, and adapt to it, in numerous, entirely unforeseeable 
ways. Through this, corporate law encourages innovation and 
entrepreneurship, in a manner that is impossible to attain by any other legal 
device. 
As a result, both contractarians (arguing that corporate law merely 
provides “default rules” in a contract between shareholders and managers),300 
and property theorists (arguing that corporate law simply draws lines between 
distinct pools of property, in turn reducing contracting costs with 
stakeholders),301 are missing the bigger picture. Corporate law does something 
more profound: through its open-endedness principle, it creates a whole new 
actor, free from the shackles of pre-existing obligations, and sends it off to 
pursue unlimited adventures. The infinite cost of planning all future activities 
through contract is reduced to less than one hundred dollars—the filing fee for 
establishing a new corporation.302 That is, to say the least, anything but 
trivial.303 
The discussion so far has focused on the benefits generated by 
                                                                                                                                   
298 See, e.g., Baker & Krawiec, supra note 283, at 725. 
299 See Raz, supra note 34, at 547-48. 
300 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3. 
301 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 32, at 401-03. 
302 See, e.g., Division of Corporations Fee Schedule, DEL. DEP’T OF ST. 1 (Aug. 1, 2020), 
https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/Augustfee2020.pdf (indicating that the filing fee for 
establishing a new Delaware corporation is $89). Of course, corporate law is not the single 
driver of economic activity and wealth formation in any society, but it is an important one. 
See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A 
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1287 
(2001) (“[E]lementary variables such as technology, education, availability of capital, and 
even social values such as diligence and self-restraint, are vital ingredients as well. But . . . it 
[is] clear . . . that the law of enterprise organization plays an important role in facilitating 
economic welfare.”). 
303 Cf. Black, supra note 3. 
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corporate law’s open-endedness principle—namely, efficiency and innovation, 
facilitated by corporate personhood, the “any lawful act or activity” statutory 
language, perpetual existence, and the business judgment rule. Although the 
trajectory of the corporation’s life is open-ended, the same is not true of 
corporate law itself. Corporate law does not only confer power; it also imposes 
duties. Unlike in a contract, however, those duties are not delineated before-
the-fact. Instead, they are based on concepts of purpose, equity and fiduciary 
duty, calling for a judicial inquiry that examines “the parties’ relationship as it 
existed at the time of the wrong”304—meaning ex post. 
As a general matter, if it does not violate the norms of corporate law, 
the corporation can fail—going bankrupt, or dissolving with zero net worth—
with its residual claimants receiving no compensation at all. This fact is implicit 
in the very concept of a residual claim, which again, is unique to corporate 
law.305 This is the opposite of contract law, where by definition, a failure to 
perform the subject matter generates a right for remedy.306 The corporation is 
neither a contractual counterparty to shareholders, nor their fiduciary.307 This 
does not mean, however, that shareholders have no claims at all. It just means 
that those rights are shaped within corporate law itself, and subject to its open-
endedness principle, using tools of equity and ex post review. 
For example, even if we could somehow tell the corporation’s fortunes 
in advance (which we cannot)—say, that the corporation’s net worth on 
December 31 next year will be precisely $1 billion—shareholders would still be 
exposed to a wide variety of unpredictable scenarios. One category of such 
events is share dilution: at any given moment, the corporation might increase 
its outstanding share capital, by allocating additional shares to new owners, 
thus decreasing each current shareholder’s relative stake in the corporation’s 
residual value (along with other rights, such as voting). The corporation can do 
this—nothing says otherwise, ex ante—but it must do it in an equitable 
manner. Delaware law has dealt with intricate sets of circumstances in this 
context.308 More generally, the range of situations that might occur in the 
                                                                                                                                   
304 ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC, 
50 A.3d 434, 440 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
305 See Raz, supra note 215, at 272-78. 
306 See, e.g., supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
307 See, e.g., In re Stillwater Capital Partners Inc. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 556, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (“A corporation does not owe a fiduciary duty to its shareholders . . . .”); Alessi v. 
Beracha, 849 A.2d 939, 950 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Earthgrains [(defendant corporation)] owes 
no fiduciary duty to Alessi [(plaintiff shareholder)].”). 
308 See, e.g., Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006) (resolving a situation where 
shareholders’ economic and voting rights have both been diluted); Feldman v. Cutaia, 
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corporation-shareholder relationship extends beyond any example we may be 
aware of at the present moment; corporate law generates and responds to 
unexpected, perhaps even odd, events, of which neither the substance, nor the 
parties being affected, can be known before-the-fact.309 
The same holds true for the law of corporate purpose: that the 
corporation can “engage in any lawful act or activity”310 does not mean that a 
for-profit corporation, for example, may start acting like a charitable or 
nonprofit corporation. In a series of cases, including 1989’s Paramount v. 
Time311 and 2010’s eBay,312 the Delaware courts have held that the for-profit 
corporation’s purpose is the lawful pursuit of profit.313 Directors and officers, 
by unilateral action (either charter or bylaw amendment, or the ongoing 
management of the enterprise), cannot abuse the fact that the law of corporate 
purpose is not clearly delineated in statute or contract. Once again, the courts 
are required to divine the equitable substance of corporate law, ex post. 
As this Section has shown, corporate law has none of contract law’s 
building blocks: neither consent, nor ex ante promises, nor sanction for breach. 
Corporate law has different components: purpose, entity status, and ex post 
equitable supervision accompanied by fiduciary duties. While contract law has 
                                                                                                                                   
956 A.2d 644, 655 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“A claim for wrongful equity dilution is premised on 
the notion that the corporation, by issuing additional equity for insufficient consideration, 
made the complaining stockholder’s stake less valuable.”); Mira Ganor, The Power to Issue 
Stock, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 701 (2011) (discussing the law and theory of share 
dilution). 
309 See, e.g., Verified Complaint, Shekhawat v. Kumar, No. 2019-0079-AGB (Del. Ch. Feb. 
6, 2019) (asking for remedy following an allegedly inequitable reverse share split, at a ratio 
of 1-for-2,185,000, designed to strip the plaintiff of his shares, specifically in order to 
forestall another shareholder litigation case filed by the plaintiff); Verified Petition for 
Equitable Relief at 1, In re Heat Biologics, Inc., No. 2019-0741-JTL (Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 
2019) (asking for remedy ex parte, such “that the Court deem the Company to have received 
approval from the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares” for a proposal necessary 
to maintain NASDAQ listing, since the corporation could not actually receive such 
approval, as a large fraction of its public shareholders happen to reside in Germany, where 
proxy materials cannot be adequately distributed to shareholders and received from them). 
For an ever-replenishing source of similarly unpredictable corporate law stories, see 
Columns by Matt Levine, BLOOMBERG, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/authors/ARbTQlRLRjE/matthew-s-levine (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2021). 
310 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2020). 
311 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
312 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
313 See Raz, supra note 34, at 536-39. 
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its unifying principle of consent, corporate law rests on a principle of open-
endedness. Corporate law confers power upon entities and their fiduciaries to 
embark on unpredictable adventures, nowhere prescribed ex ante, but it also 
disciplines the use of that power ex post. When we move away from the more 
extreme form of legal realism, and examine corporate law as law, we also find 
that it distinctively facilitates innovation, entrepreneurship, and other desirable 
economic and social values. 
If we accept that what the law says matters, the difference between 
corporate and contract law—specifically under the most important jurisdiction 
in this area, Delaware—cannot be ignored. Any attempt to treat corporations 
in an ex ante manner, as if they were contracts, leaves no choice but either to 
eliminate the economically beneficial freedom of action provided by corporate 
law, or to abandon its ex post remedial mechanisms, basically handing a gift to 
wrongdoing corporate actors. When deciding the question of mandatory 
arbitration in corporate law,314 the federal courts, relying on state law,315 have 
no ground for conflating these two, very distinct legal frameworks. 
 
C.      How We Use the Word “Contract” in Corporate Law: Either Metaphor or 
Error 
A contract means something. It’s the law, and it’s enforceable. 
Deal with it.316 
 
Given this Article’s bright-line argument—corporate law is not 
contract law, but an independent legal category, with its own principles, 
structure, and economic and social implications—one might justifiably 
wonder: how does this settle with the common use of the word “contract” in 
both corporate law cases and corporate academic literature? Although 
corporate charters and bylaws are never described as “contracts” in the 
Delaware statute,317 the Delaware courts do seem to be calling them that.318 
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318 See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010) 
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Similarly, the term “contract” is a mainstay of corporate law scholarship, 
especially on the law and economics side.319 
This Section proves that both of these corpuses of text are using the 
word in one of two ways: either as a metaphor,320 intended to broadly allude to 
some similarities—but certainly not an identity—between charters and 
contracts; or as a simple error, ignoring what corporate law actually says and 
does. The use of “contract” in corporate law is thus similar to its use in phrases 
such as “the social contract.”321 It is also akin to how the term “fiduciary” is 
employed in constitutional and administrative law: a useful comparison, 
informing and enriching our understanding of the legal device,322 but in no way 
one that can be used to invoke the entire structure, doctrines, and rules of 
contract (or fiduciary) law, in a manner that can be directly applied to 
corporations (or the U.S. government).323 
In Delaware cases, the word “contract” is occasionally invoked in 
connection with corporate charters and bylaws.324 Opponents of private law 
enforcement are likely to try and take advantage of this terminology in the 
upcoming mandatory arbitration debate.325 In reality, however, the Delaware 
courts are using that term in a highly qualified manner—making it so different 
from actual contract, as defined by contract law,326 that it can only be construed 
as a metaphor. The word “contract” is subordinated to the inherently non-
contractual concepts327 of equity’s primacy, broad judicial oversight, and ex post 
                                                                                                                                   
319 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3. 
320 See, e.g., Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law, 
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779 (2002). 
321 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (G. D. H. Cole trans., Prometheus 
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323 See Samuel L. Bray & Paul B. Miller, Against Fiduciary Constitutionalism, 
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325 See supra Section I.C. 
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327 On the fundamental nature of contract law as grounded in the ex ante dimension (and 
being incompatible with ex post judicial supervision of the kind prevalent in corporate law), 
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intervention. 
To see this, one need only examine several decisions cited in 
Salzberg,328 the most recent Delaware Supreme Court case on the nature of 
corporate charters and bylaws. The Salzberg court quotes a decision stating that 
“[a]t its core, the Delaware General Corporation Law is a broad enabling act 
which leaves latitude for substantial private ordering, provided the statutory 
parameters and judicially imposed principles of fiduciary duty are honored.”329 
Another decision is cited as saying that “Delaware’s corporate statute . . . leaves 
the parties . . . with great leeway to structure their relations, subject to . . . the 
policing of director misconduct through equitable review.”330 Once again: “[forum 
selection clauses should be] den[ied] enforcement . . . to the limited extent 
necessary to avoid some fundamentally inequitable result.”331 Other cases 
emphasize the same.332 
This regime of ex post judicial modification is not “contract,” and by 
definition, it cannot be.333 Instead, what the Delaware courts are talking about 
                                                                                                                                   
see ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC, 
50 A.3d 434, 440 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
328 Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020). For discussion of the case, see supra 
Section I.B. 
329 Salzberg, 227 A.3d at 116 (emphasis added) (quoting Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 
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Stockholders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 2019-0948-JRS, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 373, at *3 
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abides . . . .”); Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 664 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“An essential aspect 
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can entrust directors with broad legal authority precisely because they know that that 
authority must be exercised consistently with equitable principles . . . .”). 
333 See supra Section II.B; supra note 327. 
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is the structure of corporate law, as a self-standing legal category. They are 
essentially saying this: when a given act—by directors, officers, or any other 
person subject to the norms of corporate law—comports with the building 
blocks of corporate law (among them equity and fiduciary duty),334 we are likely 
to approve that act after-the-fact. While doing so, we will sometimes also 
mention that an “event of volition” on the part of some shareholders, or the 
corporate entity (say, a vote to amend the corporate charter), took place, if it 
did, which is not always the case. This is where we use the word “contract,” 
mainly for lack of more nuanced terminology—perhaps a long-term effect of 
legal realism’s disdain for legal concepts.335 This is the space in which the “ex 
ante corporate governance movement”336 has been operating, and should 
continue to operate. 
Even when these scattered instances of volition occur, however, they 
do not rise to the level of “consent,” and do not turn corporate law into contract 
law. If the act at issue does not align with our equitable principles—and, given 
the open-ended power which corporate law uniquely confers upon the entity 
and its fiduciaries,337 some acts will inevitably end up in that basket—we shall 
deem the act inequitable, and thus impermissible;338 any purported ex ante 
“consent” will not change this result. 
Therefore, contrary to some commentators’ well-motivated 
concerns,339 a close reading of Delaware case law does not lend support to a 
“contractarian” view of the corporation. The exact opposite is true: at every 
turn, corporate actors rely on ex post adjudication to remedy violations, deter 
misconduct, and reduce power and information asymmetries. When faced with 
the question of mandatory arbitration in corporate law, the federal courts will 
have to carefully examine these cases—the original Archimedean point from 
which corporate law emanates, and based on which the federal courts must 
determine its nature.340 Even if, occasionally, a case uses the word “contract” 
                                                                                                                                   
334 See Raz, supra note 34, at 545-46, 557-66. 
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337 See supra Section II.B. 
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without following it with a discussion of equity and ex post review,341 this does 
not detract from the many cases that do.342 Corporate law should be treated as 
a whole. A judge (and certainly a textualist judge) is not at liberty to read one 
part of the sentence—“contract”—and skip the other part—“non-contractual, 
ex post supervision, grounded in equity and in the structure of corporate law.” 
When we turn to the story of “contract” in corporate law scholarship, 
things get even more interesting. Since the 1970s, and particularly following 
Professors Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s description of the 
corporation as “a nexus for contracting relationships,”343 corporate law 
academics—especially within the dominant law and economics movement—
have been keen on using a language of “contract” when discussing innumerable, 
ever-changing topics in corporate law.344 
Yet, there is an apparent irony here: more often than not, these law 
and economics scholars belong to the shareholderist camp, advocating both 
shareholder wealth maximization (as the end) and shareholder empowerment 
(as the means) in corporate law.345 The highly influential corporate governance 
movement,346 which has expanded to global proportions,347 largely rests on 
these premises. The legal concept of contract, however, is strongly antithetical 
to advancing shareholders’ rights. 
After all, if the corporate “contract” is the corporation’s charter and 
bylaws; if contract law is an ex ante regime, where contracts are to be enforced 
according to their existing terms;348 and if directors and officers (shareholders’ 
arch-rivals under the “agency costs” theory that dominates corporate economic 
                                                                                                                                   
341 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 318. 
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scholarship)349 can both dictate the terms of charters and bylaws,350 and run 
nearly every other aspect of the corporation351—then “contract” as such cannot 
possibly be beneficial for shareholders. Mandatory arbitration, of course, 
provides the clearest example.352 To protect shareholder interests, there must 
be some framework other than contract at play, and indeed there is: corporate 
law. In practice, the leading economic works debate the merits of various non-
contractual, corporate-specific legal devices, grounded in equity, fiduciary 
duties, and legislative and judicial lawmaking to protect asymmetrically-
positioned parties.353 
How, then, can the widespread use of the phrase “contract” in 
corporate scholarly circles be explained? There are at least two plausible 
answers. First, it is likely that some law-and-economists, deeply influenced by 
the tradition of legal realism,354 do not pay sufficient attention to legal concepts 
and categories—especially when it comes to corporate law, which suffers from 
a “low-visibility problem” at the outset.355 While the substance of these authors’ 
scholarship deals with corporate law as corporate law, the language they employ 
turns to “contract.” In any case, the mere use of a word cannot override the 
legal norms and structures that define what is required to form a contract (ex 
ante consent to specific promises), and what corporate law is about (ex post 
supervision over open-ended adventures), making the two areas inherently 
differ from one another.356 
The second explanation involves an intriguing bit of history. It comes 
from new research by Professor David Gindis.357 As Gindis reveals, Jensen and 
Meckling chose to highlight the term “contract” in their 1976 article358 as a 
                                                                                                                                   
349 See, e.g., Heaton, supra note 31. 
350 See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text. 
351 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2020) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors . . . .”). 
352 See supra Section I.C. 
353 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 242-44. 
354 See Smith, supra note 4, at 46-48. 
355 See supra text accompanying notes 26-36. 
356 See supra Section II.B. 
357 David Gindis, On the Origins, Meaning and Influence of Jensen and Meckling’s Definition of 
the Firm, 72 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 966 (2020). 
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response to a broader social and political controversy going on at the time. That 
debate concerned the proper role of corporations in society: should they only 
serve shareholder interests, or should they operate in the benefit of other 
stakeholders, including employees and consumers.359 This is the same topic 
that has resurfaced over the last couple of years.360 In the vocabulary of the 
1970s, Jensen and Meckling believed that stressing a “contractual” view of the 
firm, as opposed to it being a creature of the state, would support the 
shareholderist argument.361 
Today, however, we know that this particular dispute—between the 
lawful pursuit of wealth and stakeholder orientation—lies on a separate axis 
from the debate concerning the rights and duties of the corporate entity, its 
shareholders, and its fiduciaries vis-à-vis one another. Put simply, there is no 
need to invoke the word “contract” to defend a lawful profit-seeking view of 
the corporation.362 More accurately, Jensen and Meckling (just like present-
day law and economics scholars) could have said that the corporation is a 
creature of private law—which includes, in addition to contract, the fields of 
property, tort, and corporate law, among others.363 In each of these, the actors 
are private. The state serves in a legislative and adjudicative capacity, but is not 
itself a party (a right-and-duty bearer) within the private law relationship.364 
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as the contractarians. The former tend to underappreciate the effect of general 
incorporation, see supra note 291. That reform has modified the state’s role in corporate law, 
from a right-and-duty bearing actor to a law-making and law-enforcing one—just as it is in 
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To meaningfully create and enforce certain rights—including those of the 
shareholders Jensen and Meckling sought to defend—the legal (and economic) 
framework must differ from contract.365 
Given that Jensen and Meckling came from a background of 
economic, not legal, scholarship (combined with the influence of legal realism, 
discussed above), there was scant chance they would take this simple, but 
profound, step. They settled for “contract,” intending to address a completely 
different problem from the present one, in which pro-arbitration advocates will 
seek to leverage a misconstrued “contract” terminology to collapse corporate 
law’s enforceability, allowing disloyal actors to place themselves beyond the 
reach of legal remedy.366 This is a far cry from what law-and-economists, from 
Jensen and Meckling to the present day, have been aiming for. 
When the question of mandatory arbitration in corporate law reaches 
the federal courts in full force, in addition to the substantive and functional 
inquiry offered in Section II.B, they should remain mindful of this Section’s 
linguistic analysis—demonstrating the exceptionally qualified, metaphorical, 
and historically circumscribed way in which both state courts, and members of 




A storm is brewing on the corporate law horizon. A series of recent 
events, which this Article ties together for the first time—namely, the Johnson 
& Johnson case pending in federal court, and the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
recent Salzberg decision—raise the possibility that, in the near future, large 
swaths of U.S. corporate law would become unenforceable, placed beyond the 
reach of any court or other remedial mechanism. 
This would happen if the federal courts—possibly as high as the 
Supreme Court—choose to authorize the enforcement of mandatory 
arbitration clauses in corporate charters and bylaws. Such provisions would 
then be unilaterally imposed by corporate directors and officers—the very same 
people whom litigation in open court is meant to supervise—and, due to the 
Supreme Court’s expansive arbitration jurisprudence, would eliminate any 
chance for corporations and shareholders to challenge both the arbitration 
                                                                                                                                   
other areas of private law. The content of each private law framework (contract, property, 
corporate, and so on) is different, but the state’s role is similar. 
365 See supra Section II.B. 
366 See supra Section I.C. 
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clause itself, and any act of misconduct by directors, officers, and other 
corporate law actors, however egregious or harmful. 
Although it is likely that not all corporations will become subject to 
mandatory arbitration, the corporations most likely to suffer from such justice-
impeding provisions are the ones where wrongdoing is more likely to occur in 
the first place. In practice, such arbitration terms are precisely equivalent to a 
waiver of all fiduciary and equitable duties within the corporate relationship—
a waiver which Delaware law has long prohibited, even outside of the 
arbitration context. Part I describes in detail this new trajectory U.S. corporate 
law might soon embark on. 
Will mandatory arbitration in corporate law actually happen? 
According to the Federal Arbitration Act itself, and ample precedent from the 
Supreme Court, this troubling move hinges upon one preliminary finding: that 
corporate charters and bylaws are “contracts.” As this Article explains in Part 
II, such a determination cannot be made consistent with law. Under the 
influence of legal realism, scholars have long been reluctant to discuss the legal 
structure of corporate law, and the boundary separating it from other 
frameworks, most importantly, contract law. As this Article originally 
demonstrates, if we bring corporate law in line with the newest private law 
scholarship, while taking a moment to consider corporate law as law, we find 
that corporate law is not merely different, but in some respects the opposite of 
contract law. 
Just like other areas of private law, including contract and property, 
have an underlying theme, corporate law has its open-endedness principle: it is 
about what happens after-the-fact. Corporate law generates extremely little 
information ex ante, and vests the corporate entity with the power to go on 
unpredictable adventures (think Google or SpaceX), premised on the concepts 
of corporate personhood, the “any lawful act or activity” statutory language, 
perpetual existence, and the business judgment rule—all of them unique 
creatures of corporate law, not encountered in any other framework, least of all 
contract. 
While contract law is about promises made before-the-fact, and 
enforceable according to their pre-defined terms, corporate law disciplines its 
actors through ex post devices: the law of corporate purpose, equitable 
remedies, and fiduciary duties. Corporate law’s non-contractual nature thus 
encourages innovation, entrepreneurship, and risk-taking, while keeping 
corporations and their fiduciaries within enforceable legal constraints. The 
majority of corporate law cases are variations on this basic theme: freedom of 
action, combined with ex post enforcement to remedy and deter wrongdoing. 
What corporations can do is open-ended and permissive; corporate law itself is 
not. If there is anything remotely approaching an act of “consent” by 
corporations and shareholders, it is to enter the structure of corporate law, where 
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they are protected by these non-contractual devices. 
This Article has shown that the Realist-inspired “contract” metaphor 
cannot substitute for a serious, methodical analysis of what corporate law is, 
what makes it distinct from other legal frameworks, and how its unique 
building blocks support economic progress and innovation in modern society. 
Facing the specter of mandatory arbitration, even economically-minded 
scholars should pay attention to the legal taxonomies upon which the future of 
corporate governance hinges. Following the developments examined in this 
Article, federal courts will soon be asked to decide whether to allow corporate 
law actors to place themselves beyond the reach of enforceable law, through 
the use of mandatory arbitration clauses. According to the Federal Arbitration 
Act and the Supreme Court’s precedents—combined with the diverging, 
almost polar, concepts of corporation and contract under state law—there is no 
basis for doing so. If we accept that it is possible for some legal concepts to not 
be contracts (which even the most market-oriented lawmakers and scholars 
would admit), then corporate law, and the instruments it gives rise to—
corporate charters and bylaws—top that list. 
 
 
 
